Online Platforms, Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the Gap by Akman, P
This is a repository copy of Online Platforms, Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the Gap.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/148590/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Akman, P orcid.org/0000-0001-5796-8598 (Accepted: 2019) Online Platforms, Agency, 
and Competition Law: Mind the Gap. Fordham International Law Journal, 43. ISSN 
0747-9395 (In Press) 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
ONLINE PLATFORMS, AGENCY, AND COMPETITION LAW: MIND THE GAP 
PINAR AKMAN 
(FORTHCOMING) 43 FORDHAM INT¶L L.J. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many RIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWYDOXDEOHFRPSDQLHVadopt the online platform business model to 
bring together different groups of customers ± suppliers and customers ± seeking to transact 
with one another. This article aims to establish the correct legal characterisation of these 
platforms and the implications thereof for competition law purposes. To do so, it explores 
two related questions: first, whether platforms are agents of their suppliers; and, second, 
whether the competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements should apply to 
agreements between platforms and suppliers, which restrict competition on the relevant 
market for the products/services regarding which the platform facilitates a transaction. The 
first question arises because the platform business model resembles an agency arrangement 
more than any other, and many platforms self-proclaim to be agents of their suppliers. Yet, 
the decisional practice and commentary have developed on the premise that they are not 
agents. The second question arises due to the ³agency rule´ under the ³single economic 
entity doctrine´, according to which restrictive agreements between an agent and a principal 
take place within the same ³undertaking´ and are consequently immune from the 
competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements between separate undertakings. 
After applying concepts of agency and similar delegation models found in different areas of 
law to the standard contracts of six major platforms ± Amazon Marketplace, Apple App 
Store, Uber, eBay, Booking.com, and, Airbnb ± this article finds that, as a matter of positive 
law, all of these platforms are agents of their suppliers. Consequently, SODWIRUPV¶ 
agreements with their suppliers that restrict competition on the relevant products/services 
market cannot be scrutinised due to the agency rule under the ³single economic entity 
doctrine´ as currently conceived. This represents a significant ³platform gap´ in the 
application of competition law in digital markets. Following these findings, the article 
conducts a normative assessment to demonstrate that in the context of platforms that not 
only intermediate transactions for, but also compete with their suppliers on the relevant 
market, the ³single economic entity doctrine´ should be (re)interpreted. The ³agency rule´ 
should not apply to agreements of such platforms and suppliers that contain restrictions of 
competition on the relevant market. This is because the conflict of commercial and 
competitive interests between a ³principal´ (supplier) and an ³agent´ (platform) that 
competes with its principal fundamentally violates the principles of agency and the 
reasoning underlying the single economic entity doctrine. The article develops a 
³competitive neutrality´ principle to inform and underlie this proposed (re)interpretation of 
the ³single economic entity doctrine´. This (re)interpretation fills the ³platform gap´ 
identified in the article by subjecting the agreements of platforms that are not in a 
competitively neutral position with regard to their suppliers to the full application of the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements. 
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I. Introduction 
0DQ\RIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWYDOXDEOHFRPSDQLHVVXFKDV$PD]RQDQG$SSOHFRQGXFWPXFK
of their business using the ³platform´ model. A ³platform´, for the purposes of this article, 
can be defined as an online marketplace which ³provides a discrete set of services to the 
parties using it, facilitating their efforts to transact effectively and efficiently, including 
searching for potential transacting partners, agreeing to terms with them, and performing the 
contract´.1 This is a factual definition of a platform based on what a platform does in 
                                            
1
 Federal Trade &RPP¶Q (F.T.C.) Staff Report, 7KH ³6KDULQJ´ (FRQRP\ ,VVXHV )DFLQJ 3ODWIRUPV
Participants & Regulators, Nov. 2016, 3 available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-
regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf. 
Although the F.T.C. 5HSRUW¶VGHILQLWLRQKDVEHHQRIIHUHG in the context of the sharing economy, it is broad 
HQRXJKWRFRYHUSODWIRUPVRIDOOW\SHVWKDWDUHUHOHYDQWWRWKLVDUWLFOH¶VLQTXLU\(YDQVDQG6FKDPHOHQVHHDSWO\
GHILQH ZKDW SODWIRUPV GR DV ³PDWFKPDNLQJ´ EHFDXVH SODWIRUPV RSHUDWH SK\VLFDO RU YLUWXDO SODces where 
members of different groups of customers are brought together; DAVID S. EVANS AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, 
MATCHMAKERS 1-2 (2016). As such platforms bring together different groups of customers together, they 
operate as two-sided or multi-sided businesses. For a technical, economic model of the two-sided platform 
business and platform competition, see the seminal paper by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform 
Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1(4) J. EUR. ECON. ASS¶N 990 (2003). 
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bringing together suppliers and customers who would like to transact with one another. 
Although this definition is useful for conceptual delineation and for distinguishing between 
different types of online commercial enterprises, it is not a legal definition of what a platform 
is. The question of what a platform is and the implications of this characterisation for legal 
purposes ± and in particular, for EU competition law purposes ± are the focus of this article. 
Platforms that operate in digital markets raise two fundamental questions regarding 
their legal characterisation for the purposes of this article: first, whether platforms are 
³agents´ of the suppliers for whom the platforms enable transactions with customers; and, 
second, how the scope of the competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements  
should be drawn in relation to agreements between platforms and suppliers, which restrict 
competition on the market for the products/services, for which the platform facilitates a 
transaction between a supplier and a customer (hereafter, the ³relevant market´).2 These 
questions arise out of the fact that the platform business model, in the way that it functions 
through the facilitation of contracts between suppliers and customers, displays the qualities 
of an agency relationship more than any other commercial arrangement. In fact, many of the 
platforms self-proclaim to be agents of their suppliers in their agreements with them and 
with customers. Further, agreements between platforms and suppliers can contain clauses 
which restrict competition in relation to price, quantity, availability, etc. of the 
products/services supplied to customers on the relevant market. Yet, Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (hereafter, ³Article 101´) which 
prohibits anticompetitive agreements, concerted practices and decisions of association of 
undertakings, which have the object or effect of restricting, distorting or preventing 
competition within the internal market, does not apply to agreements between principals and 
agents where such an agreement restricts, distorts or prevents competition on the relevant 
                                            
2
 This article GRHVQRWSXUVXHDQLQTXLU\DVWRZKHWKHUSODWIRUPVDUHDOVRDJHQWVRIWKH³FXVWRPHUV´EX\HUV
ZKRHQWHULQWRWUDQVDFWLRQVZLWKWKHVXSSOLHUVRQWKHSODWIRUPWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWVXFKFXVWRPHUVDUH³FRQVXPHUV´
(i.e. end users). This is because for competition law to apply to an agreement/practice at all, both of the parties 
WRWKHDJUHHPHQWKDYHWREH³XQGHUWDNLQJV´)RUWKHFRPSHWLWLRQODZGHILQLWLRQRIXQGHUWDNLQJsee infra text 
around note 113. Similarly, such an inquiry requires examination of the particular formation details of the 
contract facilitated by the platform under the relevant contract law, which goes beyond the scope of this article. 
WherHWKHEX\HUVRQWKHSODWIRUPDUHDOVR³XQGHUWDNLQJV´QDPHO\WKHSODWIRUPIDFLOLWDWHVEXVLQHVV-to-business 
transactions (and the contract is formed, indeed, in such a way that the platform acts as an agent for both parties 
to the contract), the legal assessment of the relationship between the platform and the supplier should equally 
apply to the assessment of the relationship between the platform and the buyer. However, where the platform 
is found to be an agent for both of these parties, one pertinent question will be whether the platform can act 
for two parties with conflicting interests in a given transaction. For the legal position on this under the common 
law, see infra note 48. 
4 
 
market.3 This stems from the doctrine according to which Article 101 does not apply to 
agreements between two or more legal persons that form a ³single economic entity´ (e.g. an 
agent and a principal) since the application of the provision requires an agreement between 
separate undertakings.4 The implication of finding platforms to be agents of their suppliers 
and thus, part of the same ³single economic entity´ as their suppliers is that anticompetitive 
agreements between a platform and suppliers would fall outside the scope of, and cannot be 
scrutinised by, EU competition law, and any other competition law system modelled 
thereon. The same goes for all jurisdictions whose competition law includes a similar 
doctrine that prevents the application of competition law to agreements between a principal 
and an agent.5 This is a matter of scope of application. Further, in the EU, under Regulation 
1/2003, EU Member States are obliged not to prohibit agreements and concerted practices 
by their national competition laws if the same practice is not prohibited in EU competition 
law provided that there is an ³effect on trade between Member States´.6 This obligation is 
                                            
3
 $OWKRXJKRFFDVLRQDOO\UHIHUHQFHLVPDGHWR³JHQXLQHDJHQWV´UHJDUGLQJWKLVOLPLWDWLRQRIVFRSHLQFRPSHWLWLRQ
ODZD³JHQXLQH´DJHQWLVVLPSO\DQDJHQWZKRVDWLVILHVWKHcriteria for agency as provided for by competition 
law. Therefore, it does not further the inquiry beyond distinguishing agents from entities that are not agents 
EXWPD\DSSHDUDVVXFKDQGZLOOQRWEHXVHGDVDWHUPRIVLJQLILFDQFHLQWKLVDUWLFOH2Q³JHQXLQH´vs. ³VKDP´
agents, see, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964) where the U.S. Supreme Court clarified 
that it is the substance of the relationship between two entities and not its form or description that determines 
antitrust liability. 
4
 On the case law establishing the doctrine, see, e.g., Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV and Adnaan De Peijper v. 
Sterling Drug Inc., ECLI:EU:C:1974:114, ¶ 41; Case 22/71,  Béguelin Import v. GL Import Export, 
ECLI:EU:C:1971:113, ¶  8; Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v. Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:225, ¶ 19; Case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe VB v. &RPP¶Q ECLI:EU:C:1996:405, ¶ 16. On 
the single economic entity doctrine, see, in general, Okeoghene Odudu and David Bailey, The Single Economic 
Entity Doctrine in EU Competition Law, 51 C.M.L.R. 1721 (2014). See also the discussion in EINER ELHAUGE 
AND DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 814-816 (2d ed. 2011) and the case law 
cited therein. 
5
 7KLVLQFOXGHVIRUH[DPSOHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZKHUHWKH³LQWUD-HQWHUSULVHFRQVSLUDF\´GRFWULQHFDQH[FOXGH
the possibility of liability for infringement of Sherman Act, Section 1 (equivalent to Article 101) where there 
is an agreement between a principal and an agent, and the agreement does not deprive the market of actual or 
potential competition; see, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 197 (2010). For 
WKH³LQWUD-HQWHUSULVHFRQVSLUDF\´GRFWULQHsee, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
771 (1984) and American Needle, id., at 192 et seq. See also U.S. v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) 
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance does not apply 
in a case where there is a genuine relationship of principal and agent. In contrast, for example, Swiss 
competition law does not contain any provisions that would exclude the application of the prohibition of 
anticompetitive agreements to those agreements between principals and agents; see, Swiss Competition 
&RPP¶Q (COMCO), Online-Booking Platforms for Hotels, Oct. 10, 2016, at ¶ 97. 
6
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
DQGRIWKH7UHDW\2-/$UWLFOHVWLSXODWHVWKDW³>W@KHDSSOLFDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQ
law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States but which do not restrict competition within the 
meaning of Article [101](1) of the Treaty, or which fulfil the conditions of Article [101] (3) of the Treaty or 
which are covered by a RegulaWLRQIRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOH«´$VWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUSODWIRUPVDUH
agents is a question of scope in determining whether Article 101(1) applies to an agreement at all, where EU 
competition law would find a lack of applicability due to the single economic entity doctrine, argumentum a 
fortiori, there cannot be a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1). Thus, Member States 
cannot find an infringement under those circumstances, either, where there is an effect on trade between 
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likely to apply to the agreements of some of the largest platforms such as Amazon, $SSOH¶V
App Store, Uber, Booking.com, etc., which have global operations. Consequently, this 
inquiry into scope of application has significant implications for applying competition law 
in digital markets, and in particular for e-commerce, given the ubiquity of the platform 
model in these markets. Thus, the agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine can 
immunise a large part of the business model of these undertakings from the application of 
EU competition law, as well as Member State competition laws depending on the legal 
characterisation of platforms under the single economic entity doctrine. There is, therefore, 
potentially a significant ³platform gap´ in the application of competition law in digital 
markets. An exploration and critical analysis of this ³SODWIRUPgap´, and how it may be filled, 
if necessary, is what this article aims to conduct. 
The overall research question of this article concerns the correct scope of application 
of competition law to agreements between a platform and its suppliers, which restrict 
competition on the relevant market. To that end, the article first conducts a positive 
assessment of the law in order to explore whether platforms are agents of the suppliers on 
the platform. After an exploration of the concepts of agency found in different areas of law 
including competition law, this article answers that question in the affirmative, and posits 
that as the law stands, platforms are, indeed, the agents of their suppliers. This is the first 
contribution of this article. The implication of this finding is that because platforms are 
agents, under the single economic entity doctrine, their agreements with their suppliers 
which restrict, distort or prevent competition on the relevant market cannot be scrutinised 
by Article 101. $VWKLV³LPPXQLW\´IURPFRPSHWLWLRQODZPHDQVWKDWpotentially substantial 
restrictions of competition in digital markets fall outside the scope of the competition law 
prohibition that aims at scrutinising such restrictions, an assessment of the appropriateness 
RI WKLV ³LPPXQLW\´ EHFRPHV QHFHVVDU\ Subsequently, this article conducts a normative 
assessment to explore whether, and if so how, the single economic entity doctrine and the 
agency rule thereunder should be (re)interpreted to apply to the agreements of these 
platforms with their suppliers. This article identifies the common thread between the general 
principles of agency and the single economic entity doctrine to be that of an alignment of 
                                            
Member States and Regulation 1 is applicable. This author has argued elsewhere in this context that the German 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) proceedings concerning the most-favoured-customer clauses of 
certain online travel agents were possibly, as a result of this provision, in violation of Regulation 1/2003, due 
to their prohibition of an agreement which would not have been prohibited under Article 101 were the single 
economic entity doctrine correctly applied as per the EU competition rules; see, 3ÕQDU$NPDQA Competition 
Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses, 12(4) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 781, 806 
(2016). 
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commercial and competitive interests between the principal and the agent. Consequently, 
the article posits that there is one particular scenario in which the single economic entity 
doctrine should be (re)interpreted in order to include within the scope of Article 101 those 
restrictive agreements between platforms and suppliers that currently fall outside of its scope 
of application: where the platform in question competes with the suppliers on the relevant 
market. The proposed (re)interpretation is based on the premise that in such circumstances 
where the platform competes with suppliers, there is a conflict of commercial and 
competitive interests between the agent (platform) and the principal (supplier) which goes 
fundamentally against the principles of agency and the reasoning underlying the single 
economic entity doctrine. The article advances this proposed (re)interpretation of the single 
economic entity doctrine based on a concept of ³competitive neutrality´, which it develops.7 
This proposal to (re)interpret the single economic entity doctrine for the agreements of 
platforms that compete with their suppliers using the concept of ³competitive neutrality´ is 
the second contribution of this article. With this (re)interpretation, this article fills the 
³platform gap´ by making the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, which is currently 
inapplicable, applicable to those restrictive agreements of platforms and suppliers to the 
extent that the platform competes with the suppliers on the relevant market. 
This DVVHVVPHQWRISODWIRUPV¶OHJDOFharacterisation and how competition law does 
and should apply to their agreements with their suppliers is fundamental to correctly 
assessing the business practices of major platforms such as Amazon, Apple App Store, 
Booking.com, Uber and others, some of which have already been scrutinised by competition 
authorities around the world for their various agreements. The literature and decisional 
practice thus far have either proceeded on the premise that these platforms are not agents of 
their suppliers or have not engaged with this legal question at all.8 The EU Courts have not 
                                            
7
 7KHFRQFHSWRI³FRPSHWLWLYHQHXWUDOLW\´LVWUDGLWLRQDOO\XVHGWRUHIHUWRWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWVWDWH-owned and 
private businesses compete on a level playing field; see, OECD, Achieving Competitive Neutrality, available 
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/achievingcompetitiveneutrality.htm (accessed on Mar. 6, 2019). The current 
DUWLFOH¶VFRQFHSWRI³FRPSHWLWLYHQHXWUDOLW\´LVVLPLODULQVXEVWDQFHWRWKHWUDGLWLRQDOXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWEXW
transposes that concept to the context of competition between private businesses. The proposal is one of 
(re)interpreting the single economic entity doctrine because the doctrine has not yet been interpreted by the 
EU Courts in the context of platforms, although it has been interpreted in the context of other agency 
agreements.  
8
 See, e.g., OECD Report, Vertical Restraints for On-Line Sales, (DAF/COMP(2013)13) 30 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/VerticalRestraintsForOnlineSales2013.pdf (accessed on Mar. 18, 2019). 
There is no explicit discussion of agency in the context of the single economic entity doctrine/intra-enterprise 
conspiracy doctrine in any of the following decisions: Case COMP/39.847/E-%RRNV (XURSHDQ &RPP¶Q
Decision, C(2013) 4750, 25/7/2013; Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Hotel online booking: Decision to accept 
commitments to remove certain discounting restrictions for Online Travel Agents Booking/Expedia/IHG 
(OFT1514dec) 2014; Swedish Competition Authority Decision, Ref. No. 596/2013, Bookingdotcom Sverige 
AB, (Apr. 15, 2015); Bundeskartellamt, Meistbegünstigstenklauseln bei Booking.com, 9th Decision Division, 
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yet had to deal with this particular legal issue, but given the prevalence of the platform model 
and the ongoing scrutiny of platforms by the EU Commission and national competition 
authorities, it is highly likely that they soon will need to determine the application of the 
single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule to restrictive agreements between 
platforms and their suppliers.9 This author has argued elsewhere that, in particular, the 
various competition authority proceedings in Europe concerning most-favoured-customer 
clauses adopted by certain platforms in their agreements with their suppliers have proceeded 
on the erroneous basis that these platforms are not agents of the suppliers.10 The current 
article takes this work further by investigating the publicly available terms and conditions 
of the relevant standard contracts of six major platforms operating in different business 
sectors ± Amazon Marketplace, eBay, Apple App Store, Uber, Airbnb, and Booking.com. 
This is done with a view to attaining a robust understanding of the operation of the platform 
business model in relation to agreements between platforms and suppliers. The current 
article is not concerned with the examination of a particular type of contractual clause, but 
                                            
B 9-121/13, 22/122015; U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Apple, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015); cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). The following decisions discuss it, but rule it out: Bundeskartellamt, HRS-Hotel 
Reservation Service, 9th Decision Division, B 9 ± 66/10, Dec. 20, 2013; COMCO Online Booking, supra note 
5. Notably, these decisions relate to more or less identical conduct by similarly-situated/identical platforms 
and apply similar/identical legal provisions, so it is curious that some authorities have engaged with the issue 
whilst others have not. For rare examples of academic commentary considering the possibility that platforms 
and suppliers may be part of the same economic entity for the purposes of competition law, all of which discuss 
the question in the context of sharing economy platforms, see, Mark Anderson and Max Huffman, The Sharing 
Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, A Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 (3) COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 860; Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, Uber in Europe: Are There Still Judges in 
Luxembourg?, COMPETITION POL¶Y INT¶L ANTITRUST CHRON. 6  (May 2018); Julian Nowag, When sharing 
SODWIRUPVIL[VHOOHUV¶SULFHV, 6 (3) J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 382 (2018); Niamh Dunne, Competition Law 
(and its Limits) in the Sharing Economy, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LAW AND REGULATION OF THE 
SHARING ECONOMY 91 (Nestor M. Davidson, Michèle Finck and John J. Infranca eds., 2018). Discussing the 
issue more generally in the context of platforms, but arguing that it is difficult to find platforms to be agents, 
see Andrei Gruin and Luc Peeperkorn, Vertical Agreements, in THE EU LAW OF COMPETITION ¶ 9.01, ¶ 9.58 
(Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay eds., 2014).  
9
 Other than an E-commerce Sector Inquiry (2015-2017), in the last few years, the EU &RPP¶Q has pursued 
investigations and reached infringement decisions in relation to Google Search (AdSense) (AT.40411, Mar. 
20, 2019); Google Android (AT.40099, Jul. 18, 2018); Google Search (Shopping) (AT.39740, June 27, 2017); 
Apple (State Aid) (SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP), Aug. 30, 2016); online vertical restraints 
of electronics manufacturers (Asus (AT. 40465); Denon & Marantz (AT. 40469); Philips (AT.40181); Pioneer 
(AT. 40182) (July 24, 2018)). It also adopted commitment decisions in relation to e-books, Amazon MFNs 
and other matters (AT.40153, May 4, 2017); E-Books, supra note 8; etc. The Final Report of the E-commerce 
Sector Inquiry (COM(2017) 229 final) can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf (accessed on Mar. 18, 2019). 
Most recently, it has been reported that the EU &RPP¶Q LVWRODXQFKDIRUPDOFRPSHWLWLRQLQTXLU\LQWR$SSOH¶V
position in relation to Apple App Store following a complaint by Spotify alleging that Apple App Store abuses 
its dominant position to favour Apple Music over rivals such as Spotify; see Rochelle Toplensky, Brussels 
SRLVHGWRSUREH$SSOHRYHU6SRWLI\¶VIHHVFRPSODLQW, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 6, 2019. 
10
 See Akman, supra note 6, 805 et seq. The author argued therein that proceedings and decisions against, for 
example, Booking.com should not have been pursued on the basis of Article 101, but on the basis of Article 
102 TFEU which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position because Booking.com is the agent of the hotels 
and their agreements fall outside the scope of Article 101.  
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with the legal characterisation of platforms in their dealings with their suppliers and third 
parties, and its findings have implications for all clauses of agreements between platforms 
and suppliers, which restrict, distort or prevent competition on the relevant market. Other 
than most-favoured-customer clauses, examples of such contract clauses which would fall 
outside the scope of Article 101 (and equivalent provisions), if platforms are agents of 
suppliers, include many vertical restraints11 such as restrictions on pricing, including the 
fixing of the price;12 discounting restrictions;13 non-discrimination clauses;14 restrictions on 
output, and imposition of supply conditions; as well as any such restrictions imposed by the 
platform on the supplier or vice versa in relation to the transaction facilitated by the platform 
between the supplier and third parties (i.e. customers).15  
The findings of this article are timely and important in several aspects. First, the EU 
rules applicable to vertical restraints, which cover agreements between agents and their 
principals, are due to expire in 2022, and the current review period presents prime 
opportunity to revisit the agency rule in the context of platforms.16 The Commission has, 
                                            
11
 $ ³YHUWLFDO DJUHHPHQW´ LV DQ DJUHHPHQW HQWHUHG into between two or more undertakings each of which 
operates, for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production/distribution chain, and relating 
to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services; &RPP¶Q 
Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (VBER), 2010 
2-/$³YHUWLFDOUHVWUDLQW´LVDUHVWULFWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQIRXQGLQDYHUWLFDODJUHHPHQWid. 
12
 For a case in the United States which dismissed a claim against twelve major hotel chains and nine online 
travel agents on the basis that, inter alia, the liability arising out of a resale price maintenance agreement cannot 
be made out because the agency defence has not been overcome, see In Re Online Travel Company (OTC) 
Hotel Booking Antitrust Litigation, Case 3:12-cv-03515-B (U.S. D.C. Northern District of Texas, 2014). The 
DXWKRU KDV QRW XVHG WKH WHUP ³UHVDOH SULFH PDLQWHQDQFH´ LQ WKH WH[W FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR WKLV IRRWQRWH VLQFH
WHFKQLFDOO\LIWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\LQTXHVWLRQLVDQDJHQWWKHUHLVQR³UHVDOH´EXWRQO\D³VDOH´EHFDXVHDQ\³VDOH´
is being made on behalf of/for the principal by the agent). In the context of a platform (e.g. Uber) setting the 
price for suppliers on the platform and the competition law treatment of this, see Nowag, supra note 8. 
13
 See, e.g., Booking/Expedia/IHG, supra note 8; ACCC v. Flight Centre [2016] HCA 49 (Austl.). 
14
 For a non-discrimination clause in the shape of an anti-steering provision, see Ohio et al. v. American 
Express Co. et al., 585 U. S. ____ (2018) where the vertical restraint imposed by Amex on merchants required 
them not to discriminate against purchases made using an Amex card through the steering of customers to use 
other cards. 
15
 This author has argued elsewhere that the source and direction of the competitive restraint being imposed 
(i.e. whether it is the putative agent or the principal imposing the restriction on the other) is not relevant to 
establishing the nature of the relationship between the two parties (i.e. the existence or absence of agency) 
since the assessment of the restraint in question only becomes possible if the relationship is identified not to 
be one of agency; Akman, supra note 6, 807. Thus, it is irrelevant to the legal assessment of agency whether 
it is the platform that is imposing the restraint on the supplier or vice versa. This position is in contrast to the 
Bundeskartellamt decision in HRS where because the restriction in question was imposed by the platform on 
the supplier rather than the other way around, the platform was found not to be the agent of the supplier; see 
HRS, supra note 8, ¶ 147. Same goes for Online Booking, supra note 5, ¶ 99 where the Swiss COMCO noted 
that the contractual clauses at issue ± most-favoured-customer clauses ± ZHUH³FOHDUO\DWRGGVZLWKWKHSULPDF\
RISULQFLSDO´ZKLFKZDVDIDFWRUMXVWLI\LQJWKe finding that the relationship was not one of agency. Again, the 
nature of the imposed restraint should not matter for the legal characterisation of the arrangement, which is 
independent of the types of restrictions that such an arrangement may ensue. 
16
 The EU VBER, supra note 11, came into force on June 1, 2010 and is due to expire on May 31, 2022. The 
VBER exempts vertical agreements that satisfy certain criteria from the application of the prohibition of Article 
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indeed, already emphasised the importance of online sales and the emergence of new market 
players such as platforms as factors that need to be taken into consideration regarding the 
future legislative steps that it will take.17 Second, there is growing concern and litigation 
around the world in relation to how competition law should apply to platforms that compete 
with their suppliers on the platform in the relevant market.18 Third, there is a real possibility 
that different areas of law (most notably, agency, employment, tax, and, competition law) 
and different jurisdictions may develop contradictory approaches to the legal 
characterisation of platforms with the consequence of diminishing legal and business 
certainty, as well as threatening the internal coherence of the legal system. Given the 
significance of the digital economy and its increasing share in commerce and economic 
growth, such an outcome should be avoided to the extent possible. Unfortunately, such 
divergence can already be observed, leading to undesirable fragmentation of the legal 
treatment of such platforms. For example, in the context of free movement, the Court of 
                                            
101(1) through the mechanism of Article 101(3) without the need for individual assessment of agreements. 
Namely, those agreements which satisfy the criteria of VBER are assumed to fall within the scope of the 
exception rule found in Article 101(3). At the time of writing, the &RPP¶Q is reviewing the VBER to decide 
the course of action to take in relation to the Regulation. The &RPP¶Q can decide to prolong the duration of 
the existing VBER or revise it or allow it to lapse; see &RPP¶Q Consultation Strategy for the Evaluation of 
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/ 
2018_vber/consultation_strategy.pdf (accessed Mar. 11, 2019). 
17
 See &RPP¶Q Consultation Strategy, supra note 16. 
18
 See, e.g., EU Comm¶r for Competition Vestager on starting an informal probe into Amazon on the basis of 
FRQFHUQVWKDW$PD]RQ¶VGXDOUROHDVDFRPSHWLWRUZKLOHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DFWLQJDVKRVWWRWKLUG-party merchants 
in relation to Amazon Marketplace; EU: Vestager opens probe into Amazon, COMPETITION POL¶Y INT¶L, Sept. 
19, 2018 available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/eu-vestager-opens-probe-into-amazon-
use-of-data-about-merchants/ (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). Soon after the Comm¶U¶V VWDWHPHQW WKH
Bundeskartellamt opened abuse of dominance proceedings against Amazon in relation to the same concerns 
regarding Amazon Marketplace; Press Release, Bundeskartellamt initiates abuse proceeding against Amazon, 
(Nov. 29, 2018) available at 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/29_11_2018_Verfahre
nseinleitung_Amazon.html (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). In the United States, Senator Elizabeth Warren has 
expressed a similar view in relation to platforms participating as sellers on their own platforms in a call to 
break up some technology companies; see Colin Lecher, Elizabeth Warren says she wants to break up Amazon, 
Google, and Facebook: A proposal to unwind Big Tech, (Mar. 8, 2019 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/8/18256032/elizabeth-warren-antitrust-google-amazon-facebook-break-up 
(accessed Mar. 18, 2019) and Nilay Patel, Elizabeth Warren Wants to Break Up Apple, too, (Mar. 9, 2019) 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust 
(accessed Mar. 18, 2019). Spotify, a competitor of Apple, has recently lodged a complaint to the EU &RPP¶Q 
WKDW$SSOHLVLQIULQJLQJWKHFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHVWKURXJKLWVUROHLQ$SS6WRUHE\³HVVHQWLDOO\DFWLQJ as both a 
player and referee to GHOLEHUDWHO\GLVDGYDQWDJHRWKHUDSSGHYHORSHUV´https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-03-
13/consumers-and-innovators-win-on-a-level-playing-field/ (accessed Mar. 13, 2019). See, supra note 9 
indicating that the EU &RPP¶Q may, indeed, launch an investigation into this alleged practice by Apple. On 
the suggestion of structural separation for platforms, see also Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and 
Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2019). For a critique of the proposal that platforms should not 
be allowed to sell their own goods alongside third-SDUW\ VHOOHUV¶ JRRGV, and why the proposal might hurt 
consumers and labour, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 7KH:DUUHQ&DPSDLJQ¶V$QWLWUXVW3URSRVDOV, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper No 19-14, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353716.  
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Justice of the European Union (CoJ) held that Uber is a transport service provider (and not 
an information society services provider).19 In the UK, there is growing employment 
jurisprudence concerning Uber ± currently at the Supreme Court ± finding Uber to be an 
employer of the drivers who are its workers.20 These two legal findings put together would 
mean that agreements between Uber and its drivers, which may restrict competition on the 
market for services provided to customers (i.e. riders) through, for example, fixing of the 
fares, are completely immunised from competition law scrutiny. This is because the 
competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements is not applicable to agreements 
between employers and employees under the single economic entity doctrine, in similar 
fashion to agreements between agents and principals.21 Yet, it is conceivable that a national 
competition authority or court may find drivers on a platform such as Uber or sellers on a 
platform such as Amazon Marketplace to be competing undertakings and the platform a 
                                            
19
 Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:981, ¶ 40. 
,Q FRQWUDVW IRU H[DPSOH WKH86)7&QRWHV WKDW VXFKSODWIRUPV DUHRIWHQ UHIHUUHG WR DV ³WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
QHWZRUNFRPSDQLHV´)7&5HSRUW supra note 1, 13. In Uber Spain, the CoJ held that the intermediation 
VHUYLFHZKLFK8EHUSURYLGHGZDVDQ³LQWHJUDOSDUWRIDQRYHUDOOVHUYLFHZKRVHPDLQFRPSRQHQWLVDWUDQVSRUW
VHUYLFHDQGDFFRUGLQJO\PXVWEHFODVVLILHGQRWDV³DQLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\VHUYLFH´«EXWDV³DVHUYLFHLQWKH
field RIWUDQVSRUW´«´id. ¶ 40. The distinction is significant because, inter alia, freedom to provide information 
society services from another Member State cannot be restricted, but the rules facilitating the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services do not apply to transport 
services. In contrast, a first instance commercial court in Spain has found a platform similar to Uber, namely 
Blablacar, to constitute a platform offering an information society service rather than a transportation company; 
Confebus v. Comuto Iberia S.L. and Comuto S.A., Judgment of  Feb. 2, 2017, noted in Callol Coca 
Competition Bulletin, Mar. 2017 available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/79537ac5-
cd17-4261-836a-a8ebe7fe7274.pdf (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). Interestingly, Advocate General (AG) Szpunar 
in his Opinion in AIRBNB Ireland found that Airbnb, in contrast to Uber, does offer a service that corresponds 
WRWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\VHUYLFHV´ZKLFKZRXOGEHQHILWIURPWKHIUHHPRYHPHQWRIVHUYLFHV
see Opinion of AG Szpunar in Case C-390/18, Criminal proceedings against YA and AIRBNB Ireland UC ² 
other parties: Hotelière Turenne SAS, Pour un hébergement et tourisme professionnel (AHTOP), Valhotel, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:336. 
20
 See Aslam, Farrar, and others v. Uber BV, Uber London Ltd, Uber Britannia Ltd, Case Nos: 2202550/2015 
& Others, Employment Tribunal (Oct. 28, 2016); Uber BV, Uber London Ltd, Uber Britannia Ltd v. Aslam, 
Farrar, Dawson and others, Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) UKEAT/0056/17/DA (Nov. 10, 2017); Uber 
BV, Uber London Ltd, Uber Britannia Ltd v. Aslam, Farrar, Dawson and others, [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2748. 
In the ongoing litigation, Uber argues that it is an agent of the drivers. The Court of Appeal (CA) judgment 
has been appealed to the Supreme Court. The CA, in similar fashion to CoJ in Uber Spain, supra note 19, in 
DJUHHLQJZLWKWKH(PSOR\PHQW7ULEXQDO¶VILQGLQJVQRWHGWKDW8EHUGRHVQRWZRUNIRUWKHGULYHUVEXWWKHGULYHUV
work for Uber and Uber runs a transportation business; Uber (CA), id. ¶ 95. Notably, the dissenting opinion 
of Underhill LJ in Uber (CA) aptly describes the issue being not that of whether Uber provides transportation 
services ± because it all depends on what one means by that term and in one sense, Uber obviously provides 
transportation services ± EXWUDWKHUWKDWRI³ZKHWKHULWGRHVVRE\SURYLGLQJWKHVHUYLFHVRIWKHGULYHUVLWVHOIRU
E\SURYLGLQJDVHUYLFHIRUERRNLQJDQGSD\LQJIRUWKHP´id. ¶ 137. 
21
 On Article 101 not applying to agreements between employers and employees, see, Case C-22/98, Jean 
Claude Becu and others, EU:C:19997HFKQLFDOO\LQWKH8.WKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³HPSOR\HHV´
DQG³ZRUNHUV´XQGHUWKH(PSOR\PHQW5LJKWV$FWZKLFKLVWKHDSSOLFDEOH$FWLQTXHVWLRQUHOHYDQWWRWKH
dispute in Uber (CA), supra note 20. This distinction does not make a difference in terms of the competition 
law assessment as both concepts denote someone being in an employment relationship with another party, 
which is the relevant factor in competition law. 
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common intermediary between competitors as parties to a possible cartel.22 In fact, in a case 
concerning a competitor of Uber, the Luxembourg competition authority found there to be 
a horizontal cartel agreement between the drivers operating on the platform.23 In other 
proceedings, the Bundeskartellamt similarly opined that Amazon Marketplace is effectively 
a horizontal cartel agreement between Amazon and the suppliers (i.e. third-party sellers).24 
Yet, some of these findings concerning the legal characterisation of these platforms by 
different authorities in different contexts are legally, mutually exclusive.25 For example, 
although the CoJ finding in Uber Spain does not preclude a finding that a business model, 
VXFKDV8EHU¶VUHSUHVHQWs a horizontal cartel between competitors, it does exclude a finding 
that the same business model represents both an employment relationship between the 
platform and suppliers, and, a cartel. This is because the latter requires the suppliers of the 
relevant products/services (e.g. drivers) to be ³undertakings´ competing with one another, 
and not ³employees´ of another undertaking (i.e. the platform) regarding the relevant 
                                            
22
 See, e.g., the class action in the United States against Uber alleging that the company has orchestrated and 
facilitated an illegal price-fixing conspiracy between the drivers using an algorithm that sets the prices for rides 
in violation of Sherman Act, Section 1; see Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017). This 
dispute is likely to go to arbitration for resolution after the 2nd &LUFXLW¶VILQGLQJWKDWWKHFRPSXOVRU\DUELWUDWLRQ
clause in the standard contract is valid; see Meyer v. Travis Kalanick, & Uber Technologies, Inc. U.S. District 
Court, Southern District of New York, No. 15-09796 (Mar. 5, 2018). For the argument that if 8EHU¶VGULYHUV
DUHGHHPHGWREHLQDJUHHPHQWZLWKHDFKRWKHUWRSULFHDFFRUGLQJWR8EHU¶VDOJRULWKP8EHU¶VHQWLUHEXVLQHVV
model would be a violation of Sherman Act, Section 1, see Anderson and Huffman, supra note 8, 908. See 
also Nowag, supra note 8, for an exploration of the possible antitrust treatments of centralised, platform-driven 
price-fixing.  
23
 See Webtaxi ± Luxembourg Competition Council (2018-FO-01) (June 8, 2018) available at 
https://concurrence.public.lu/dam-assets/fr/decisions/ententes/2018/decision-n-2018-fo-01-du-7-juin-2018-
version-non-confidentielle.pdf (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). The Authority has exempted the agreement due to 
the benefits it brings to consumers, which outweigh the restrictive effects on competition.  
24
 Although no infringement decision was taken in this case as the proceedings were terminated when Amazon 
voluntarily removed the price parity (most-favoured-customer) clauses which it had imposed on the retailers 
selling on the Marketplace, in the relevant Case Report, the Bundeskartellamt expressed its finding that 
$PD]RQ0DUNHWSODFHZDVD³KRUL]RQWDOWUDGHFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ$PD]RQDQGWKLUG-party sellers that has as 
iWVREMHFWDQGHIIHFW YDULRXV UHVWULFWLRQVRIFRPSHWLWLRQ´DQG WKDW WKHSULFHSDULW\FODXVHV LQTXHVWLRQZHUH
horizontal price-fixing agreements; see Case Report, Amazon removes price parity obligation for retailers on 
its Marketplace platform, (Dec. 9, 2013) available at 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2013/B6-46-
12.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (accessed Mar. 19, 2019). Notably, the Bundeskartellamt does not appear 
to distinguish between the different entities involved as regards their position in this arrangement: it does not 
distinguish Amazon, the retailer, which may (or may not) be in competition with third-party sellers depending 
on the relevant range of products, from Amazon Marketplace, the platform (i.e. marketplace) which brings 
together the suppliers (including Amazon, the retailer, and the third-party sellers). Technically, Amazon 
Marketplace is not a competitor to the third-party sellers as it is Amazon, the retailer, which may be in 
competition with them if Amazon, the retailer, has its own product range which it sells alongside third-party 
VHOOHUV¶SURGXFWVRQ$PD]RQ0DUNHWSODFH+DYLQJVDLGWKDWDVWKH%XQGHVNDUWHOODPWDOVRQRWHVLQWKH&DVH
5HSRUWWKHVHWZRVHJPHQWVDUHSUHVHQWHGE\$PD]RQDVD³VLQJOHLQWHJUDWHGSODWIRUPWKDWPDNHVQRGLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQ$PD]RQ¶VRZQUHWDLOEXVLQHVVDQGWKH0DUNHWSODFHEXVLQHVV´id. 
25
 On the need to appreciate the different business models and competition concerns that may arise with 
different types of technology platforms, see D. Daniel Sokol, $QWLWUXVW¶V&XUVHRI%LJQHVV3UREOHP, 118 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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economic activity.26 In contrast to the various authority findings, interestingly, Uber itself 
argues that its relationship with drivers is legally one of agency. This is identical to what 
Apple had argued in Apple (iPhone), recently decided by the US Supreme Court in a 5-to-4 
split, where Apple was held to be a ³retailer´ selling the apps of app developers directly to 
iPhone owners through the App Store.27 A finding of agency, as this article posits to exist, 
places platforms somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of competition law applicability 
since the agency rule only ³immunises´ those agreements between platforms and their 
suppliers that restrict competition on the relevant (products/services) market from the 
application of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements.28 Other restrictions of 
competition arising out of the agreement between a platform and suppliers (e.g. restrictions 
of competition on the platform market or the supplier market), as well as any unilateral 
practices which may constitute abuse of dominance, would continue to be subject to 
competition law.29 If the (re)interpretation of the single economic entity doctrine and the 
                                            
26
 A finding that drivers are employees, by definition, excludes the possibility that they are undertakings. This 
appears also to be part of the underlying reasoning of the employment cases which found Uber to be the drivers¶ 
employer wheUHWKH7ULEXQDOVIRXQGWKDW8EHUGULYHUVGLGQRW³RSHUDWHEXVLQHVVHVRQWKHLURZQDFFRXQW´LQ
explaining why the drivers were employees; see e.g., Uber (EAT), supra note 20, ¶ 109. 
27
 Robert Pepper and others v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017). The correct legal characterisation of 
this relationship is, indeed, of fundamental importance not just in Europe, but also in jurisdictions such as the 
United States, where standing to sue in private actions is limited to direct purchasers, and identifying the exact 
role of the platform in a transaction which takes place over the platform is, therefore, essential to establishing 
the existence or absence of an antitrust cause of action. The legal characterisation of a platform as an agent, as 
RSSRVHGWRIRUH[DPSOHDGLVWULEXWRUKDVLPPHGLDWHEHDULQJRQZKRWKH³VXSSOLHU´DQGWKH³GLUHFWSXUFKDVHU´
are, with consequences in relation to standing for a private right of action in the United States. This was exactly 
the pertinent legal issue in Apple (iPhone) litigation in which a class of consumers who purchased iPhone apps 
sued Apple for monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market for iPhone apps. The legal 
question was whether the consumers are direct purchasers of iPhone apps from Apple, rather than from app 
developers, which the 9th Circuit answered in the affirmative (in disagreement with the 8th &LUFXLW¶VDQDO\VLV
in a similar case), with the implication that the plaintiffs had standing to sue under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720 (1977). The 9th Circuit found that Apple was a distributor of iPhone apps, selling them directly 
to purchasers through its App Store. The alternative legal characterisation would have involved a finding that 
LWZDVWKHDSSGHYHORSHUVZKRVROGWKHDSSVWRFRQVXPHUVWKURXJK$SSOH¶VDJHQF\LQZKLFKFDVHWKHFRQVXPHUV
would have had no standing to sue Apple. In the United States, standing to sue for antitrust damages is reserved 
for the direct purchasers of the alleged infringer of competition law; Illinois Brick, id, 729. The judgment of 
the 8th Circuit with which the 9th Circuit disagreed is Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999), which is discussed infra text around note 359. The U.S. Supreme 
Court majority held, without discussing Campos or the particular issue of agency, that iPhone users were direct 
purchasers who may sue Apple for alleged monopolisation and their claim is not barred by Illinois Brick; Apple 
Inc v. Pepper et al., 587 U.S. ____ (2019). 
28
 This is the case for EU competition law as established by CoJ in Suiker Unie in that the agency exception is 
only relevant in relation to (restrictions of competition found in) agency agreements concerning the relevant 
market where the contracts are entered into with third parties, and not in relation to the agreement between the 
agent and the principal more generally; see Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 113, 114-73, Cooperatieve 
9HUHQLJLQJ³6XLNHU8QLH´8$DQGRWKHUVY(&&RPP¶Q, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, ¶¶ 482-483. See also Case 
C-217/05, Confederacion Espanola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v. Compania Espanola de 
Petroleos SA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:784,  ¶ 62. It is in the context of these contracts with third parties on the 
relevant market that the agent is deemed to be part of the same ³XQGHUWDNLQJ´DVWKHSULQFLSDO 
29
 The single economic entity doctrine limiting the application of Article 101 is not applicable in case of Article 
102 because the application of Article 102 does not require an agreement between undertakings and concerns 
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agency rule as proposed in this article is adopted, then those restrictions of competition on 
the relevant market arising out of agreements of platforms that are not in a competitively 
neutral position with regard to their suppliers would also be subject to the application of 
Article 101. Given the developing state of conflicting legal assessments of the platform 
model and the current opportunity to review the applicable rules at the EU level, the correct 
legal assessment of the relationship and agreements between such platforms and their 
suppliers is of fundamental practical, legal and commercial importance. 
This article comprises seven sections. In Section II, the article presents the relevant 
concepts of agency and similar business models recognised in common law and commercial 
law, whilst also distinguishing agency from similar contractual arrangements such as 
employment and independent contracting. The purpose of this inquiry is to identify the main 
characteristics of agency found in these areas of law and to establish what distinguishes 
agency from other similar delegation models, in order to inform a more robust understanding 
of agency in competition law. This is necessary because these other areas of law are more 
advanced than competition law in relation to assessing such different business models. Thus, 
identifying the general principles underlying the delegation model of agency in these other 
areas of law can inform the construction of the concept of agency in competition law. Section 
III sets out the single economic entity doctrine and the operation of the agency rule 
thereunder in competition law in order to discuss the conditions under which competition 
law would treat intermediaries as agents. Section IV exposes the relevant terms and 
conditions of the standard contracts of the platforms under study. Section V applies the 
agency principles established in Sections II and III to the terms and conditions set out in 
Section IV to demonstrate how, when the general principles of agency and the agency rule 
within the single economic entity doctrine are applied to the contracts of platforms under 
study, the application leads to the finding that these platforms are, as a matter of positive 
law, agents of their suppliers. This inquiry encompasses findings on agency from different 
areas of law, not just from competition law, in order to ensure consistency in the way 
different areas of law treat identical business models, which is desirable for legal and 
business certainty. As the finding of agency implies immunity from competition law scrutiny 
of anticompetitive agreements for potentially substantial restrictions of competition in 
                                            
unilateral conduct adopted by an undertaking in a dominant position. The CoJ has explicitly held that a practice 
to which Article 101 is not applicable due to the single economic entity doctrine may still be challenged as an 
abuse under Article 102; see Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. 
Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140, ¶ 35; Viho, supra note 4, ¶ 17. 
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digital markets, Section VI normatively assesses the appropriateness of this immunity and 
proposes a (re)interpretation of the agency rule within the single economic entity doctrine 
based on the concept of ³competitive neutrality´ which it develops. It argues that the single 
economic entity doctrine and the agency rule should not apply to agreements between 
platforms and suppliers restricting competition on the relevant market to the extent that the 
platform competes with the suppliers on that relevant market. Thus, these agreements should 
be made subject to full scrutiny by competition law. Section VII concludes. 
II. Agency and Similar Delegation Models  
Although ³agency´ within the ³single economic entity´ doctrine is a concept of EU 
law, and, compliance with national law governing the relationship is not determinative when 
assessing whether the agreement is caught by EU competition law,30 there is limited 
guidance on the general concept of agency in EU competition law. This is because the 
competition law jurisprudence has developed in piecemeal fashion, responding to legal 
disputes concerning whether a given intermediary is an agent or not, in order to answer the 
question of whether that entity is part of another ³undertaking´ under the ³single economic 
entity´ doctrine. This inquiry method has led to case-by-case assessments without robust 
theoretical or conceptual foundations concerning the component elements of an agency 
agreement, which could be used as guidance for future cases in which the question of agency 
may arise.31 Further, as will be demonstrated here, the EU concept of agency is one that 
broadly reflects the same underlying principles found in different areas of law. 
Consequently, this section briefly outlines the constituent elements of agency, and how they 
differ from other common means of delegation in commercial contracts by consulting 
common law and commercial law, whilst also explaining how agency can be distinguished 
from other means of similar delegation arrangements such as independent contracting and 
employment. The principles and findings from this section provide essential guidance in 
terms of setting out the relevant criteria for agency, which can aid to fill in the ³gaps´ in 
competition law concerning aspects of an agency arrangement where competition law has 
not yet established its own criteria. 
                                            
30
 Suiker Unie, supra note 28, ¶ 478. 
31
 European &RPP¶Q³*XLGHOLQHVRQ9HUWLFDO5HVWUDLQWV´2-&DFFRPSDQ\LQJWKH(89%(5
supra note 11, contains the most detailed expressions of agency for EU competition law purposes. Yet, the 
entire discussion of agency in the Guidelines ± although helpful ± takes up around 3 pages in total, and beyond 
providing a definition and some factors in relation to when an agreement will constitute an agency agreement, 
only deals with the question of when agency agreements will be deemed to fall within or outside of the 
prohibition of Article 101. It does not offer any detailed principles concerning, for example, the factors that 
distinguish agency from other delegation and distribution models. 
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(a) The Common Law (and Equity) Principles Relating to Agency 
Agency is a common means of delegation in commerce where the ³agent´ acts on 
behalf of a ³principal´ in return for payment, normally a ³commission´. Put more formally, 
agency is the (fiduciary) relationship that exists between two persons, ³one of whom 
expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf so as to affect 
his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or 
so acts pursuant to the manifestation´.32 
There are two aspects of agency: internal and external. The internal aspect is the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, which imposes special duties (arising out 
of the fiduciary liability) on the agent vis-à-vis the principal, whilst the external aspect is 
WKDWXQGHUZKLFKWKHDJHQWKDVSRZHUVWRDIIHFWWKHSULQFLSDO¶VOHJDOSRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQWR 
third parties.33 To an agent in the full sense, both aspects are relevant, but some persons (e.g. 
³introducing agents´) may be agents by virtue of their internal relationship despite having 
no external powers.34 
The typical, internal features of agency which distinguish it from other relationships 
are that: first, the agent undertakes to use due diligence on behalf of the other (as opposed 
to undertaking strict duties to the other in a situation commercially adverse to that other); 
she is subject to fiduciary duties; and she is remunerated by commission or an equivalent (as 
opposed to making her own profit).35 Bowstead and Reynolds note that agency situations 
should first be viewed from the point of view of the third party.36  
A person who has a fiduciary relationship with a principal so that he acts on behalf 
RIWKHSULQFLSDOEXWKDVQRDXWKRULW\WRDIIHFWWKHSULQFLSDO¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKLUGSDUWLHVPD\
still be an agent because of the fiduciary relationship.37 This type of agent may be an example 
                                            
32
 PETER G. WATTS AND FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY ¶ 1-001 (21st ed. 
2018). The fiduciary nature of the relationship is subject to debate and appears to be a matter of degree; id. See 
also EWAN MCKENDRICK, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW ¶ 5.23 (5th ed. 2016). 7KHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKHDJHQW¶V
power is the idea of a unilateral manifestation by the principal of willingness to have his legal position altered 
by the agent. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no requirement for a contract to achieve this creation of power. 
It is sufficient for the principal to manifest to the agent that he is willing for the agent to act and that the agent 
does so in circumstances which indicate that her acts arise from the manifestation of the principal; id. 1-006. 
33
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-7KHGXWLHVDULVLQJRXWRIWKHLQWHUQDODVSHFW³IROORZIURP
WKHQHHGWRFRQWUROWKHDJHQW¶VRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRH[SORLWKLVSRVLWLRQ´id. 
34
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-019. 
35
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-024. 
36
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-025. 
37
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-001. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW ± AGENCY, s. 1.01 
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) RQO\UHIHUVWR³DFWLQJRQEHKDOI´RIWKHSULQFLSDOIRUDQLQWHUPHGLDU\WREHDQDJHQW
without also requiring the agent to act sRDVWRDIIHFWWKHSULQFLSDO¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKLUGSDUWLHV7KXVXQGHU
WKDWZLGHUGHILQLWLRQRIDJHQF\ WKH LQWHUPHGLDU\¶VQRWKDYLQJDXWKRULW\ WRFKDQJH WKH OHJDOSRVLWLRQRI WKH
principal would not UHQGHUWKHSRVLWLRQRQHRI³LQFRPSOHWH´DJHQF\ 
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of ³incomplete agency´ (e.g. an ³introducing agent´ or ³canvassing agent´) in that the 
internal parts of agency law apply to these agents, but they are not agents in the full sense 
of the word due to the limited nature of their external powers WRDIIHFWWKHLUSULQFLSDOV¶OHJDO
positions.38 These intermediaries do not conclude contracts and do not dispose of property, 
but are hired as an employee or an independent contractor, to introduce parties who would 
like to contract and leave them to contract between themselves.39 Estate agents are obvious 
examples of this type of agent.40 Such canvassing agents have very limited powers to alter 
WKHLUSULQFLSDOV¶OHJDOUHODWLRQV41 Nevertheless, by virtue of the fact that they may have the 
authority to receive DQGFRPPXQLFDWHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHLUSULQFLSDOV¶EHKDOIWKH\PD\KDYH
WKHFDSDFLW\WRDOWHUWKHSULQFLSDOV¶OHJDOSRVLWLRQ42 Similarly, they are also subject to typical 
rules, mostly developed in estate agency cases, as to entitlement to commission and they 
may sometimes hold money for their principals.43 Another relevant distinction is that 
between ³general agent´, and ³special agent´, where the former has authority to act for her 
principal in all matters concerning a particular trade business, etc. and the latter has only 
authority to do some particular act, or to represent her principal in some particular 
transaction.44 
Where the power to create legal relations exists (i.e. the agent not only acts on behalf 
of the principal, but acts so as to affect WKHSULQFLSDO¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKLUGSDUWLHVWKHQRUPDO
incidents of agency are likely to apply ³HYHQLIWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFWH[SUHVVO\GLVDYRZVRQH
being the µagent¶ of the other´.45 Conversely, the mere use of the label ³agency´ LQSDUWLHV¶
contract may not lead to the application of agency law if there is no authority to alter the 
                                            
38
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-020. Under this reasoning, an agent in a strict sense, is someone 
ZKRKDVWKHSRZHUWRDIIHFWKHUSULQFLSDO¶V legal relations; id. ¶ 1-019. Legal rules attach to such an agent 
relating to internal and external aspects of agency; id.  
39
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-020. Notably, such agents do not undertake any duties, but are 
entitled to certain contractual rights if they do certain things and may be liable for misconduct; id. ¶ 6-001. 
40
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-$QRWKHUW\SHRI³LQFRPSOHWHDJHQF\´FDQEHIRXQGLQVR-
FDOOHG³LQGLUHFWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ZKHUHE\DSULQFLSDODSSRLQWVDSHUVRQZKRPD\EHFDOOHGDQDJHQWWRGHDORQ 
his behalf on the understanding that the agent will deal with any third party in her own name as principal; id. 
¶ 1-021. Again, in such a situation, the internal aspect of agency exists, but not the external; id. ¶ 1-021. 
Bowstead and Reynolds find no doctrinal objection in common law to the creation of such a situation of indirect 
representation; id. ¶ 1-022. 
41
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-020. 
42
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-020. Similarly, they may be subject to the fiduciary duties of 
agents to their principals because they may act in a capacity which involves the repose of trust and confidence; 
id. In fact, even an agent, properly defined, may owe fiduciary duties in some respects, but not others; id. ¶ 6-
037. 
43
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-020. 
44
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-039. 
45
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-004 with reference to Sydney District Rugby League Football 
Club Ltd. v News Ltd. (2000) 177 ALR 611, [131] et seq aff.d (2003) 215 CLR 563 (Austl.).  
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SULQFLSDO¶V OHJDO SRVLWLRQ46 The rules of agency will apply, in common law, even if the 
existence of the principal or his connection with the transaction is unknown, if there is 
preceding authority to act for the principal.47  
Bowstead and Reynolds point out a particular feature of agency resulting from the 
DJHQW¶VILGXFLDU\GXWLHVLQ that  
[i]t is inconsistent with those duties that an agent should act in respect of h[er] 
relationship with the principal for h[er] own profit (unless [s]he discloses this to the 
principal and the principal consents). H[er] relationship with h[er] principal is 
commercially related rather than commercially adverse. Thus, [s]he should be 
remunerated by commission in respect of the services [s]he has rendered, and not take 
h[er] own undisclosed profit as an independent intermediary. The commission need 
not however be related to the value of the transaction: it can be by a mark-up. The 
essence of the payment received by the agent is that it is not an independent profit 
taken by the agent, but rather a fee paid to h[er] by the principal in return for acting on 
his behalf.48  
 
Thus, in the heart of the agency relationship lies the fact that the agent and the 
principal have commercial interests that are aligned, rather than adverse. This is directly 
reflected in the way agency is conceptualised as a mode of delegation where the agent 
provides a service to its principal and is remunerated for that service by commission, in 
contrast to an intermediary who pursues profit from its commercial relation with the other 
party independently of the commercial interests of that other party. As will be explained 
below,49 the criterion of absence of risk-taking by the agent on the relevant market under the 
³single economic entity doctrine´ in competition law can be conceptualised as similarly 
requiring an alignment of (competitive) interests between the agent and the principal. This 
                                            
46
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-004 with reference to Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v. 
Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29 (Austl.); UBS AG (London Branch) v. Kommunale Wasserwerke 
Leipzig GmbH [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1567, ¶ 91. 
47
 Such a principal whose existence or connection with the transaction is not known is referred to as an 
³XQGLVFORVHG´SULQFLSDO%RZVWHDGDQG5H\QROGVsupra note 32, ¶ 1-009. Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 
32 note that in some jurisdictions (e.g. France) even though the principal need not actually be named, agency 
rules would normally only apply in the case of an agent who when acting purported (or at least was understood) 
WRGRVRRQEHKDOIRIRU³LQWKHQDPHRI´DSULQFLSDOHYHQWKRXJKWKHSULQFLSDOQHed not actually be named; id. 
¶ 1-009. They also note that regarding undisclosed agents, the results in some civil law systems now approach 
some of the results in common law; id. ¶ 1-009. Mere economic interdependence between two parties does not 
create a relationship of agency; Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-012 with reference to, inter alia, 
UBS AG, supra note 46 and Plevin v. Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61, ¶ 33. 
48
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-016. The agent of one party can act as the agent of the other 
party (including the other party to the transaction) (e.g. solicitors), but the rules of equity would apply: equity 
presumes that a person in a fiduciary position must avoid conflicts of interest unless the parties assent to the 
conflict; Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 2-013. The fact that commission is paid by one party is not 
LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHDJHQW¶VDFWLQJIRUWKHRWKHUSDUW\DVZHOOid. ¶ 2-033. Restatement, supra note 37, s. 8.01 
VWLSXODWHVWKDWDQDJHQWKDVDILGXFLDU\GXW\WRDFWOR\DOO\IRUWKHSULQFLSDO¶VEHQHILWLQDOOPDWWHUVFRQQHFWHG
with the agency relationship. 
49
 See infra text around note 137. 
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alignment of commercial and competitive interests will, indeed, be used to inform the 
criterion of ³competitive neutrality´ in Section VI, which this article proposes to be adopted 
in the (re)interpretation of the single economic entity doctrine to apply to platforms. 
A useful example in relation to this issue of commercial interest alignment is that of 
distributors, concessionaires and franchisees, all of which are arrangements that differ from 
agency for the same reason. With these arrangements, the relationship is an adverse 
commercial relationship, and the analogy of agency is normally not pursued where a 
purchase for resale exists.50 Nevertheless, the contractual restrictions sometimes imposed on 
distributors, such as a non-compete clause, can placHWKHPXQGHUWKHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VFRQWURO
in such a way that the relation may resemble that of agency.51 The underlying principle is 
that a person cannot be an agent if she is a seller or buyer to her principal and vice versa 
because sale is a commercially adverse relationship, whereas agency involves a fiduciary 
relationship of trust and confidence.52 The distinction normally turns on whether the person 
concerned acts for herself to make such profit as she can or whether she is remunerated by 
pre-arranged commission.53 Similarly, whereas a seller answers for defects in description 
and quality, an agent may not do so because she is not a party to the contract.54 Much also 
turns on the extent to which the principal can call for an account because the duty to account 
LVDW\SLFDOIHDWXUHRIDQDJHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ55 
A further distinction can be drawn between agents and persons supplying services 
(e.g. a repairer, painter, etc.) who do so normally on a commercially adverse basis.56 Such 
persons normally owe a duty of best endeavours only, owe no fiduciary duties and are not 
remunerated by commission.57 There is, however, also an intermediary category where their 
work is directed toward a fixed target which may be valued and they may be remunerated 
                                            
50
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-035. 
51
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-035; Hospital Products Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 
CLR 41; Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd. [1999] 1 SCR 142 (Can.). 
52
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-036. Bowstead and Reynolds argue that if in a 
manufacturer/supplier relationship, if the supplier, on true construction of the contract, is a buyer from the 
manufacturer, then the manufacturer may be in breach of contract if he sells the goods himself, but if the 
supplier is a genuine agent, the manufacturer would usually be entitled to sell himself, too; Bowstead and 
Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-036 with reference to WT Lamb & Sons v. Goring Brick Co. [1932] 1 KB 710 
and Bentall, Horsley & Baldry v. Vicary [1931] 1 KB 253. 
53
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-036. Yet, the fact that the resale price is fixed by the 
manufacturer does not necessarily make the supplier an agent and exceptionally, a buyer for resale may also 
be paid commission or an agent remunerated by being allowed to keep the excess over a stipulated price; id. ¶ 
1-036 and the cases cited therein. 
54
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-036. 
55
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-036. 
56
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-038. 
57
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-038. 
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by commission (e.g. travel agents, patent agents), as well as those who offer personal 
services and charge fees rather than commission (e.g. solicitors) who may attract some, but 
not all, of the features of agency law.58 Having said that, in general, an agent does not 
normally warrant success in what she does, but only to use reasonable endeavours.59  
In sum, there are some fundamental features of agency in common law, which 
distinguish it from other arrangements such as WKHDJHQW¶VZDUUDQWWRXVHGXHGLOLJHQFHDV
opposed to warrant success or a particular outcome), and the alignment of commercial 
interests between the agent and the principal, which implies, inter alia, that the agenW¶V
remuneration is comprised of fees for her services to the principal rather than of profit 
generated from the activity (e.g. through resale). Beyond these, there are several grey areas 
in agency law, including the scope DQGERXQGDULHVRIWKHDJHQW¶VILGXFLDU\GXWLHVDVZHOODV
the line between those intermediaries who are agents and those who are not, on the basis of 
the (lack of) completeness of the internal and external aspects of agency in a given 
arrangement. All in all, it appears that ± outside of the clear-cut cases ± establishing whether 
a given intermediary is an agent requires a balancing of the factors some of which may 
suggest the presence and some of which may suggest the absence of agency. As will be seen 
below,60 this is also a feature of the assessment adopted in competition law, which ultimately 
requires an assessment of the relevant factual and commercial context in qualifying an 
arrangement as agency or otherwise. 
(b) The Concept of the ³Commercial Agent´ 
A particular notion of agency is that of a ³commercial agent´ which has certain legal 
implications due to the Commercial Agents Regulations transposing the EU Directive on 
the same subject.61 The term stems from continental European law and is not known to the 
common law.62 Importantly, the Directive and Regulations only cover agents who 
intermediate the sale/purchase of products as opposed to provision of services.63 Although 
                                            
58
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-038. Yet, some travel agents may supply services as principal 
and not merely as agent; see Wong Mee Wan v. Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd [2011] EWCA (Civ) 1569, ¶ 
16; Moore v. Hotelplan Ltd (t/a Inghams Travel) [2010] EWHC 276 (QB). 
59
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 6-001. 
60
 See infra text to note 146. 
61
 The Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993 No 3053) transposing Council 
Directive on the Coordination of the Law of the Members States Relating to Self-Employed Commercial 
Agents, 1986 O.J. (L382) 17. 
62
 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-$FFRUGLQJWRWKH'LUHFWLYHDQG5HJXODWLRQV³FRPPHUFLDO
DJHQW´PHDQVDVHOI-employed intermediary who has continuing authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of 
JRRGVRQEHKDOIRIDQRWKHUSHUVRQWKH³SULQFLSDO´RUWRQHJRWLDWHDQGFRQFOXGHWKHVDOHRUSXUFKDVHRIJRRGV
on behalf of and in the name of that principal; Regulations, supra note 61, Article 2(1) and Directive, supra 
note 61, Article 1(2). 
63
 See Regulations, supra note 61 Article 2(1) and Directive, supra note 61 Article 1(2). 
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every commercial agent in the sense of the Regulations is an agent (under common law), not 
every agent is a commercial agent, but can still be an agent for legal (i.e. common law) 
purposes, despite not being able to benefit from the protection of the Regulations. Much of 
the commercial case law in the UK has revolved around establishing whether a given party 
is a ³commercial agent´ for the purposes of the Regulations. Although the Regulations only 
apply to the internal aspects of the relationship between the principal and agent,64 the case 
law concerning commercial agents is particularly illuminating for competition law purposes 
in its establishing of relevant criteria for agency as distinct from other methods of delegation. 
A commercial agent does not trade on her own account; thus, she is not a 
distributor.65 The most important question to ask regarding this distinction has been noted 
to be that of the title to the products being sold: if the agent never owns the products, but 
simply finds customers for the supplier, ³QRPDWWHUKRZH[WHQVLYHWKHDJHQW¶VUROHRWKHUZLVH
is, then the agent will be in all probability a commercial agent of the supplier´.66 In this 
context, to ³negotiate´ a contract means more than simply negotiating a sale, as established 
in Fryer where the Court held that an agent who introduced customers, suggested indicative 
prices and encouraged a customer to place orders at the prices agreed or specified by the 
principal comes ³well within the ordinary meaning of µnegotiate¶´.67 In fact, one 
commentator has noted that the operator of an internet site for various principals such as a 
³virtual shopping mall´, which facilitates the contract between principals and consumers, 
but sets up the website itself and receives the money from the customer to deduct 
commission before sending the money to the principal has been likened to an ³agent walking 
from shop to shop with his bag of samples´.68 The online platforms studied in this article 
are, indeed, some obvious examples of such virtual shopping malls. 
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 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 11-005. 
65
 SUSAN SINGLETON, COMMERCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (4th ed. 2015).  
66
 Singleton, supra note 65, 2.  
67
 Nigel Fryer Joinery Services Ltd v. Ian Firth Hardware Ltd. [2008] EWHC 767 (Ch), ¶ 20. For the position 
WKDWZKDWPDWWHUV LQHVWDEOLVKLQJZKHWKHU WKHDJHQWVDWLVILHV WKH5HJXODWLRQV¶ UHTXLUHPHQW WR³QHJRWLDWH´ LV
whether the agent has the authority to negotiate rather than whether the agent actually negotiates, see FERGUS 
RANDOLPH AND JONATHAN DAVEY, THE EUROPEAN LAW OF COMMERCIAL AGENCY 42 (3rd ed. 2010). The 
authors note that the reality in many mature commercial agencies is that the agent does little day-to-day 
negotiating and long-established customers communicate their repeat orders via different media on the basis 
of a published price list. Although this involves no meaningful negotiation as such, the agent undeniably has 
authority to negotiate, which is what matters; id. 42. 
68
 Singleton, supra note 65, 35. The question whether the Regulations (or the underlying Directive) applies to 
such websites to protect these agents is not directly relevant to this work and will not be discussed further. 
Whether the Regulations protect such websites as agents does not have any bearing on the question whether 
these websites are agents since the Regulations explicitly only cover certain types of agents (e.g. notably only 
those who intermediate sale of goods as opposed to services; and, where customers select the goods themselves 
and merely place their orders through the agent, etc.). See Regulations, supra note 61, Article 2(1). Singleton, 
in fact, argues that the fact that the website invests substantial efforts to ensure customers find the right page 
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In IDFWHYHQWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\¶VFKDUJLQJDPDUN-up of its own choosing on top of 
the input price it pays to the principal to establish the price to the third party (rather than 
charging a commission) does not render the intermediary a non-agent. Thus, the way in 
which the final product is priced for the consumer is not determinative in establishing 
agency. In MIG, the principal was content for the agent to retain an undisclosed margin on 
contracts made with third parties.69 In this case, the contracts with third parties had stipulated 
that the contracts were made with the principal and the intermediary was acting as agent 
only.70 The putative agent received no commission (or other remuneration), but simply 
charged more to customers than it confirmed to the putative principal which the latter did 
not mind as it was receiving the price that it stipulated to the agent.71 The agent was keeping 
for itself an undisclosed margin.72 The Court of Appeal held that that documentation had to 
be conclusive unless it could be shown to be a sham; other factors allegedly inconsistent 
with the claimant¶V being an agent (e.g. the mark-up) could not be relied on to displace that 
documentation.73 The Court noted that the test of whether the intermediary was an agent or 
distributor was one of substance rather than form.74 Interestingly, on the facts, the agent was 
receiving payment for the products from the customer after paying the principal itself and 
thus, in the interim bearing the commercial risk (even if it charged interest to the buyer).75 
Further, the agent had signed some of the important contracts with purchasers ³for and on 
behalf´ of itself; negotiated a refund in its own discretion with purchasers who complained 
of defective products and sometimes bore the cost of these refunds; negotiated its own 
marketing support, rebate or discount arrangements with important purchasers; and, did not 
                                            
for the item and the website is attractive, etc. may mean that the Regulations will provide protection despite 
customers technically choosing what they would like to purchase themselves on such websites. 
69
 Mercantile International Group Plc v. Chuan Soon Huat Industrial Group Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 788, 
[2002] EWCA (Civ) 288. 
70
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶¶ 5, 13, 15. 
71
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 5. 
72
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 5. In MIG, when the agent had an order, it would send the details to the principal who 
would confirm the feasibility of the order or suggest changes; id. ¶ 12. However, it is noteworthy that the 
products at issue in the case were timber products such as door and window frames, which were made to order 
and would have required such confirmation from the principal (the manufacturer) regarding specifications, etc. 
73
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 36. In AMB Imballaggi Plastici SRL v. Pacflex Ltd. [1999] EWCA (Civ) 1618, the 
CA held that the intermediary in question was not a commercial agent in consideration of the fact that the trade 
between the putative principal and agent was conducted on the basis of a sale by the principal to the agent who 
resold the goods to the end users after adding a mark-up of her own choosing, namely on the basis of a resale 
model. Thus, the intermediary was a distributor and not an agent (despite the goods being delivered by the 
principal to the end users directly). The CA distinguished MGI from Pacflex on the basis that in the latter, there 
was no documentation that described the relationship between the manufacturer and the intermediary as one 
of agency; MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 31. 
74
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 6. 
75
 MIG, supra note 69, ¶ 16. 
22 
 
account to the principal for any of the sale proceeds obtained from the purchasers.76 It was 
argued by counsel that the contracts between the alleged agent, principal and customers were 
³contracts in chain´ and the agent bore financial risks incompatible with agency which 
suggested that the contract, in reality, was essentially a distributor/resale contract.77 The 
Court of Appeal rejected this contention (as well as the contention that the existence of a 
mark-up, which is how the agent gets paid, is in conflict with agency).78 This case is 
important for pointing out that even in situations where the intermediary appears close to a 
retailer in terms of the commercial risks which it takes, and the way in which it operates 
(e.g., negotiating and bearing the costs of refunds for defective performance), there may still 
be agency, in particular where the contract between the supplier and the intermediary 
stipulates it to be so, and the contract is not a sham. 
An interesting question, particularly for platforms under discussion here, is whether 
the fact that a platform acts for potentially competing principals is: (i) a feature that would 
prevent a finding of agency, or LLDQLQIULQJHPHQWRIDQDJHQW¶VGXW\WRDFWLQJRRGIDLWK or 
fiduciary duty. Although good faith is not normally implied into commercial relationships 
in English law, the Regulations explicitly imply a duty of good faith which obliges the agent 
to look after the interests of her principal and act dutifully and in good faith.79 In fact, in one 
case, the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that such acting for competing principals 
might breach an agency agreement by falling foul of the fiduciary position of the agent vis-
à-vis the principal without any reference to the duty of good faith in the Regulations.80 Thus, 
the issue of acting for competing principals is directly relevant to establishing the existence 
or infringement of an agency agreement in English law even for those agents that do not fall 
within the scope of the Regulations. In RML, the Court of Appeal held that an agent occupies 
a fiduciary position and owes his principal the single-minded duty of loyalty, so that she 
must not place herself in a position where her duty and her interest conflict, and she may not 
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act for the benefit of a third party without the informed consent of her principal.81 The Court 
of Appeal went further to note that, as held by the Privy Council in Kelly, it is normally a 
³breach of an agent¶V duty to act for competing principals´.82 However, crucially for the 
purposes of this work, the Court of Appeal decided that an agent can act for two principals 
with conflicting interests in two types of cases: first, where both principals give fully 
informed consent for this; and, second, where ³the principal must have appreciated that the 
QDWXUH RI WKH DJHQW¶V EXVLQHVV >i.e. a residential estate agent] is µto act for numerous 
principals¶´.83 In the second case, despite the conflict of interest, such agents must be free 
to act for several competing principals since otherwise they will be unable to perform their 
function.84 Although in Kelly it was held that the starting point is that agents appointed to 
sell a particular type of product are not expected to be acting for competing principals in the 
same market, in the case of estate agents and travel agents, it may be expected that they will 
be acting for competing principals in the same market.85 Thus, in cases where the nature of 
the business so requires, acting for competing principals does not prevent the qualification 
of the intermediary as an agent (or EUHDFK WKH DJHQW¶V ILGXFLDU\ GXW\), which is a point 
directly relevant to platforms studied in this article, as discussed below.86 The Court of 
$SSHDO¶VILQGLQJVLQRML are also noteworthy in establishing that the fiduciary nature of 
agency implies that the agent must not place herself in a position where her duty and interest 
conflict vis-à-vis the principal. This ties in directly with the feature of agency, discussed 
above,87 concerning the commercial interest alignment between the agent and the principal, 
and also underlies the concept of ³competitive neutrality´ proposed in this article to 
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 Rossetti Marketing Ltd v (1) Diamond Sofa Company, (2) Solutions Marketing Ltd [2012] EWCA (Civ) 
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 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 6-015. In a Scottish case, namely Lothian, an agent (perhaps, 
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supra note 32, ¶ 6-015 with reference to Lothian v. Jenolite Ltd 1969 SC 111 (Scot.). 
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distinguish those platforms which should be treated as agents and those which should not 
for the purposes of competition law, as will be seen below.88  
(c) Agency Distinguished from Other Relationships: Independent Contracting 
and Employment 
A relevant distinction for the purposes of this article is the relationship between an 
agent, an employee and an independent contractor, which originates from tort law, but is 
also significant in employment law and tax law.89 As will be seen below,90 there have already 
been cases in relation to platforms in employment law and tax law where this distinction 
was instrumental in the outcome of the dispute. The difference turns on the degree of control 
exercised.91 Indeed, a major reason for imposing liability on one person (e.g. the principal) 
for the torts of another is the degree of control exercised over the latter.92 In agency, despite 
usually referring to control by the principal as a defining characteristic, such control plays a 
more limited role than in, for example, employment law.93 In fact, agents will often not 
accept control by their principals as to the manner they act in and some will only accept 
instructions to act which are in line with usages of their own market.94 An employee (a 
³servant´) works for the other on terms that the employee is under the control and directions 
of her employer regarding the manner in which the work is to be done.95 In contrast, an 
independent contractor undertakes to produce a given result, but is not under the orders or 
control of the person for whom she does it in the actual execution of the work and may use 
her discretion for things not specified in advance.96 If the employer lacks the right to control 
the worker, the worker is likely to be an ³independent contractor´.97  
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Mr Submarine Ltd (1994) 108 DLR (4th) 517; aff.d (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 382; Alliance Craton Explorer Pty 
Ltd. v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29, [74] (Austl.). 
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In relation to agency, ³independent contractor´ as a category covers those who are 
agents as well as those who are technically not agents; the distinction is pertinent in relation 
to whether a person is an employee or not.98 Thus, although an agent may be an employee, 
the typical agent is not and ³acts in an independent manner´.99 Bowstead and Reynolds note 
that an agent may still be an employee even when she is rewarded principally by 
commission.100 An independent contractor who has authority to change another SHUVRQ¶V
legal relations is likely to be an agent, and one who does not is unlikely to be so.101 Thus, 
the common law categorisations of agent, employee and independent contractor cut across 
each other and are not mutually exclusive, and the specific characterisation is dependent ± 
arguably ± on the degree of control exercised by the ³principal´. This makes it difficult to 
clearly demarcate, for competition law purposes, between these different persons. Yet, the 
distinction, for example, between an employee and independent contractor is fundamental 
for the competition law doctrine of single economic entity, as discussed in Section III below.  
The distinction in cases which straddle the boundary between employment, agency 
and independent contracting appears to be essentially that between a contract of service 
(employment) and a contract for services (independent contractor).102 For example, in Hong 
Kong Golf Club, the Privy Council held that a golf caddie who worked at a golf club was 
not an employee on the basis of facts such as that the caddie could decide whether to turn 
up at the golf course and how long to stay if he turned up; the club made no guarantee that 
there would be work for him; where the caddie did get to work, the payment would be made 
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by the club at a rate fixed by the club which debited the amount from club members, etc.103 
The Privy Council noted that even if the caddies entered into individual contracts with club 
members for their services, this would not be inconsistent with the finding that the club acted 
DVPHPEHUV¶DJHQWLQcollecting the fees and making payments to the caddies.104 Notably, in 
Hong Kong Golf Club, the club was not making any money through caddie fees and arguably 
was making a loss due to the administration costs of the arrangement. The Privy Council, 
thus, held the relationship to be one of agency despite the agent¶V not necessarily receiving 
remuneration for its agency.105 The Privy Council further held that even though it is the club 
that establishes certain terms of conduct (e.g. to wear uniform, behave well on premises, 
etc.), and, pays the caddies, it would be the player who avaiOHGRIWKHFDGGLHV¶DFWXDOZRUN 
services and who would be in control.106  
Similarly, in Mingeley, the Court of Appeal held that the relationship between a 
private hire taxi driver and the taxi company was not one of employment despite the fact 
that the driver was required to wear the company uniform and the company enforced a scale 
of charges for the rides, which could not be amended by the driver, as well as the fact that 
the company sought to impose a code of conduct on the drivers and had power to order a 
refund to the customer in case of complaints, etc.107 Although this arrangement between the 
taxi driver and the taxi company was not identified as one of agency ± as this was not 
relevant to the dispute at hand ± the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) (whose 
characterisation the CA did not take issue with) described the arrangement as a contract 
whose dominant purpose was the supply of services by the taxi company to the taxi driver 
in return for a fixed fee in order to ³to enable him to ply his trade as a self-employed taxi 
driver´.108 Thus, the way in which the contractual arrangement is described is very similar 
to an agency arrangement where the taxi company provides the drivers a service in enabling 
them to reach customers. The agency relation was explicitly accepted in a case concerning 
VAT liability, which held that the taxi company that was paid rent for the use of its base by 
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³self-employed taxi drivers´ (which the Tribunal equated to ³commission´) was an agent of 
the drivers.109 The rental fee was essentially the commission of the agent and the agency 
nature of the business was also justified by the fact that there was no other generation of 
profit through the difference between the remuneration received from customers and the cost 
of acquiring the services in question.110 The transport service was supplied by the drivers for 
whom the taxi company was the agent in arranging the jobs.111 Finally, in another case 
concerning a taxi company, the EAT held, obiter, that the relation between a private hire 
taxi driver and the taxi company was analogous to the relation between the golf caddy and 
the golf club in Hong Kong Golf Club (as well as that in Mingeley), namely one of agency.112 
As will be discussed in Section V, the facts of these cases are very similar to the operation 
of the agreements between platforms and suppliers studied in this article, and thus, these 
findings are illuminating for assessing the legal characterisation of platforms. The 
application of these principles to platforms is left for Section V. 
III. Single Economic Entity Doctrine and the Agency Rule in Competition Law  
This section sets out the application of the single economic entity doctrine to agents in 
competition law. To do so, first, it explains the concept of ³undertaking´ in competition law. 
Then, it discusses the operation of the agency rule within the single economic entity doctrine 
as the case law currently stands. Both of these are necessary preliminary steps before the 
application of the single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule to platforms can be 
discussed, which is left for Section V after an exposé of the terms and conditions of the 
standard contracts of platforms in Section IV. 
For the purposes of EU competition law, the concept of an ³undertaking´ ± which is 
the subject of the application of the rules ± encompasses ³every entity engaged in an 
economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is 
financed´.113 As clarified by the CoJ in CEPSA, in EU competition law, the concept of 
³undertaking´ must be understood as designating an economic unit ³for the purpose of the 
subject matter of the agreement in question´ even if in law the economic unit consists of 
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several natural or legal persons.114 The reason for the concept¶V EHLQJ FHQWUHG DURXQG
economic activity rather than legal personhood is because not all economic interactions 
between separate legal entities are capable of having competitive significance, whereas it is 
possible that economic interactions within the same legal entity can have competitive 
significance.115 According to the General Court (GC), the prohibition in Article 101 is 
³aimed at economic units which consist of a unitary organization of personal, tangible and 
intangible elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can 
contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in that provision´.116 
Thus, where the agreement is not between ³undertakings´ understood as separate economic 
entities, the prohibition of Article 101 does not apply, and this is known as the ³single 
economic entity doctrine´. Odudu and Bailey interpret the case law to mean that it is the 
impossibility of competition between different natural or legal persons, which determines 
whether separate legal entities are to be treated as a single economic entity.117 Namely, the 
constituent elements of an economic entity are the minimum necessary to exert a single 
competitive force on the market.118 Although the most obvious application of the single 
economic entity doctrine is in the context of an agreement between a parent and a subsidiary 
company, the relationship between an employer and an employee, and a principal and agent 
are analogous.119  
For the purposes of competition law, an ³agent´ is defined in almost identical manner 
to the common law concept discussed above.120 Namely, an ³agent´ is a ³legal or physical 
person vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another 
SHUVRQWKHSULQFLSDOHLWKHULQWKHDJHQW¶VRZQQDPHRULn the name of the principal´ for 
the purchase (sale) of products/services (supplied) by the principal.121 The agency rule 
within the single economic entity doctrine is that where ³«an agent works for the benefit 
of h[er] principal [s]he may in principle be treated as an auxiliary organ forming an integral 
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SDUWRIWKHODWWHU¶VXQGertaking, who must carry out h[er] SULQFLSDO¶VLQVWUXFWLRQVDQGWKXV
like a commercial employee, forms an economic unit with this undertaking´.122 Notably, 
this is to be distinguished from a situation where the agreement between the intermediary 
and the principal confers upon the intermediary, or allows the intermediary to perform 
duties, which are approximately the same as those carried out by an ³independent dealer´, 
because it provides for the intermediary¶V accepting the ³financial risks of the sales or of the 
performance of contracts entered into with third parties´.123   
The importance of the existence or absence of an agency relationship between two 
entities is that, agreements between them are covered by Article 101 only where they can 
both be regarded as independent economic operators, and there is, thus, an agreement 
between two separate undertakings.124 In CEPSA, the CoJ noted that where an intermediary 
(such as a petrol-station operator) does not independently determine its conduct on the 
market since it depends entirely on the principal (such as the fuel supplier) because the 
principal assumes the financial and commercial risks as regards the economic activity 
concerned (i.e. sale of fuel to third parties), the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU does not 
apply to the relationship between the intermediary and the principal, despite the 
intermediary¶V having separate legal personality.125 The Court noted that the formal 
separation between two parties resulting from their separate personality is not conclusive, 
the decisive test being the unity of their conduct on the market.126 In contrast, where the 
agreement between the principal and the intermediary confers on or allows the intermediary 
functions which ± from an economic point of view ± are broadly the same as those carried 
out by an ³independent economic operator´, because they make provision for the 
intermediary to ³assume the financial or commercial risks linked to sales or the performance 
of contracts entered into with third parties´, then such an intermediary cannot be regarded 
DVDQDX[LOLDU\RUJDQIRUPLQJDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHSULQFLSDO¶VXQGHUWDNLQJ127 In that case, 
a clause restricting competition may be an agreement between separate undertakings for the 
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purposes of Article 101.128 Notably, the agency rule applies only to the obligations imposed 
on the intermediary in the context of the provision of the products/services to third parties 
on behalf of the principal, and not to clauses (such as non-compete and exclusivity 
requirements) concerning the relationship between the principal and the agent in the context 
of which the agent continues to be an ³independent economic operator´.129  Thus, for 
example, an obligation to sell the product at a specific price in the agreement between the 
supplier and the intermediary (e.g. ³resale´ price maintenance) would fall outside the 
provision of Article 101, and would be inherent in the VXSSOLHU¶VDELOLW\WRGHOLPLWWKHVFRSH
of the activities of its agents.130 
It is important at this point to distinguish between two markets, as done by Advocate 
General Kokott in CEPSA: the market on which the agent offers her agency services to 
potential principals, and the other market on which she offers her SULQFLSDO¶V
products/services to potential customers (i.e. third parties).131 On the first market, in relation 
to the agency services that the agent offers, the agent is normally an independent economic 
operator and thus, an undertaking for competition law purposes.132 This continues to be the 
case even when on the second market (i.e. the relevant (product/services) market in which 
the agent negotiates/concludes transactions on behalf of the principal for the sale/provision 
RIWKHSULQFLSDO¶Vproducts/services), the agent is not an ³undertaking´ because she is deemed 
to constitute an economic unit with the principal on that second market.133 It is the risks 
which the agent undertakes on this second market (i.e. the relevant market) that determine 
whether the intermediary in question falls within the agency rule under the single economic 
entity doctrine, and thus, is part of the same ³undertaking´ as the principal. For example, in 
DaimlerChrysler, the GC reiterated that where an agent, although having separate legal 
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,I WKH HQWLW\ LQTXHVWLRQ LV QRW DQ ³XQGHUWDNLQJ´ WKH DVVHVVPHQWQHYHU UHDFKHV WKHSRLQW RI H[DPLQLQJ WKH
practice in question, and therefore, the issue of whether the entities have the capacity to restrict competition 
by their agreement is not part of the inquiry. See supra to note 12 for an explanation why the practice in 
TXHVWLRQLVWHFKQLFDOO\QRW³UHVDOH´SULFHPDLQWHQDQFH  
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personality, does not independently determine his own conduct on the market, but carries 
out the instructions of his principal, Article 101 does not apply to the relationship between 
the agent and the principal.134 According to the GC, where the principal sells the product 
and takes, on a case-by-case basis, the decision to accept or reject the orders negotiated by 
the agent, the agent has extremely limited commercial freedom in relation to the sale of 
products: the agent is, thus, not in a position to influence competition on the market in 
question, which in DaimlerChrysler was the retail market for Mercedes passenger cars.135 
The issue of the agent¶s ability to influence competition on the market where the principal¶V
products/services are provided to third parties (i.e. the ³relevant market´) was, thus, a central 
point in the findings. As will be discussed below, this is also a crucial factor in relation to 
the legal characterisation of platforms under competition law and the concept of 
³competitive neutrality´ developed in this article in pointing out the necessity of 
distinguishing between the ³agency market´ and the ³relevant market´ in the legal 
assessment.136 
Despite the fact that the case law does not explicitly acknowledge this or specify it 
as the underlying reasoning for the single economic entity doctrine, the reference in the 
jurisprudence to ³assumption of risks by the agent´ on the ³relevant market´ can be linked 
to the possibility of competition on the relevant market between the agent and the principal. 
Consequently, the underlying assumption in the case law is possibly that where the 
intermediary assumes risks on the relevant market, it acts as an economic entity for its own 
account with potential competitive consequences on that market.137 Namely, it is the 
assumption of risks on the relevant market which puts the agent in a position to influence 
competition on the relevant market. Thus, it may be possible to rationalise the case law in 
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the following way: where the agent and the principal act as one competitive unit on the 
UHOHYDQWPDUNHWWKH\DUHDVLQJOHXQGHUWDNLQJGHVSLWHWKHDJHQW¶VFRQWLQXLQJWREHDVHSDUDWH
undertaking in its own right on the separate market for agency services. Where on the 
relevant market, the agent undertakes such commercial and financial risks in that it acts as a 
market actor that can affect the competitive conditions on that market, then it is no longer 
part of a single undertaking with the principal.138 What the case law does not recognise is 
that in those circumstances where the agent assumes such risks that it can affect competition 
on the relevant market, something else also happens: WKH DJHQW¶V DQG WKH SULQFLSDO¶V
commercial interests are no longer aligned because they are no longer in a competitively 
neutral position in relation to one another. This results from the fact that in that case, the 
putative agent and the principal essentially become competitors of one another. The 
alignment of commercial interests is, as noted above,139 a central factor in agency law, in 
establishing whether an intermediary is an agent or a retailer, etc. As will be seen below in 
Section VI, the ³competitive neutrality´ criterion, which this article proposes to use to 
(re)interpret the single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule in relation to platforms 
is built precisely upon this underlying premise of commercial (and competitive) interest 
alignment in agency relations. 
In competition law, agents can lose their character as independent traders only if they 
do not bear any of the risks resulting from the contracts negotiated on behalf of the principal 
and they operate as auxiliary organs forming an integral part of the princLSDO¶V
undertaking.140 Thus, the key issue is whether the agent assumes the financial and 
commercial risks linked to sales or the performance of contracts entered into with third 
parties (i.e. risks on the relevant market).141 Examples provided by the CoJ are the risks 
UHODWLQJ WR FRVWV RI GLVWULEXWLQJ WKH SURGXFWV PDLQWDLQLQJ VWRFN DW WKH DJHQW¶V H[SHQVH
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assuming responsibility for any damage caused to/by the products by/to third parties; 
investments specifically linked to the sale or advertising of products, etc.142 In short, in order 
to determine whether Article 101 is applicable, the allocation of the financial and 
commercial risks between the principal and the agent has to be analysed on the basis of such 
criteria concerning the relevant market as stipulated by the CoJ.143 The Court also noted that 
the fact that the intermediary bears only a negligible share of risks does not render Article 
101 applicable.144  
The Court further remarked that the decisive factor (to determine whether a petrol-
station operator is an independent economic operator) is to be found in the agreement 
between the principal and the intermediary, and particularly, the implied or express clauses 
of that agreement relating to assumption of the financial and commercial risks linked to sales 
of products to third parties.145 The question of risk has to be analysed on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account ³the real economic situation´ rather than ³the legal classification 
of the contractual relationship in national law´.146 In the context of risks, the CoJ 
distinguished between two types of risks: first, those risks linked to the sale of the products 
(e.g. financing of fuel stocks); and, second, those risks linked to investments specific to the 
market (i.e. those necessary to enable the intermediary to negotiate or conclude contracts 
with third parties).147 In the context of the relationship between the petrol-station operator 
and the supplier of fuel, the CoJ noted that, for example, if the payment made by the station 
operator to the supplier corresponds to the quantity of fuel actually sold and the period of 
payment to the supplier reflects the actual turnover period for the products at the service-
station, then it would have to be concluded that the commercial risk is borne by the 
supplier.148 However, the CoJ also noted (regarding the second type of risks which are 
³linked to investments specific to the market´) that if the petrol-station operator makes 
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investments specifically linked to the sale of the products, such as premises or equipment 
such as a fuel tank, or commits itself to investing in advertising campaigns, such risks are 
transferred to the operator.149 It is noteworthy that both types of risk relate to risks on the 
relevant market (arising specifically out of contracts with third parties in relation to the 
SURYLVLRQRIWKHSULQFLSDO¶Vproducts/services to third parties), and not to risks arising out of 
WKHLQWHUPHGLDU\¶VDFWLYLWLHVon the separate agency market. 
The (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGHOLQHVRQ Vertical Restraints, which accompany 
the Verticals Block Exemption Regulation, similarly note that the determining factor in 
defining an agency agreement for the application of Article 101 is the financial or 
commercial risk borne by the agent in relation to the activities for which it has been 
appointed as an agent.150 For the purposes of applying Article 101, the agreement will be 
qualified as an agency agreement if the agent does not bear any or bears only insignificant 
risks in relation to: the contract concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal; 
market-specific investments for the field of activity; and, other activities required by the 
principal to be undertaken on the same product market.151 The risks that relate to the activity 
of providing agency services in general, such DV WKH ULVN RI WKH DJHQW¶V LQFRPH EHLQJ
dependent upon its success as an agent or general investments in premises or personnel, are 
not material to this assessment.152 Thus, an agreement will be generally considered an 
agency agreement where property in the contract goods does not vest in the agent or the 
agent does not herself supply the contract services and where the agent does not contribute 
to the costs relating to the supply of goods/services; does not maintain at her own cost or 
risk stock of the contract goods; does not undertake responsibility towards third parties for 
GDPDJHFDXVHGE\WKHSURGXFWGRHVQRWWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFXVWRPHUV¶QRQ-performance 
RIWKHFRQWUDFWZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIWKHORVVRIWKHDJHQW¶VFRPPLVVLRQLVQRWREOLJHGWR
invest in sales promotion; does not make market-specific investments in equipment, 
premises, personnel, etc.; does not undertake activities within the same product market 
required by the principal, unless they are fully reimbursed by the principal; etc.153 According 
to the Guidelines, since the principal bears the commercial and financial risks related to the 
selling and purchasing of the contract goods and services, all obligations imposed on the 
agent in relation to the contracts concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal fall 
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outside the prohibition of Article 101.154 As one of the obligations that will be considered 
an inherent part of an agency agreement, the Guidelines note ³the prices and conditions at 
which the agent must sell or purchase´ the contract goods/services.155 Such obligations relate 
to the ability of the principal to fix the scope of activity of the agent in relation to the contract 
goods/services, which is essential if the principal is to take the risks, and therefore, to be in 
a position to determine the commercial strategy.156 It is noteworthy that the Guidelines do 
not recognise the possibility that the obligations in relation to the contracts with third parties 
may be found in standard contracts of the agent to which the principal agrees (as opposed to 
being ³imposed´ by the principal on the agent). Where the agent is a business acting for 
more than one principal and operating on the basis of standard contracts, as is common in 
many areas of commerce including the platforms, such conditions and obligations may be 
contractually ³imposed´ by the agent on the principal. Yet, such a contractual setting 
between the agent and the principal does not imply that the principal no longer takes the 
financial or commercial risks arising out of the separate contract with the third party 
facilitated by the agent for the principal on the relevant market. As will be seen below in 
Sections IV and V, this is exactly the case regarding the standard terms and conditions of 
platforms studied here.   
A look at the case law on the issue of risk suggests that the criterion of risk is not 
interpreted rigidly, but with a view to balancing the various components in relation to the 
risks involved in the relevant activity. For example, in Peugeot 2, a dispute which concerned 
an intermediary (Eco System) acting as an agent on behalf of French final consumers 
wishing to purchase (through parallel imports) Peugeot and Talbot vehicles, an assessment 
of risks involved was undertaken by the GC with the ultimate conclusion that the 
intermediary was an agent.157 Eco System offered final consumers a service by purchasing 
vehicles in countries where the price was most advantageous.158 The GC had to decide 
whether such an intermediary was essentially carrying on an activity equivalent to that of a 
reseller or an activity as a provider of services.159 It is notable that the GC put the relevant 
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legal question in very similar terms to the common law assessment provided above, which 
also inquires into whether the contract is one of providing services to another party or one 
of making independent profit.160 On the facts, Eco System did not offer a guarantee service; 
an after-VDOHVVHUYLFHWDNHFXVWRPHUV¶XVHGFDUVLQSDUW-exchange, or keep a stock of cars 
owned by it.161 Eco System was remunerated by commission, which was calculated as a 
percentage of the invoice price, and this was found to be a normal form of remuneration in 
this type of contracts.162 Yet, Eco System itself initially payed the approved reseller who 
supplied the vehicles, the basic price with VAT and the costs of importing the vehicle.163 
Namely, at face value, Eco System was buying the vehicle first to then resell it, which could 
have been interpreted to constitute activities of a retailer, thus a separate undertaking in its 
own right. The GC found that in doing so Eco System was essentially providing in each 
transaction a credit to the consumer equal to the amount over and above the deposit it 
received (since it was seeking reimbursement for the price and the costs from the 
purchaser).164 The Court considered that such grant of credit did not alter the legal 
designation even if such credit is not inherent in the activity of an agent.165 According to the 
Court, such incurring of expenses, which the principal had to repay was a normal part of 
activities of an agent.166 (FR 6\VWHP¶V XQGHUWDNLQJ WKH VWRUDJH ULVN E\ LQGHPQLI\LQJ WKH
principal in the event of loss of or damage to the vehicle during the period between the 
receipt of the vehicle by Eco System and delivery to the final consumer was also found to 
be a normal activity for an agent.167 This is notable since in this case, Eco System was 
essentially undertaking risks in relation to the supply of the specific product on the relevant 
market, which is a risk noted in CEPSA to suggest absence of agency.168 Furthermore, in 
this case, Eco System was also arguably involved in promotional activities on the relevant 
market.169 7KH *& QRWHG WKDW VXFK DQ LQWHUPHGLDU\¶V DFWLYLW\ PD\ HQWDLO SURPRWLRQDO
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measures aimed at the public as well as accepting the risks inherent in any undertaking 
providing services.170 The Court found that Eco System was acting as an agent in that it was 
³providing a service consisting in establishing contact between a customer and «a reseller´ 
in ³creating the necessary direct contractual relationship between the two parties and in 
carrying out the associated formalities´.171 The Court noted that Eco System, as agent, was 
not a party to the contract of purchase and sale, which it concluded with a reseller on behalf 
and for account of the final consumer, and consequently, never acquired ownership of the 
vehicle which was the subject of the transaction.172 Another factor noted was the fact that 
Eco System never bore any risk arising from this (double) transfer of ownership including 
the risk of having to sell the vehicle if the final consumer withdrew, etc.173 It must be noted 
that in this case, the agent in question was acting on behalf of numerous principals (i.e. final 
consumers). Relying on Binon, Peugeot argued that this factor should mean that Eco System 
was not an agent. The GC noted that, ³a purely quantitative criterion based on the number 
of authorizations received by an intermediary´ cannot by itself alter the nature of the 
LQWHUPHGLDU\¶V Rperations.174 This finding of the GC is significant and appears to be in 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQZLWKWKH&R-¶V earlier holding in Reisbureaus where the CoJ held that a travel 
agent was not an agent of the tour operator due to the multiplicity of tour operators the agent 
worked for and the multiplicity of the agents through which the tour operator sold travel.175 
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The relevance of multiple principals for the assessment of platforms as agents will be 
returned to in Sections V and VI. 
In voestalpine, another case in which the assumption of risks by the agent was 
analysed, the GC elaborated on the relevant case law and held that where according to the 
terms of the contract between the intermediary and the putative principal, a sale is concluded 
between the customer and the principal, rather than between the agent and the customer, 
then ³[t]hat contract is « to be analysed as an agency agreement´.176 The GC also noted 
that where there is no provision in the contract which makes the ³agent´ responsible for 
financing stocks or which requires her to make specific investments to represent that 
particular principal, the economic risk associated with sales negotiated by the putative agent 
and concluded with the principal is essentially borne by the principal, and not the agent.177 
This finding was not contradicted by the fact that the agent may assume certain expenses, 
which may be regarded as ancillary to the activities entrusted to the agent or covered by the 
fixed nature of remuneration in the form of commission (e.g. expenses linked with the 
incidental obligations associated with the conclusion of contracts, costs of legal advice, 
etc.).178 Regarding the exclusive nature of the relationship between the agent and the 
principal, the GC noted in this case (where the agent did work for more than one principal) 
that it was necessary to determine whether the agent was in a position, ³as regards the 
activities entrusted to h[er] by [the] principal, to act as an independent trader free to 
determine h[er] own business strategy´.179 Interestingly, in this case, the GC ultimately 
concluded that the same intermediary can be acting as the agent, and thus be part of a ³single 
economic entity´ with two different members of the same cartel at the same time.180 
Importantly, the GC related this point on exclusivity back to the factor of risk, and remarked 
that the ³decisive factor´ in establishing a single economic entity that covers the principal 
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and the agent lies in the assessment of the financial risks associated with sales or the 
performance of the contracts concluded with third parties through the agent.181 Notably for 
the purposes of this article, the issue of exclusivity can also be related to the alignment of 
commercial interests between the principal and the agent in the context of the fiduciary 
duties of an agent, as noted in common law above.182 This will be returned to in Section VI 
in discussing the role of such exclusivity under the ³competitive neutrality´ concept of this 
article. 
IQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGHOLQHVRQ9HUWLFDORestraints, two occasions are envisaged 
where an agent would no longer be deemed to be part of the same economic entity with the 
principal and their agreement would no longer be immune from the application of Article 
101. Thus, the Guidelines stipulate there to be two exceptions to the agency rule under the 
single economic entity doctrine. The first exception is where because ³the agent is a separate 
undertaking from the principal´RQWKHDJHQF\PDUNHW, the relationship between the agent 
and principal may infringe Article 101 due to, for example, provisions preventing the agent 
from acting as an agent or distributor to undertakings that compete with the principal, and 
post-term non-compete provisions.183 The second exception is where the agency agreement 
facilitates collusion.184 This can happen where, for example, multiple principals use the same 
agent to collude on marketing strategy or to pass on sensitive information to one another. 
Neither of these exceptions has implications for the subject matter of the current article, 
namely for establishing the presence or absence of agency regarding platforms (i.e. the first 
research question) or for determining the scope of competition law application to restrictions 
of competition found in agreements between platforms and suppliers on the relevant market 
(i.e. the second research question), for the following reasons. In fact, both exceptions in the 
Guidelines are non sequitur because the agency rule as established in the case law only 
immunizes the agency agreement from the application of Article 101 in relation to 
restrictions of competition concerning the sale/provision of products/services to third parties 
on the relevant market, anyway.185 The first exception relates to ³provisions which concern 
the relationship between the agent and the principal´ and not to ³conditions of sale or 
purchase of the contract goods or services by the agent on behalf of the principal´.186 Neither 
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 voestalpine, supra note 176, ¶ 154. 
182
 See supra text around note 48. 
183
 Verticals Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶¶ 19-20. 
184
 Verticals Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 20. 
185
 It is notable that the Verticals Guidelines, supra note 31, do not provide any authority from the case law (or 
elsewhere) in support of the explanation concerning the facilitation of collusion. 
186
 Verticals Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 19. 
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the findings of this article nor the agency rule has no bearing on the assessment of such 
restrictions of the former type as they fall outside of scope, which is limited to restrictions 
of competition on the ³relevant market´, so this exception is irrelevant to the subject matter 
at hand. As for the second exception, if the agent facilitates collusion between principals, 
then as stipulated in the Guidelines, Article 101 can be applied to the agreement which 
facilitates that collusion. Yet, this would not necessarily render that intermediary a non-
agent for other purposes including that of assessing whether it is, nevertheless, part of the 
same undertaking as the principal in relation to restrictions of competition on the ³relevant 
market´ for products/services provided to third parties. Where the agent facilitates collusion 
EHWZHHQSULQFLSDOVWKLVLVQRUPDOO\FRQGXFWHGWKURXJKWKHDJHQW¶VDFWLYLWLHVRQWKHDJHQF\
market ± where the agent acts as a common intermediary between competing principals ± 
rather WKDQ WKHDJHQW¶VDFWLYLWLHVRQ WKHPDUNHWFRQFHUQLQJ WKH UHOHYDQW products/services 
where it acts on behalf of and/or for a given principal in relation to contracts concluded with 
third parties.187 Facilitating collusion between principals as an anticompetitive activity is not 
an activity concerning restrictions of competition concerning the products/services in the 
contracts with third parties, so is already not excluded from the full application of Article 
101 due to the agency rule. Consequently, even where the agency agreement can be 
scrutinized for facilitating collusion between principals, and the agent can be treated as an 
³undertaking´ facilitating or participating in that collusion, for restrictions of competition 
on the ³relevant market´ resulting from the agency agreement, the agent may still be part of 
the same undertaking as the principal.188 Thus, the second exception does not have any 
bearing on the assessment of this article, either, as the findings of this article would continue 
to be applicable to the assessment of whether the intermediary is an agent on the relevant 
market in relation to the restrictions of competition found in the contracts with third parties. 
Consequently, the exceptions will not be further elaborated on in this article.  
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 This is in line with the case law, such as findings in, e.g., Case C-194/14 P, AC-Treuhand AG v. European 
&RPP¶Q, ECLI:EU:C:2015:717 concerning an intermediary (a consultancy firm) being found to be a member 
of a cartel despite not having any operations on the cartelised market (the heat stabilisers market). See also 
Gurin and Peeperkorn, supra note 8, ¶ 9.56 referring to this exception in the Guidelines as one concerning 
IDFLOLWDWLRQRI³KRUL]RQWDOFROOXVLRQEHWZHHQFRPSHWLQJSULQFLSDOV´7KXVWKHH[FHSWLRQUHODWHVWRhorizontal 
competition between principals, and not to vertical restraints imposed by the contract between the principal 
and the agent. 
188
 As noted in voestalpine, the agent can, in fact, be an agent for multiple principals which are parties to a 
cartel agreement and be part of a single economic entity with those different cartel members at the same time; 
see, voestalpine, supra note 176, ¶ 160. 
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IV. Relevant Terms and Conditions of PlatformV¶6WDQGDUG&RQWUDFWs 
After an overview of the fundamental concepts of agency and its operation in 
different areas of law in Section II and of the position of agency under the single economic 
entity doctrine in competition law in Section III, this section sets out the relevant terms and 
conditions of six major platforms ± Uber, Amazon Marketplace, eBay, Apple App Store, 
Airbnb, and, Booking.com ± on the basis of their publicly available standard contracts.189 
This is done with a view to later assessing in Section V whether these platforms are agents 
of their suppliers on the basis of the relevant contractual terms given the elements of agency 
exposed in Sections II and III above. The platforms chosen represent a variety of business 
activities all of which are organised around the platform model and are some of the most 
popular platforms used by millions of consumers around the world. As also revealed in this 
Section, their contracts contain very similar clauses, reflecting the similarity of the essential 
activity in which they are engaged (i.e. facilitating transactions between suppliers and 
customers), despite the SODWIRUPV¶RSHUDWLQJLQYHU\GLIIHUHQW business sectors. The relevance 
of the terms and conditions studied in this Section is that although none of the areas of law 
examined above are bound by the wording of the contracts in question when assessing 
whether a given relationship between parties is that of agency, and all are guided by the ³real 
economic situation´, they all start by examining the relevant contract in assessing the legal 
nature of the relationship between two parties.190 In establishing the nature of an entity, it 
also makes commercial sense to start with the terms and conditions which the entity 
stipulates to be applicable to dealings with that entity as these terms and conditions reveal 
the parameters of those dealings.  
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 Unless otherwise stated, terms and conditions relate to UK operations of the platforms studied. The findings 
of the article are limited to the publicly available standard terms and conditions, and the possibility of there 
being privately negotiated versions of these terms and conditions with different clauses is acknowledged. Due 
their confidential nature, any such terms and conditions ± if/where they exist ± cannot be studied. Similarly, 
some of the terms and conditions (e.g. in the case of Uber) relate to the contract between users (i.e. riders) and 
the platform (i.e. Uber) rather than the suppliers (i.e. drivers) and the platform (i.e. Uber) due to lack of public 
availability of any other terms and conditions. This is not deemed to be detrimental for the subject matter of 
WKLVDUWLFOHEHFDXVHWKHDUWLFOH¶VIRFXVLVRQWKHrelevant market for products/services provided to third parties 
and its inquiry concerns the position of platforms in relation to the transactions facilitated on that market in 
relation to third parties, namely users/customers (e.g. riders). This is also in line with agency law where what 
matters foremost is the point of view of the third party; Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 1-025. 
1RWDEO\LQWKHHPSOR\PHQWOLWLJDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJ8EHULQWKH8.WKHFRXUWVKDYHDOVRXVHGWHUPVRI8EHU¶V
DJUHHPHQWZLWKULGHUVLQDVVHVVLQJ8EHU¶VOHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLWVGULYHUVsee, e.g., Uber (CA), supra note 
20, ¶ 13. In fact, Uber itself argues in this litigation that there is no contract between Uber London Ltd and 
GULYHUVGHVSLWHDQ³DJUHHPHQW´EHWZHHQ8EHU¶VSDUHQWFRPSDQ\DQG drivers), so that the relation is governed 
by the agreements applicable to riders, which create a contract between riders and drivers (for whom Uber 
London Ltd is an agent); see, Uber (CA), id., ¶¶ 33; 53-54. Finally, on occasions this article refers to contractual 
statements found outside of the standard terms and conditions where such statements are found on different 
parts of the platform website. 
190
 See supra text to note 73 for commercial law and note 146 for competition law.  
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This Section is structured along the lines of pertinent factors concerning agency as 
established in Sections II and III, and examines the standard terms and conditions of the 
platforms under three categories in three subsections. The first subsection examines the 
contractual stipulations concerning the legal nature of the agreement found in platforms¶ 
standard contracts because the legal nature of the agreement between two parties as 
stipulated in their contract represents the starting point for the assessment of the relationship 
between them in all areas of law studied. The second subsection studies the terms and 
conditions regarding price-setting and remuneration because the power to set price and the 
mode of remuneration are informative in relation to the real operation of the business 
arrangement, as well as for identifying any risk-taking on the relevant market, and, in 
particular, for distinguishing between intermediaries such as retailers and agents. Finally, 
the third subsection focuses on ownership, investments, liability, and risks undertaken on 
the relevant market because the ownership of contract goods as well as any investments, 
liability, and risks undertaken on the relevant market are fundamental factors in all the areas 
of law studied above in establishing a position of agency. A diagram summarising the 
findings of this Section can be found at the end of the Section.  
(a) Contractual stipulations concerning the legal nature of the agreement  
$FFRUGLQJWR8EHU¶VWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV8EHU³is not a Transportation Provider 
and does not provide transportation services´.191 Transportation services are provided to the 
passenger under a contract (the ³transportation contract´) between the passenger and the 
³transportation provider´ that is identified to the passenger in the booking confirmation 
provided by Uber.192 According to the terms that passengers agree to when logging onto the 
app, Uber accepts bookings as the ageQW IRU WKH WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ SURYLGHU DQG 8EHU¶V
acceptance gives rise to a contract between the passenger and the transportation provider for 
the provision to the passenger of transportation services.193 According to these terms, ³Uber 
UK is not a party to the Transportation Contract and acts as a disclosed agent for the 
Transportation Provider in communicating the Transportation Provider¶s agreement to enter 
                                            
191
 Uber UK Terms and Conditions (last updated on Mar. 14, 2018) Part 1 Section 4 available at 
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/gb/ (accessed Aug. 3, 2018). 
192
 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191 3DUW 6HFWLRQ ³7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ3URYLGHU´ PHDQV D
provider of transportation services, including any drivers licensed to carry out private hire bookings in 
accordance with the legislation; id. Part 1 Section 1. 
193
 Uber (ET), supra note 20, ¶ 28. Elsewhere in the agreement, Uber identifies itself as a ³GLVFORVHGSD\PHQW
FROOHFWLRQDJHQW´RIWKHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQSURYLGHUZKRLVWKHSULQFLSDO8EHU8.7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVsupra 
note 191, Part 2 Section 4. In the ongoing employment litigation concerning Uber, the CA raises questions as 
WRWKHDFFXUDF\RI8EHU¶VWHUPVLQUHODWLRQWRZKHQDQGEHWZHHQZKRPDFRQWUDFWLVIRUPHGsee Uber (CA), 
supra note 20, ¶¶ 76-82. 
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into the Transportation Contract´.194 Further, Uber describes itself as a platform that 
facilitates users to contract with ³independent third party providers´ of various services.195 
The agreement also requires users to agree to the condition that Uber does not provide any 
of the transportation, etc. services, and that these are provided by independent third-party 
contractors who are not employed by Uber.196 6RPHRI8EHU¶VWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVVWLSXODWH
rules for the contract between the passenger and the driver ± GHVSLWH8EHU¶VQRWEHLQJDSDUW\
to it ± such as the one relating to the responsibility of the passenger for the cost of repair or 
damage to the vehicle in excess of normal wear and tear.197 
$FFRUGLQJ WR $PD]RQ¶V VWDQGDUG WHUPV DQG FRQGLWLRQV DSSOLFDEOH WR WKH UHODWLRQ
between Amazon and third-party sellers on Amazon Marketplace,198 Amazon and the sellers 
selling on its Marketplace ³are independent contractors, and nothing in this Agreement will 
be construed to create a partnership, joint venture, agency, franchise, sales representative, or 
employment relationship between the parties´.199 According to the same terms, Amazon is 
not an intermediary between the buyer and the seller, either.200 Nevertheless, ³>D@EX\HU¶V
obligation to pay for an item purchased « is satisfied when the buyer properly pays 
[Amazon] in full for that item«´.201 Thus, Amazon not only receives and holds funds on 
behalf of/for the supplier, it also imposes into the contract between the supplier and the buyer 
the clause that receipt of payment by Amazon discharges the contractual obligation of the 
customer (i.e. third party) to pay the seller. H%D\¶VVWDQGDUGWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVDUHVLPLODU
WR$PD]RQ¶VLQVWDWLQJWKDW ³[n]o agency, partnership, joint venture, employee-employer or 
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 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191, Part 1 Section 4. 
195
 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191, Part 2 Section 2. 
196
 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191, Part 2 Section 2. The term also covers other services that 
Uber intermediates such as logistics, delivery, etc. 
197
 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191, Part 2 Section 4. It also appears that on occasions (e.g. 
where passenger claims to be overcharged) Uber may be making refunds to passengers without necessarily 
referring to the driver, which may or may not lead to a deduction from the payment made by Uber to the driver; 
Uber (ET), supra note 20, ¶ 23. 
198
 Amazon Marketplace is the platform owned and operated by Amazon where third-party suppliers sell their 
SURGXFWVRQ$PD]RQVRPHWLPHVEXWQRWDOZD\VDORQJVLGH$PD]RQ¶VRZQSURGXFWVIRUZKLFK$PD]RQLVWKH
retailer). Therefore, Marketplace is the legally UHOHYDQWDVSHFWRI$PD]RQ¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHOIRUWKHSXUSRVHV
RIWKLVDUWLFOHVLQFHLWLVWKH³SODWIRUP´ZKHUH$PD]RQDFWVDVDQLQWHUPHGLDU\EHWZHHQVXSSOLHUVDQGFRQVXPHUV
(rather than as a retailer selling its own products for its own profit). 
199
 Amazon Services Europe Business Solutions Agreement (last updated Dec. 6, 2018), Section 14, available 
at 
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/201190440?language=en_GB&ref=efph_201190440_con
t_521 (accessed Mar. 19, 2019).  
200
 Amazon Business Agreement, supra note 199, Section 14. 
201
 Amazon Payments ± Selling on Amazon User Agreement (last updated Jan. 25, 2019, Section 1.3 available 
at 
https://sellercentral.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=201190410&language=en_GB&ref=ef
ph_201190410_relt_201190440 (accessed May 10, 2019). Notably, according to the same section, Amazon is 
not a fiduciary or trustee of either the seller or the buyer. 
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franchiser-franchisee relationship is intended or created´ by the agreement.202 Moreover, 
eBay ³is not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and sellers´.203 Further, the 
agreement notes that the ³contract for the sale is directly between buyer and seller´.204 Yet, 
similar to Amazon, eBay can automatically FKDUJHWKHVHOOHU¶Vaccount to collect fees and 
charges, including reimbursements to buyers where a dispute is resolved in favour of the 
buyer, etc.205 Thus, eBay also clearly has access to, and authority to dispose of, the VHOOHU¶V
funds RQ WKH VHOOHU¶V EHKDOI )XUWKHU LW LV notable that the buyer ³enter[s] into a legally 
binding contract to purchase an item when [she] commit[s] to buy an item, or if [she has] 
the winning bid (or [her] bid is otherwise accepted)´.206 Hence, in practically all purchases, 
there is no further ³negotiation´ between the buyer and the seller beyond the facilitation of 
the contract provided by eBay; the contract of sale is concluded by the intermediation of 
eBay through the interaction of the third party merely with the platform. Further, the clause 
establishing when the contract is formed is inserted into the contract of the supplier and the 
customer by eBay. 
In the Apple ³iPhone Developer Program License Agreement´, it is stipulated that the 
app developer  
appoint[s] Apple and Apple Subsidiaries (collectively ³Apple´) as [his] 
worldwide agent for the delivery of the Licensed Applications to end-users, 
during the Delivery Period. [The developer] « acknowledge[s] that Apple 
will deliver the Licensed Applications to end users in Apple¶s own name, 
through one or more App Stores, but for [the developer] and on [the 
GHYHORSHU¶V@ behalf.207 
 
,QGHHG$SSOH¶V0HGLD6HUYLFHV7HUPVDQG&RQGLWLRQVZKLFKDUHDLPHGDWXVHUV
also stipulate that ³Apple acts as an agent for App Providers in providing the App Store and 
is not a party to the sales contract or user agreement between [the user] and the App 
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 eBay User Agreement available at https://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/user-agreement.html (accessed 
Mar. 15, 2019). The agreement applies to sellers as well as buyers on eBay. 
203
 eBay User Agreement, supra note 202$FFRUGLQJWRWKHXVHUDJUHHPHQW³H%D\LVDPDUNHWSODFHWKDWDOORZV
users to offer, sell and buy just abRXWDQ\WKLQJLQDYDULHW\RISULFLQJIRUPDWVDQGORFDWLRQV´id. 
204
 eBay User Agreement, supra note 202. 
205
 eBay User Agreement, supra note 202. 
206
 eBay User Agreement, supra note 202. 
207
 iPhone Developer Program License Agreement,  
 Schedule 1, ¶ 1.1; available at https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/gadgetlab/2010/03/ 
20100302_iphone_dev_agr2.pdf (accessed Mar. 19, 2019). In contrast, according to the separate Apple 
'HYHORSHU $JUHHPHQW ZKLFK D GHYHORSHU KDV WR DJUHH WR EH ERXQG E\ ³QR OHJDO SDUWQHUVKLS RU DJHQF\
relationship LV FUHDWHG´ EHWZHHQ D GHYHORSHU DQG $SSOH $SSOH 'HYHORSHU $JUHHPHQW, ¶ 1 
https://developer.apple.com/terms/apple-developer-agreement/Apple-Developer-Agreement-English.pdf 
(accessed Jan.  18, 2019). 
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Provider´.208 $SSOHFKDUJHVWKHXVHU¶VDFFRXQWDXWRPDWLFDOO\IRUDQ\SDLGWUDQVDFWLRQV209 
Given that the majority of the payment in relation to an app purchase is due to the app 
developer since Apple only retains a certain percentage of that amount as its commission, 
this clause demonstrates that Apple holds funds for the app developers and has the ability to 
impose contractual terms into the contract between the app developer and the third party.210 
$FFRUGLQJ WR $LUEQE¶V WHUPV Airbnb is ³an online marketplace that enables 
UHJLVWHUHGXVHUVµ0HPEHUV¶) and certain third parties who offer services («) to publish « 
Host SeUYLFHVRQWKH$LUEQE3ODWIRUPµ/LVWLQJV¶) and to communicate and transact directly 
with Members that are seeking to book such Host Services...´.211 $LUEQE¶VWHUPVVWLSXODWH
that ³[w]hen Members make or accept a booking, they are entering into a contract directly 
with each other. Airbnb is not and does not become a party to or other participant in any 
contractual relationship between Members, nor is Airbnb a real estate broker or insurer´.212 
These terms also stipulate that Airbnb does not act as an agent in any capacity for any 
Member.213 However, this is except for when it comes to payment services as in that case, 
³« $LUEQE 3D\PHQWV DFWV DV WKH 3URYLGLQJ 0HPEHU¶V SD\PHQW FROOHFWLRQ DJHQW IRU WKH
limited purpose of accepting payments from [the user] on behalf of the Providing 
Member´.214 In fact, ³Airbnb Payments will deduct any Host Fees from the Listing Fee 
before remitting the payout to the Host´, meaning that Airbnb will hold funds on behalf 
of/for the host.215 When the host ³accept[s] or [has] pre-approved a booking request by a 
Guest, [she is] entering into a legally binding agreement with the Guest´.216 Yet, ³[i]n certain 
circumstances, Airbnb may cancel a pending or confirmed booking on behalf of a Host or 
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 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions available at https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/us/terms.html (accessed Mar. 19, 2019). 
209
 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 208. 
210
 Cf Apple (iPhone), supra note 26ZKHUHWKH866XSUHPH&RXUWIRXQG$SSOHWREHWKH³UHWDLOHU´RIDSSV
which implies that the sale of contract takes place between Apple and the iPhone owner (i.e. customer) rather 
than the app developer and iPhone owner. 
211
 Airbnb Terms of Service available at https://www.airbnb.co.uk/terms Section 1.1 (accessed Aug. 3, 2018). 
Members and third parties ZKRRIIHUVHUYLFHVDUH³+RVWV´DQG WKHVHUYLFHV WKH\RIIHUDUH³+RVW6HUYLFHV´
0HPEHUV XVLQJ +RVW 6HUYLFHV DUH ³*XHVWV´ +RVW 6HUYLFHV PD\ LQFOXGH WKH RIIHULQJ RI YDFDWLRQ RU RWKHU
SURSHUWLHVIRUXVH³$FFRPPRGDWLRQV´VLQJOHRUPXOWL-day activities in vDULRXVFDWHJRULHV³([SHULHQFHV´
DFFHVVWRXQLTXHHYHQWVDQGORFDWLRQV³(YHQWV´DQGDYDULHW\RIRWKHUWUDYHODQGQRQ-travel related services, 
ibid. Members are registered users which include the consumers and suppliers. 
212
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 1.2.  
213
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 1.2.  
214
 See Airbnb Payments Terms, Section 9.3 available https://www.airbnb.co.uk/terms/payments_terms. Also, 
according to these Payments Terms, Airbnb is a payment collection agent solely for the limited purpose of 
accepting funds from Members purchasing services on the platform; id. Section 9.1. The same Payments Terms 
also include a liability disclaimer and indemnification clause in favour of Airbnb; Payments Terms, id., 
Sections 18 and 19. 
215
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 6.3. 
216
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 7.1.7. 
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Guest and initiate corresponding refunds and payouts´.217 Thus, Airbnb can directly 
influence the formation and operation of the contract between the host and the guest. Further, 
similar to Uber, some of the terms of the contract between the host and the guest are imposed 
E\WKHWHUPVRI$LUEQE)RUH[DPSOHDFFRUGLQJWR$LUEQE¶VWHUPVDFRQILUPHGERRNLQJRI
accommodation is a limited licence granted to the guest by the host to enter, occupy and use 
the accommodation, during which time the host retains the right to re-enter the 
accommodation ³LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK>WKHJXHVW¶V@DJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHKRVW´.218 Similar to 
Amazon Marketplace, $LUEQE¶VWHUPVVWLSXODWHWKDWWKe relationship between a host (or co-
host) and Airbnb is ³limited to being an independent, third-party contractor, and not an 
employee, agent, joint venturer or partner of Airbnb for any reason´.219 Further, the host or 
co-host acts exclusively on his own behalf and for his own benefit.220 
In contrast, aFFRUGLQJWR%RRNLQJFRP¶VWHUPVWKHSODWIRUP³acts as an intermediary 
(agent) between guests wanting to make an online hotel reservation and [the hotel partner] 
offering rooms´.221 Furthermore, ³the agreement and transaction is made directly between 
[the hotel partner] and the guest. « Booking.com is not a contracting party in the transaction 
between >WKHKRWHOSDUWQHU¶V@ property and the guest´.222 The payment is made by the guest 
directly to the hotel and Booking.com does not sell the accommodation.223 Notably, ³[w]hen 
a guest makes a booking, their reservation is confirmed immediately. So it [is] not possible 
to reject a reservation´.224 Thus, the contract is concluded through the agency of 
Booking.com with no further ³negotiation´ or other contractual dealings taking place 
between the actual contracting parties (i.e. the guest and the hotel) and Booking.com 
imposes the claXVH LQWR WKH SDUWLHV¶ FRQWUDFW FRQFHUQLQJ WKH Lmpossibility to reject a 
reservation. 
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 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 9.5. 
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 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 8.2.1. 
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 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 2116HFWLRQ$³FR-KRVW´LVD0HPEHUZKRPDKRVWDXWKRULVHVWR
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 And, not on behalf, or for the benefit, of Airbnb; Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 1.4. 
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 %RRNLQJFRP 3DUWQHU +HOS ³&DQ , &DQFHO D 5HVHUYDWLRQ"´ https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-
gb/articles/213302445 (accessed May 10, 2019). 
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 To summarise, all of the platforms stipulate in their standard terms and conditions 
that the relevant transaction, which is facilitated by the platform, takes place between the 
supplier and the third party (i.e. that the contract is concluded between the supplier and the 
third party) where the platform is not a party to the contract. Except for Amazon, eBay and 
Airbnb, the platforms describe themselves as agents in their standard contracts. Some of the 
SODWIRUPV¶FRQWUacts also reveal that the contract between the supplier and the third party is 
FRQFOXGHG DW WKH WLPH RI WKH WKLUG SDUW\¶V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH SODWIRUP ZLWK QR IXUWKHU
contractual steps taken by either party to the contract at a later stage (e.g. Booking.com; 
eBay; Uber). All of the platform contracts insert terms and conditions into the contract 
concluded between suppliers and customers. Nearly all of the platforms (i.e. Amazon; Uber; 
Apple App Store; Airbnb; eBay) hold funds on behalf of/for their suppliers for various 
reasons (e.g. because they receive payment from the third party before passing on the funds 
(minus their commission, etc.) to the supplier, etc.). 
(b) Price-Setting and Remuneration 
Price-setting powers of the intermediary and how the intermediary is remunerated 
are some of the significant factors in establishing the legal nature of the operations of any 
intermediary. Amongst the platforms studied here, Uber is unique when it comes to price-
setting power as it is the only platform studied, which has relatively direct influence on the 
price paid by the customer for the subject matter of the contract between the supplier and 
the customer.225 This is because at the end of a WULS8EHU¶VVHUvers calculate a fare for a 
given ride, taking account of time spent and distance covered.226 The figure stipulated by 
Uber is a recommended fare and the driver can agree a lesser (but not greater) sum with the 
passenger.227 In terms of remuneration, Uber does not charge a fee to passengers, but deducts 
a ³service fee´ from the fare paid by the passenger before passing the remainder to the 
driver.228 If a lower fare than suggested by Uber is agreed, Uber is entitled to the service fee 
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 $VZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGEHORZWKHUHDVRQIRU8EHU¶VKDYLQJVXFKLQIOXHQFHFDQEHUHODWHGWRWKHSDUWLFXODU
regulatory context in which it operates, and may not be detrimental to a finding of agency. See infra discussion 
in text around note 325. 
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 Uber (ET), supra note 20, ¶ 18. In surge areas, a multiplier is applied to fares resulting in a charge above 
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 Uber (ET), supra note 20, ¶ 19. 
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 Uber UK Terms and Conditions, supra note 191, Part 1 Section 5. According to the facts established in the 
employment law litigation against Uber in the UK, the service fee ranges between 20% to 25% of the fare; 
Uber (ET), supra note 20   7KH UDWHV WKDW DSSO\ IRU WKH ³WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ VHUYLFHV SURYLGHG E\ WKH
7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ 3URYLGHU FDQ EH IRXQG RQ WKH :HEVLWH DQG WKURXJK WKH 8EHU $SS´ 8EHU 8. 7HUPV DQG
Conditions, supra note 191, Part 1 Section 5. 
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(i.e. commission) on the basis of the recommended amount. Passenger pays Uber, who 
makes weekly payments to drivers.229  
In relation to price-setting, Airbnb provides a ³pricing tool that can recommend 
competitive rates´, but the rate charged is up to the landlord.230 Airbnb charges the guests 
before arrival and the landlord is paid automatically after check in with Airbnb deducting a 
³service fee´.231 Similarly, Booking.com operates on a commission basis and the hotel 
partner has to pay Booking.com a set percentage on each reservation made through the 
site.232 The rates are determined by the hotel partner.233 %RRNLQJFRP¶V³Preferred Partner 
Programme´ allows certain hotels (³which stand out´) to be ranked higher in the results than 
others all else being equal. These hotels pay a higher commission rate for this ranking. 
Notably, the commission percentage is also a factor taken into account by the standard 
algorithm that ranks the properties.234 ,Q FRQWUDVW $LUEQE¶V ranking algorithm does not 
appear to take into account the commission percentage, at least not explicitly.235 
 In return for the services of Amazon Marketplace, Amazon charges suppliers a 
³referral fee´ (a percentage of the sales proceeds), a non-refundable subscription fee 
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 See $LUEQE³2YHUYLHZ´DYDLODEOHDWhttps://www.airbnb.co.uk/host/homes?from_nav=1 (accessed Aug. 3, 
2018). 
231
 7KHIHHLVJHQHUDOO\RIWKHWRWDOUHVHUYDWLRQYDOXH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RZQHUV"´supra note 222. For the price-matching-JXDUDQWHHVHH%RRNLQJFRP³7ULS7HUPDQG&RQGLWLRQV´
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1FCAEoggI46AdIM1gEaFCIAQGYAQm4ARfIAQzYAQHoAQH4AQuIAgGoAgM;sid=94ae90ce16060ed
32b20c5dd267e4d9a (accessed Mar. 19, 2019). Interestingly, Booking.com offers a price-matching-guarantee 
to guests. Where such a guarantee is activated, the ultimate price paid by the guest will have been indirectly 
determined by Booking.com rather than the hotel partner. This author has argued elsewhere that the various 
investigations and decisions concerning Booking.com by competition authorities in Europe were misguided in 
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customer clauses of Booking.com; see Akman, supra note 6, 786-787. Interestingly, Booking.com also appears 
WRSURYLGHD³UDWHLQWHOOLJHQFH WRRO´ZKLFKDOORZVSURSHUW\RZQHUVWRFKHFNUDWHVDWFRPSHWLWRUV%RRNLQJFRP
3DUWQHU +HOS ³5DWH ,QWHOOLJHQFH´ DYDLODEOH DW https://partnerhelp.booking.com/hc/en-
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(monthly or per transaction) and where applicable, a ³variable closing fee´.236 eBay charges 
sellers a fee per transaction (usually a percentage of the selling price), an additional 
subscription fee for business sellers, and, it retains the right to also charge a fee even where 
the item does not sell ³for the introduction to a buyer for that item on the eBay site´.237 It is 
particularly clear from this latter term that eBay is charging for services that it provides to 
buyers and sellers, which consist in the introduction of contract parties to one another, rather 
than making a profit through resale, in remarkably similar fashion to a traditional estate 
agent business. 
Finally, for Apple App Store, many of the apps sold in the App Store are developed 
by third-party developers, and Apple earns a commission on each app purchased.238 The 
price charged for the app is determined by the developer.239 There are also annual fees that 
WKHGHYHORSHUVKDYHWRSD\WRMRLQ$SSOH¶VGHYHORSHUSURJUDPPH240 
In sum, except for Uber, none of the platforms has any (direct) influence over price-
setting in relation to the products/services of the suppliers, which are offered on the platform. 
In terms of remuneration, all of the platforms are remunerated by a fee that reflects a 
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Aug. 3, 2018). For sellers makinJDORWRIVDOHVH%D\RIIHUVWKHRSWLRQWRVHWXSDQ³H%D\6KRS´IRUDIODWIHH
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calculated as a percentage of the selling price ranging between 6% to 11% at the time of writing (excluding 
motors sales); id. 
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 When a customer purchases a third-party app, arguably, the payment is submitted to the App Store, and 
30% of that amount goes to Apple, with 70% going to the developer. See the alleged facts in Apple (iPhone), 
supra note 27. Technically, the apps made available through the App Store are licensed, not sold, to the user; 
Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 208. 
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 Apple also imposes a condition that the app is priced in dollar increments of .99 cents; Apple (iPhone) (SC), 
supra note 27. 
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 iPhone Developer Program License Agreement, supra note 207. Note that the agreement is from 2010 and 
has been acquired and made available on the internet using a Freedom of Information Request Act, and may 
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percentage of the value of the transaction intermediated by the platform. Occasionally, there 
are also fees to join the platform. Notably, the main remuneration is through a fee that 
reflects a commission for the intermediation services provided by the platform rather than 
WKHSODWIRUP¶VPDNLQJSURILW WKURXJK WKH VDOH/provision of the contract goods/services to 
third parties. 
(c) Ownership, investments, liability and risks undertaken on the relevant 
(product/services) market 
Only two of the platforms explicitly state in their standard contracts that they do not 
KDYHRZQHUVKLSRIWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIWKHWUDQVDFWLRQVRYHUWKHLUSODWIRUPH%D\¶VWHUPV
and conditions stipulate that eBay does not have possession of things listed or sold through 
its website.241 6LPLODUO\$LUEQE¶VWHUPVDOVRQRWHWKDW³Airbnb does not own, create, sell, 
resell, provide, control, manage, offer, deliver, or supply any Listings or Host Services, nor 
is Airbnb an organiser or retailer of travel packages´.242 However, it is worth noting that 
there is nothing in the business models or terms and conditions of the other platforms, which 
would suggest that they (could) have ownership of the subject matter of the contracts 
concluded on their platforms. In fact, in the case of Uber and Booking.com, the subject 
matter is a service (rides or room-booking). In the case of Booking.com, an explicit clause 
stipulates that ³Booking.com does not (re)sell, rent out, offer any (travel) product or 
service´.243 As regards Amazon Marketplace, where Amazon itself is not the supplier, it has 
no ownership of the products in question and an express term stipulates that it is the third-
party seller (i.e. supplier) who sells the product.244 In case of Apple App Store, it appears 
that for apps of developers, it is the third-party developer who licenses the app to the user 
(through the agency of Apple).245 
In terms of investments or potential risks undertaken on the relevant market in 
relation to products/services provided to third parties, in the case of Booking.com, Amazon 
Marketplace, eBay and Apple App Store, it is not possible to detect relevant clauses in 
standard contracts (or elsewhere) regarding any investments or risks undertaken on the 
relevant market. In the context of Uber, regarding investments on the relevant market, it is 
the drivers who supply the vehicle and the drivers are responsible for all costs related to 
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242
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 211, Section 1.2. 
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 %RRNLQJFRP³7ULS7HUPDQG&RQGLWLRQV´supra note 233, ¶ 1.  
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 Amazon Business Agreement, supra note 199, Section S-2.1.  
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 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 208. Users also KDYHWRDJUHHWKDW³$SSOHLVD
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owning and running the vehicle.246 Thus, Uber does not appear to make investments or take 
risks in relation to the transport activity. Uber does vet the drivers in checking that they have 
the necessary documents, that their car meets the requirements set by Uber, etc. before they 
can offer their services on the platform, and Uber offers advice to drivers who do not have 
the compulsory private car hire licence on how to get one.247 Given that all of these relate to 
8EHU¶VHIforts in facilitating more drivers to join the platform, these can be deemed to be 
LQYHVWPHQWV LQ8EHU¶VSODWIRUPEXVLQHVV i.e. the agency services market) rather than the 
relevant market concerning the services provided to customers. However, as of June 2018, 
Uber also appears to provide automatic insurance coverage for drivers satisfying certain 
eligibility criteria for the costs of on-trip as well as off-trip events, which can be seen as 
takings risks on the relevant market.248 Having said that, given that the insurance provided 
covers off-trip events as well, one could also consider this insurance to be an investment in 
8EHU¶V SODWIRUP EXVLQHVV LQ RUGHU WR DWWUDFW PRUH GULYHUV WR WKH SODWIRUP Airbnb also 
provides insurance for every property against accidental damage, as well as liability 
insurance to protect hosts against claims, which can be more easily considered as an 
investment in the relevant product/service market as the insurance is directly related to the 
services provided to third parties by the hosts.249 Although this could also be seen as an 
investment in the Airbnb platform, it is to a lesser degree than the case with Uber as the 
insurance coverage is limited to the contingencies of the contract between the host and the 
third party. 
In terms of promotional activities in relation to the contract goods/services, 
Booking.com promotes the properties listed on Booking.com on search engines as well as 
through affiliate partners, and offers assistance to hotels and their guests.250 Such assistance 
could be seen as investment in the relevant market, but could equally be deemed an 
LQYHVWPHQWLQ%RRNLQJFRP¶VRZQSODWIRUPEXVLQHVV Similarly, Amazon Marketplace terms 
and conditions stipulate that Amazon will promote third-party products as determined by 
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 Uber (ET), supra note 20, ¶¶ 44-45. 
247
 ³7KH %DVLFV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248
 ³3DUWQHU 3URWHFWLRQ ,QVXUDQFH´ DYDLODEOH DW https://www.uber.com/en-GB/drive/insurance/ (accessed on 
May 15, 2019). 
249
 $LUEQE³2YHUYLHZ´supra note 230. 
250
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Amazon including via advertising.251 Airbnb has similar terms on advertising the listed 
properties (and the platform).252 
All of the standard contracts contain clauses of liability waivers and indemnity. For 
example, Uber disclaims all liability for the reliability, timeliness, quality, suitability or 
availability of the services or third-party providers (i.e. drivers).253 Similarly, $PD]RQ¶V
standard terms include an indemnification clause by which Amazon excludes any liability 
for any claim, loss, damage, settlement, cost, expense, etc. in relation to sales channels and 
products of sellers on the Marketplace.254 The terms also note that ³because Amazon is not 
involved in transactions between customers and sellers´, Amazon is released from any 
claim, demand, damages, etc. in relation to any such disputes between market participants.255 
Similarly, the terms stipulate that the supplier is responsible for any non-performance, non-
delivery, misdelivery, theft or other mistake or act in connection with the fulfilment and 
delivery of the products.256 <HW$PD]RQDOVRUHTXLUHVSDULW\EHWZHHQWKHVXSSOLHU¶VGLIIHUHQW
sales channels and Marketplace in relation to quality of products and level of customer 
service.257 
In the same veinH%D\¶VDJUHHPHQWVWLSXODWHVWKDWZKLOHH%D\ 
may provide pricing, postage, listing and other guidance in [their] Services, 
such guidance is solely informational and [users] may decide to follow it or 
not. eBay GRHVQRWUHYLHZXVHUV¶ listings or content. « eBay has no control 
over and does not guarantee the existence, quality, safety or legality of items 
DGYHUWLVHG WKH WUXWK RU DFFXUDF\ RI XVHUV¶ FRQWHQW OLVWLQJV RU IHHGEDFN WKH
ability of sellers to sell items; the ability of buyers to pay for items; or that a 
buyer or seller will actually complete a transaction or return an item.258  
 
6LPLODUWRH%D\¶VWHUPV$LUEQE¶VWHUPVDOVRLQGLFDWHWKDW$LUEQEGRHVQRWcontrol or 
guarantee ³(i) the existence, quality, safety, suitability, or legality of any Listings or Host 
Services, (ii) the truth or accuracy of any Listing descriptions, Ratings, Reviews, or other 
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Member Content«, or (iii) the performance or conduct of any Member or third party´.259 
Booking.com has similar liability exclusion terms.260 According to AirbQE¶V ³Terms of 
Service´, hosts alone are responsible for ³identifying, understanding, and complying with 
all laws, rules and regulations that apply to their Listings and Host Services´.261  
Finally, aFFRUGLQJWR$SSOH¶VWHUPV³the App Provider of any Third Party App is 
solely responsible for its content, warranties, and claims that [the user] may have related to 
the Third Party App´.262 Apple sets content usage rules for consumers, and ³may monitor 
>XVHUV¶@ use of the Services and Content to ensure that [they] are following these Usage 
Rules´.263 Both user and developer terms and conditions include liability waiver terms in 
favour of Apple.264 
There are two further sets of terms found in the standard contracts of platforms, 
which are possibly unusual for traditional agency agreements. The first type of terms 
involves a prohibition/restriction of contact imposed by the platform (i.e. putative agent) 
between supplier (i.e. putative principal) and customer (i.e. third party) outside of the 
platform. All bar one of the platforms studied impose restrictions of contact between the 
contracting parties. For example, with Uber, drivers can neither REWDLQSDVVHQJHUV¶FRQWDFW
details nor provide their own to the passengers.265 Similarly, Amazon Marketplace 
agreement obliges sellers not to contact Amazon users directly about an order that they have 
placed with the aim of influencing them to make an alternative purchase or indirectly target 
them by communications of any kind.266 Sellers are allowed to contact purchasers only by 
using the tools that Amazon provides them for this purpose.267 Similar to Uber and Amazon, 
eBay has a policy of preventing buyers and sellers from using eBay to contact each other to 
make offers to buy or sell outside of eBay.268 Similar to (but slightly less restrictive than) 
Amazon, eBay prohibits the use of the contact information of other users for any purpose 
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other than in relation to a specific eBay transaction.269 Airbnb also has rules against members 
contracting with each other outside of Airbnb to circumvent their agreement with Airbnb.270 
Booking.com has similar restrictions in relation to allowing property/hotel owners and 
guests to contact each other, through the provision of anonymous alias email addresses, etc. 
although some contact outside the platform remains possible.271 Such a clause is not found 
LQ$SSOH¶VWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVVLQFHWhe issue of contact is not relevant to Apple App Store: 
the apps on App Store can only be used on iPhones and only those apps on App Store can 
be used on iPhones, so contact between a developer and user outside of the App Store is a 
non-issue for Apple unlike for all the other platforms.  
The second set of peculiar terms found in platform contracts relate to mechanisms 
put in place by platforms to exclude suppliers (i.e. putative principal) (and occasionally 
customers) from the platform if they do not comply with certain terms and conditions as 
well as in case of ³poor performance´. For example, concluding a sale outside of eBay after 
XVLQJH%D\ WRPDNH LQLWLDOFRQWDFWFDQ OHDG WR WKHVHOOHU¶VDQGRUEX\HU¶VH[FOXVLRQIURP
using the site.272 In the same vein, it is possible for riders as well as drivers to lose access to 
the Uber App as a result of poor ratings.273 6LPLODUWR8EHU¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHO$PD]RQDOVR
regularly reviews ³the performance of all sellers and notify them when they are off-
target´.274 Amazon ³occasionally´ suspends or blocks sellers with immediate effect and 
otherwise gives sellers 60 days for measurable improvement in performance.275 Airbnb also 
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retains the right to suspend or terminate accounts (of guests and hosts) based on performance 
(e.g. cancelled bookings, etc.).276 Booking.com has similar rules in relation to hotels where, 
for example, legitimate and serious complaints from guests can lead to termination of the 
contract by the platform.277 Similarly, Apple reserves the right to terminate or suspend the 
developer DVDUHJLVWHUHG$SSOH'HYHORSHUDWDQ\WLPHLQ$SSOH¶VVROHdiscretion, in the same 
way that the developer may terminate his participation as a registered Apple Developer at 
any time, for any reason.278 8QOLNHWKHRWKHUSODWIRUPV¶WHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV$SSOH¶VWHUPV
do not explicitly relate this to ³poor performance´. 
In sum, none of the platforms studied have ownership of what is being sold/provided 
to third parties through the facilitation of the platform; some of the platforms take on some 
limited risks and undertake some limited investments in relation to the relevant market; all 
bar one of the platforms restrict direct contact between suppliers and customers (i.e. 
contracting parties); all of the platforms have measures in place for excluding users from 
their platform, and all of the platforms have clauses that exclude their liability for various 
contractual failures and malfunctions in relation to the products/services provided by the 
suppliers to third parties. Diagram 1 below summarises the pertinent aspects of the platform 
standard contracts to illustrate the factor that are relevant to the legal characterisation of the 
platform business model.  
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Diagram 1 ± Platform standard terms and conditions 
                                            
276
 Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 2116HFWLRQ6LPLODUWRH%D\¶VWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQV$LUEQE¶V
also include terms on excluding liability and indemnification; Airbnb Terms of Service, id., Sections 17 and 
18. 
277
 %RRNLQJFRP ³*HQHUDO 'HOLYHU\ 7HUPV´ DYDLODEOH DW https://admin.booking.com/hotelreg/terms-and-
conditions.html?language=en;cc1=gb (accessed Feb. 15, 2019). 
278
 Apple Developer Agreement, supra note 207, ¶ 10. 
56 
 
V. Application of Agency Principles and Single Economic Entity Doctrine to 
Platforms 
This section brings together the relevant factors indicating agency from the different 
areas of law discussed in Sections II and III, and applies these to the platform standard 
contracts as exposed in Section IV to establish whether platforms are agents of their 
suppliers on the basis of these factors and their standard contracts. It should be noted at the 
outset that this exercise is one of balancing in trying to establish whether the factors which 
point towards the existence of agency outweigh any factors that may suggest otherwise. This 
is because in commercial relations, where an authority looks beyond the contract between 
parties in determining what the ³real´ economic and commercial context is, it is inevitable 
that such determination will be the outcome of a balancing act. As noted above,279 the areas 
of law studied do look beyond the contract to establish the real economic and commercial 
context, and the balancing act becomes necessary in such assessments. This section applies 
the findings on agency from all of the areas of law studied, rather than just competition law, 
in its striving for consistency, and legal and business certainty, which can be established to 
a greater degree if the legal characterisation of platforms were uniform under different areas 
of the law. Given that the concepts of agency found in these different areas of law broadly 
reflect the same principles, it is, indeed, also to be expected that these different areas of law 
adopt the same legal characterisation of the same business arrangement in establishing 
whether it is one of agency. The holistic treatment of principles of agency from different 
areas of law is also justified by the fact that, as noted above,280 these other areas of law have 
dealt with many more questions concerning the commercial delegation model of agency and 
its fundamental, operational principles than competition law, and thus provide important 
general guidance for the competition law assessment of such arrangements where 
competition law lacks such established general principles. When it comes to platforms in 
particular, competition law has not yet established general principles in any aspect of the 
legal question of agency. 
Reviewing the findings from Sections II and III in relation to factors demonstrating 
the existence or absence of agency leads to the identification of the following factors as 
being significant. Concerning common law and commercial agents, these relate to: 
contractual stipulations as to the existence of agency; how the intermediary is remunerated 
(i.e. being remunerated for services as opposed to by profit); commercial interest alignment 
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(resulting from the fiduciary relationship with the principal); scope of authority in changing 
WKH SULQFLSDO¶V OHJDO SRVLWLRQ; warranting to use reasonable endeavours (as opposed to 
warranting success), and, ownership of contract goods. Intermediaries which introduce 
contracting parties to one another even if they do not conclude contracts on behalf of either 
party can also be agents (e.g. estate agents). Notably, factors which do not prevent a finding 
of agency include those such as: the SULQFLSDO¶VODFNRIFRQWURORYHUWKHDJHQW; WKHDJHQW¶V
ability to influence and even set the final price paid by the third party; the undisclosed nature 
of the principal; WKHDJHQW¶VDFWLQJIRUFRPSHWLQJSULQFLSDOVZKHUHWKHQDWXUHRIWKHEXVLQHVV
so requires); WKHDJHQW¶VRFFDVLRQDOEHDULQJof costs of refunds for defective goods and some 
commercial risk arising out of the contracts between the principal and third parties. In 
competition law, the contract is also the starting point for the assessment with the main 
FULWHULRQUHYROYLQJDURXQGWKHDJHQW¶VXQGHUWDNLQJRIFRPPHUFLDORUILQDQFLDOrisks on the 
relevant market (i.e. those risks which relate to the performance of the contract with third 
parties). These risks can result from investments in relation to the contract goods/services or 
from other activities required by the principal on the relevant market. Negligible risks 
undertaken by the intermediary do not prevent it from being an agent. Some promotional 
measures aimed at the public on the relevant market do not prevent a finding of agency, 
either. Similarly, risks undertaken on the agency market as opposed to the market for the 
products/services provided to third parties (i.e. relevant market) are not relevant risks in this 
assessment. 2ZQHUVKLSRIWKHJRRGVDQGWKHFRQWUDFW¶VEHLQJFRQFOXGHGEHWZHHQWKHWKLUG
party and the putative principal are also relevant factors in competition law, similar to the 
other areas of law studied. Price-setting power is relevant in competition law in the context 
of risk-taking as it suggests the ability to determine commercial strategy and influence 
competition on the market, which would normally imply the absence of agency.281 This is a 
factor regarding which competition law differs from the other areas of law studied in the 
emphasis it places on it in relation to the existence or absence of agency. 
After applying all of the findings from Sections II and III to the terms and conditions 
set out in Section IV, one can conclude that platforms studied in this article appear to be, on 
balance, independent contractors (as opposed to employees) who are agents of their 
suppliers.282 Further, given that platforms facilitate particular transactions on behalf of their 
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suppliers on the relevant market, and it is only in this context that they act for and/or on 
behalf of the suppliers, they appear to be ³special agents´ under the traditional distinction 
recognised in English law between special and general agents.283 The rest of this section 
explains the reasons for which platforms are agents under the existing case law and rules 
found in the different areas of law studied. 
As an initial remark, it is worth reiterating the relevance of internal and external 
aspects of agency, as discussed above.284 Notably, the EU Verticals Guidelines as well as 
the EU Directive on Commercial Agents (and the UK Commercial Agent Regulations) 
define agents as persons vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on 
EHKDOIRIDQRWKHUVRFRQFOXGLQJFRQWUDFWVWRFKDQJHWKHSULQFLSDO¶VOHJDOSRVLWLRQGRHVQRW
appear essential for qualification as agency.285 The power to negotiate contracts suffices for 
it. In fact, in the context of the single economic entity doctrine, given that the inquiry relates 
to establishing whether the two entities in question are part of a single undertaking, even 
relations which demonstrate only the internal aspects of agency may qualify the relevant 
intermediaries as agents. In any case, applying the common law rules, it appears that 
platforms demonstrate not only the internal, but also external aspects of agency because all 
of the platforms studied at least hold money for their principals and/or receive and 
FRPPXQLFDWHLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHLUSULQFLSDOV¶EHKDOI and/or ultimately conclude the contract 
RQWKHSULQFLSDO¶VEHKDOIthrough the interaction of the customer with the platform with no 
further dealings between customer and the supplier. The platforms also have a degree of 
control in the operation of some aspects of the contract between the suppliers and customers 
through insertion of clauses in these contracts which they facilitate, demonstrating the ability 
WRFKDQJHWKHSULQFLSDO¶VOHJDOSRVLWLRQ without any further negotiation between the actual 
contracting parties (i.e. the principal and the third party). Thus, both internal and external 
aspects of agency are present in the case of platforms.  
In terms of contractual stipulations as to the nature of the agreement being that of 
agency, as exposed in Section IV, whilst Uber, Booking.com and Apple App Store self-
proclaim to be agents, the opposite is true for Amazon, eBay and Airbnb. Interestingly, there 
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is nothing obvious or inherent in the business models of these six platforms that would 
justify this difference in the legal characterisation of their business models. In fact, what 
they all do in facilitating transactions between contracting parties is remarkably similar in 
nature despite their activities being focused in different business sectors. As also noted 
above, 286 no area of law studied is bound by the wording of the contract in terms of the legal 
characterisation, and the assessment is conducted on the basis of the ³real´ commercial 
context. Having said that, where there is no reason to disregard the contractual wording, in 
commercial disputes, the contractual wording will be held to be valid in its characterisation 
of the relevant business relation.287 Thus, LQ VXFK FDVHV ZKHUH WKH SODWIRUPV¶ FRQWUDFWV
stipulate the existence (or absence) of agency, to rebut that clause, one will need to provide 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the ³real´ economic and commercial context proves 
a different business arrangement. For all the platforms studied in this article, including those 
that self-proclaim not to be agents, the nature of their commercial activities points to the 
existence of an agency arrangement rather than any other arrangement, as demonstrated by 
the overall content of their standard contracts studied in Section IV. The rest of this Section 
elaborates further on the reasons for this finding. 
None of the platforms studied have ownership of the products/services for which 
they facilitate transactions. ,QIDFWDOORIWKHSODWIRUPV¶WHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVexclude liability 
in relation to the performance of the contract between the supplier and the customer. These 
are factors that qualify them as agents in all the areas of law studied. Normally, these 
platforms neither make market-specific investments nor invest in sales promotion for 
particular products/services of their suppliers.288 Crucially, platforms do not assume any 
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significant financial or commercial risks related to the sales or performance of the contract 
with third parties (i.e. on the relevant market).289 There appear to be some limited exceptions 
to this in cases of, for example, provision of insurance or advertising. Yet, these appear to 
be, overall, negligible, and certainly within the scope of the case law on agency in common 
law and commercial law. Further, some of these investments (e.g. advertising) and risks can 
be deemed to relate to the platform market (i.e. the agency market) as opposed to the relevant 
market, which would imply that they are not relevant to the assessment of agency. The main, 
and perhaps the only, non-negligible risk that any of the platforms studied takes is the risk 
of not earning a commission where the contract between a supplier and a third party is not 
concluded on the platform. This, however, is a risk that relates to the activity of providing 
agency services in general and is not material to the assessment of agency.290   
$OORIWKHSODWIRUPV¶VWDndard contracts stipulate that the contract is formed between 
the supplier and the customer, which is another factor indicating agency under all areas of 
law studied. Indeed, it appears that irrespective of the time of contract formation, namely, 
whether the platform in question concludes the contract for the supplier, or, whether the 
supplier and the customer conclude the contract between themselves (after being 
³introduced´ by the platform), the platform can be an agent. This is important because in the 
online services offered by platforms, it is not always clear at which point the contract is 
concluded between the supplier and the customer, which can blur the precise role played by 
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the intermediary facilitating the transaction. There is normally not a separate dealing 
between the supplier and the customer other than the interaction that takes place between 
the customer and the platform. However, for contract law purposes, the time of contract 
formation may or may not be when the customer engages with the platform, depending on 
the platform and the activity in question.291 For example, the time of contract formation may 
be when the supplier accepts the order placed by the customer on a platform where products 
are sold. In contrast, the time of formation for booking accommodation may be when the 
SODWIRUPDFFHSWV WKHJXHVW¶VUHTXHVW WRERRNDURRPZLWKLPPHGLDWHFRQILUPDWLRQ7KHVH
different scenarios can have different consequences in relation to whether the contract has 
been concluded by the agent for the principal or not. The important point for the purposes 
of this article is that given that intermediaries who do not technically conclude the contract 
for the principal may also be agents in common law (e.g. estate agents) because it is 
sufficient for the intermediary to negotiate the contract to qualify as an agent, the contractual 
inquiry is not strictly necessary for or relevant to establishing the legal position of platforms 
as agents. As already mentioned, this is also the approach of the EU Verticals Guidelines 
and the EU Directive on Commercial Agents (and the UK Commercial Agents Regulations), 
which both acknowledge that agents may simply negotiate contracts rather than having to 
conclude contracts.292 In fact, in the context of platforms, the nature of the business model 
and of e-commerce might suggest that even ³negotiating´ contracts in the traditional sense 
is not necessary for the intermediary to qualify as an agent. This was the outcome upheld by 
the Court of Appeal in Insurancewide.com concerning a tax law dispute, where the Court of 
Appeal held that an insurance comparison website was an intermediary that qualified as an 
(insurance) agent despite the fact that the website had nothing to do with the negotiation of 
the terms of the insurance contract or its preparation or the collection of premiums or the 
handling of claims.293 This is because the comparison site in question was providing services 
characteristic of an insurance broker or agent, which were vital to the process of introducing 
those seeking insurance with insurers.294 Given that the platforms studied here not only 
introduce the contracting parties, but also impose terms into the contract between the 
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supplier and the customers, they arguably do more than what was accepted to be sufficient 
³negotiating´ in Insurancewide.com, and argumentum a fortiori satisfy the requirement of 
negotiating contracts as agents. 
Another relevant point for platforms derived from agency law is that the fact that on 
some platforms the supplier (i.e. principal) is not disclosed to the consumer does not render 
the platform a non-agent. Thus, for example, the fact that a passenger may not know with 
whom she is entering the contract of transport when using Uber which facilitates a match 
with a driver, does not prevent Uber from being an agent of that ³undisclosed principal´.295 
It is also notable that in agency law, limited control of the principal over the intermediary 
does not prevent agency. This is also relevant to platforms since in relation to most platforms 
studied in this article, the supplier does not necessarily have much control over the actions 
of the platform in its facilitation of transactions with users, which is usually a more powerful 
commercial entity than the supplier itself (e.g. Amazon Marketplace versus a retailer; Uber 
versus a single driver). Yet, an agent-principal relationship need not assume that power lies 
with the principal.296 For example, in Secret Hotels2, the UK Supreme Court held that Secret 
Hotels2, a platform which marketed holiday accommodation consisting of thousands of 
hotels, villas, etc. through a website ± similar to Booking.com and Airbnb in business 
activity ± was an agent of the hoteliers which had their hotels listed on the website.297 
According to ³terms of use´ on the website, the customer (travel agents and holiday-makers) 
had to pay the whole of the sum which she had agreed with Secret Hotels2 (at the time 
³Med´) to pay for the holiday before the holiday-maker arrived at the hotel.298 Med, 
however, only paid the hotel a lower sum when the holiday ended.299 The case concerned 
the VAT liability of Med which in turn hinged upon whether it was Med who supplied the 
room to the customer in return for the whole of the sum (in which case Med would have 
essentially booked the room for the lesser sum) or whether it was through Med¶s agency that 
the hotelier supplied a hotel room to a customer for the larger sum (in which case Med would 
have been entitled to the difference between the two sums as a commission from the hotelier 
acting as his agent).300 Essentially, the question was whether Med was the principal or the 
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 In situations where the customer believes it is dealing only with the agent and the terms and conditions have 
WKHDJHQW¶VQDPHRQWKHPUDWKHUWKDQWKDWRIWKHVXSSOLHUWKHDJHQWEHFRPHVDQXQGLVFORVHGDJHQW6LQJOHWRQ
supra note 65, 3, 48. 
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 Uber (EAT), supra note 20, ¶ 111. See also 7KH&RPPLVVLRQHUVIRU+HU0DMHVW\¶V5HYHQXHDQG&XVWRPV
v. Secret Hotels2 Limited [2014] UKSC 16. Cf Gurin and Peeperkorn, supra note 8, ¶ 9.58. 
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 Secret Hotels2, supra note 296297. 
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 Secret Hotels2, supra note 296, ¶ 4. 
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 Secret Hotels2, supra note 296, ¶ 4. 
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agent when making the supplies of hotel accommodation. Thus, the legal issue was 
remarkably similar to that of, for example, whether it is Uber that provides the transport 
VHUYLFHWRULGHUVRUZKHWKHULWLVWKHGULYHUVZKRSURYLGHWKHVHUYLFHVWRULGHUVWKURXJK8EHU¶V
agency. The Supreme Court found that the hotel room was provided by the hotelier to the 
customer through the agency of Med.301 This was despite the fact that Med was, as a result 
of its superior bargaining power, able to impose terms on the hoteliers such as that relating 
to the hotelier having to compensate Med for its losses (including loss of commission) if the 
hotelier could not provide the accommodation it had agreed to provide to a customer, and 
that the agreement was very one-sided in that it contained no express obligations on Med 
other than basic obligations (such as dealing accurately with the requests for bookings and 
relating all monies received from customers to hoteliers) whilst containing many obligations 
imposed on the hotelier.302 ,QIDFWHYHQ0HG¶VDELOLW\WRIL[LWVRZQFRPPLVVLRQGLGQRW
mean that the relationship was one other than that of agency.303 The UK Supreme Court also 
emphasised the fact that it was the hotelier, not Med, who owns the accommodation and it 
is the customer, not Med, to whom it is ultimately supplied.304 The similarity of the facts in 
these cases and the business model of platforms studied in this article is striking, which 
suggests that in the UK, the business models of these platforms would be considered as that 
of agency if this Supreme Court precedent were applied by analogy.305  
Indeed, the facts noted by the PC in Hong Kong Golf Club which relate to the control 
that the agent had over the principal, as well as the collection of fees from customers before 
making payments to the caddies,306 are also highly similar to the facts of how the platform 
business model works, and would suggest that the platforms studied here are also agents, 
even if they may ³recruit´ the suppliers (e.g. drivers) and have the power to discipline them 
(e.g. by excluding them from the platform), etc. Interestingly, the factors noted in Hong 
Kong Golf Club are comparable to the facts which the CoJ used to justify its finding in Uber 
Spain that Uber was a transport service and not an intermediation service (e.g. that Uber 
exercises ³decisive influence´ over the conditions under which the drivers provide the 
service).307 This suggests that a UK court may reach the opposite outcome to that reached 
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 Secret Hotels2, supra note 296, ¶ 41. 
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 Secret Hotels2, supra note 296, ¶ 57. 
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 This appears to be also how Underhill LJ interprets Secret Hotels2, supra note 296 in his dissenting opinion 
in Uber (CA), supra note 20, at ¶ 153. See infra note 308 for further discussion.  
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 See supra text to note 103. 
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 See Uber Spain, supra note 19, ¶ 39. Cf Advocate General Opinion in AIRBNB Ireland, supra note 19, ¶¶ 
69-71 where AG Szpunar differentiates the service provided by Airbnb from that provided by Uber in 
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by the CoJ in Uber Spain in a similar dispute concerning a platform if it applies Hong Kong 
Golf Club and Secret Hotels2 to a case concerning such a platform. In fact, the similarity 
between cases such as Hong Kong Golf Club and Mingeley concerning taxi companies and 
Insurancewide.com and Secret Hotels2 concerning online intermediaries and the business 
model of the platforms studied in this article is clear: there appears to be no apparent reason 
which would justify a different legal characterisation of platforms than that of agency given 
this case law, at least in English law.308 This outcome is diametrically opposed to, for 
example, the findings of the Bundeskartellamt which used, inter alia, the fact that the 
restraint in question was imposed by the platform over the supplier as a result of the superior 
bargaining power that the platform had over the supplier to justify its finding that the 
                                            
emphasising, inter alia, that Airbnb does not exercise decisive influence over the conditions under which the 
relevant services are provided. 
308
 In Uber, the CA refused to apply Secret Hotels2, supra note 296 in the ongoing employment litigation 
between Uber and drivers, and instead held that Autoclenz Ltd v. Belcher and others [2011] UKSC 41 ± which 
was not cited to the UK Supreme Court in SecretHotels2 ± is the relevant precedent; Uber (CA), supra note 
20, ¶ 54. The CA appears to distinguish SecretHotels2 on the basis that the case did not concern employment 
and there was no suggestion in the case that the written terms represented what was occurring on the ground, 
DQGWKDWWKHUHZDVXQGRXEWHGO\DFRQWUDFWEHWZHHQHDFKKRWHODQG0HGXQOLNH8EHU¶VDUJXPHQWLQWKHRQJRLQJ
litigation that there was no contract between Uber London Limited and drivers; id. ¶ 53. The CA also 
distinguished Mingeley, supra note 107, on the facts in Uber LQILQGLQJWKDWWKH³FULWLFDOILQGLQJLQMingeley 
was the absence of any requirement for the driver to DFFHSWDIDUHRIIHUHGWRKLPE\WKHV\VWHP´id. ¶ 57. The 
Court held that this was in contrast to the situation with Uber; Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 56. However, as 
noted supra at text to note 2278EHUGULYHUVFDQDOVRUHTXHVWGLIIHUHQWIDUHVWKDQWKDWUHFRPPHQGHGE\8EHU¶V
algorithm in that they can accept a lower sum from the rider. If it is unusual on the facts for an Uber driver to 
do so, it is presumably just as unusual for a minicab driver as the one in Mingeley to accept a different fare 
WKDQWKDWSURYLGHGE\WKHWD[LFRPSDQ\¶VV\VWHPLQSUactice. In fact, see the dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ 
in Uber (CA) QRWLQJWKDW³LWLVYHU\FRPPRQIRUPLQLFDERSHUDWRUVWRSUHVFULEHVHWIDUHVEXWWKHGULYHUVPD\
QRQHWKHOHVVFRQWUDFWDVSULQFLSDOV´Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 138. There is one notable difference in the 
facts of two cases, namely that drivers in Mingeley paid a weekly sum to the taxi company rather than 
commission per ride as is the case with Uber drivers. As also noted by the CA, in Mingeley the driver kept all 
the fare money; id. ¶ 56. However, in another case with very similar facts in Mingeley, it was held that such 
SD\PHQWZDVHVVHQWLDOO\³FRPPLVVLRQ´E\DWD[WULEXQDODQGWKH&$LQUber does not elaborate on why the 
same would not be the case for the weekly sum paid by the driver in Mingeley; see, Mahmood, supra note 109, 
¶¶ 43-45. The CA also distinguished Khan, supra note 112, on the grounds that the question in that case was 
whether there was a contract of employment and not whether the driver was providing services as the same 
W\SHRI³ZRUNHU´DVUHOHYDQW LQUber. With all respect to the CA, given how much emphasis it put on the 
relevant commission and fares in explaining why Mingeley is not applicable to the facts in Uber, given the 
similarity of facts in Khan and Uber including how commission is paid, it would have been helpful for the 
Court to elaborate further on this. Having said that, unlike Mingeley which is a judgment of the CA itself, Khan 
is an unreported EAT decision, which would not have been binding on the Court, anyway. In Uber, the CA 
also distinguished Hong Kong Golf Club, supra note 103, on the facts and held that it was of no assistance in 
the case at hand because it concerned the question whether the golf caddie was an independent contractor or 
DQHPSOR\HHUDWKHUWKDQZKHWKHUKHZDVD³ZRUNHU´DVLVWKHFDVHLQUber; Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 68. 
Again, with all respect, the CA appears to have dismissed the relevance of the case perhaps too easily ± not 
OHDVWEHFDXVH8EHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWLWLVDQDJHQWRIWKHGULYHUVDVZDVWKHILQGLQJLQUHODWLRQWRWKHJROIFOXE
in Hong Kong Golf Club, supra note 103. The dissenting opinion of Underhill LJ in Uber also supports the 
point that Mingeley, Khan and Hong Kong Golf Club are of assistance in the case; Uber (CA), supra note 20, 
¶ 144. In fact, the Dissenting Opinion also accepts that SecretHotels2 FRQILUPVWKDW³WKHRSHUDWRURIDQLQWHUQHW
platform which puts together suppliers of services and customers of those services can effectively stipulate 
that it is acting only as an agent even if it has its own strong customer-facing brand and exercises a high degree 
of control over aspects of the traQVDFWLRQEHWZHHQVXSSOLHUDQGFXVWRPHU´Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 153. 
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platform (i.e. online travel agent) was not an agent of the supplier (i.e. hotels) in the 
provision of hotel rooms to guests in HRS.309 Thus, the potential for adopting different legal 
characterisations of identical business models ± and possibly identical businesses ± with the 
consequence of diminishing business and legal certainty for platforms operating globally on 
standard contracts is clear.310 
The issue of the interests of the principal and the agent being commercially aligned 
rather than commercially adverse ± a reflection of the fiduciary relationship between the 
principal and the agent ± is also relevant to the characterisation of platforms and needs to be 
further elaborated on. In relation to a platform¶V facilitating a transaction between a customer 
and a supplier on the platform, the commercial interests of the platform and the supplier are 
normally aligned and not adverse. This is because when a transaction is facilitated on the 
platform in relation to the sale/provision of a product/service on the relevant market to the 
third party (i.e. customer), both the supplier and the platform generate revenue as a result of 
that same transaction. Thus, the platforms studied demonstrate this characteristic feature of 
an agency arrangement in relation to commercial interest alignment on the relevant market 
concerning the products/services provided to third parties. This also reflects the fact that, for 
competition law purposes, platforms and suppliers are in a vertical relationship to one 
another in the production chain, and the platform is a channel for reaching customers for the 
supplier.311 There are, however, important nuances to this, such as the relation between 
Amazon and third-party sellers on Amazon Marketplace or app developers and Apple on 
App Store, which may also offer products/apps in competition with one another.312 Such a 
conflict of commercial interests, indeed, clashes with the fundamental operation of an 
agency relationship, and will be returned to in Section VI in the (re)interpretation of the 
single economic entity doctrine and the agency rule in the context of platforms on the basis 
of the concept of ³competitive neutrality´.  
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 See findings of the Bundeskartellamt in HRS, supra note 8, ¶ 147. 
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 As noted by the current author elsewhere, this has already happened in the case of online travel agents such 
as Booking.com which have been subject to significantly different legal treatments of their business model in 
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 See, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court characterisation of the relationship between Apple App Store, app 
developers and iPhone owners as parties on a vertical chain of distribution in Apple (iPhone) (SC), supra note 
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%RZVWHDGDQG5H\QROGV
supra note 32, ¶ 6-015 with reference to Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 
41 (Austl.). 
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It may be argued that the fact that VRPHSODWIRUPV¶e.g. Booking.com) algorithms 
take into account the commission rate in ranking results also creates a degree of commercial 
adversity, as discussed above in the context of agency in common law.313 Thus, for example, 
Booking.com can increase its revenue by preferring the higher-commission-paying 
principals over principals that pay a lower commission, which may be deemed to potentially 
LQIULQJHDQDJHQW¶VILGXFLDU\GXW\WRZDUGVLWVSULQFLSDO. However, XQOLNHLQ$PD]RQ¶VFDVH
this is not about commercial interest alignment between Booking.com and the particular 
hotel on the relevant market concerning the particular room-booking activity where either 
Booking.com or that hotel generates revenue. In other words, the conflict does not concern 
WKH DJHQW¶VSXWWLQJKHUVHOI LQ DSRVLWLRQZKHUHKHUGXWLHV DV DJHQW FRQIOLFWZLWKKHURZQ
interests, but one where her duties as agent conflict with the interests of another principal. 
Thus, it is about a commercial conflict arising out of the fact that Booking.com non-
exclusively acts for principals (i.e. hotels) who are potentially in competition with another. 
Hence, this conflict arises out of the fact that the agent (i.e. platform) in question works for 
multiple principals (i.e. suppliers). It is the multiplicity of principals that creates the 
possibility that the agent (i.e. platform) may prefer some principals over others because they 
are more profitable for its agency business (and not for its separate business on the relevant 
market) due to higher commission. This is not dissimilar to the position of an estate agent ± 
which is legally an agent ± in being able to achieve different levels of commission in 
promoting and enabling the sale of potentially competing properties for different principals 
where one would generate higher revenue due to, for example, higher sales price or higher 
commission rate. As discussed above in the context of Kelly and RML,314 acting for 
competing principals is not inimical to a finding of agency in commercial law where the 
QDWXUH RI WKH DJHQW¶V EXVLQHVV UHTXLUHV WKLV Therefore, this should not be seen as a 
commercial conflict that would prevent a finding of agency in the context of platforms, 
either. 
Indeed, all of the platforms discussed in this article facilitate transactions between 
customers and numerous suppliers, many of which may also be each otKHU¶V SRWHQWLDO
competitors. The commercial law position contrasts to that of the CoJ in Suiker Unie, where 
the Court noted that, in general, the fact that a supplier prohibits its agents who sell in its 
name and for its account from acting simultaneously for competing suppliers without its 
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consent ³corresponds to the nature and spirit of a legal and economic relationship of the kind 
in question´.315 This suggests that for the CoJ, exclusivity of the agent is a normal feature of 
agency.316 Yet, the CoJ also accepts that such exclusivity can be validly contracted against 
by consent. Further, requiring exclusivity for there to be an arrangement of agency reflects 
an outdated view of commerce and commercial agency, which is no longer fit for the realities 
of commerce where agents are no longer individuals walking from door to door with a bag 
of samples, but companies acting on behalf of other companies, etc. Thus, the competition 
law position should be updated to align with the position in commercial law to bring it in 
line with the realities of 21st century commerce and e-commerce, in particular.317 As 
discussed above in relation to the position in commercial law, the online platforms analysed 
in this work clearly fall under the second type of agency as per Kelly and RML, where the 
nature of the business requires the agent to act for competing principals as this is their 
business function.318 This is, indeed, also the position found in some of the judgments of the 
GC, as noted above.319 Similarly, according to the EU Verticals Guidelines, it is immaterial 
for the assessment whether the agent acts for one or several principals.320 Both the 
commercial law position and the position of the GC and the Guidelines are preferable to that 
of the CoJ in their accommodation of the requirements of modern day agency business 
model.  
Applying the remainder of principles set out in the EU Verticals Guidelines other 
than that concerning exclusivity, online platforms studied here satisfy those criteria for 
agency, too. This is because, as exposed by their relevant standard contracts, the platforms 
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agency; see Suiker Unie, supra note 28, ¶ 478. 
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do not buy any products from the suppliers to resell them to customers;321 they do not bear 
any of the risks related to not selling/providing the products/services other than the risk of 
not generating any commission income; they do not bear any of the risks related to the 
sale/provision of the products/services to the customers due to numerous liability exclusion 
clauses (with limited exceptions concerning refunds, etc.); they get remunerated by the 
suppliers when a contract is concluded with the customer, in proportion to the value of the 
contract goods/services (i.e. by commission), etc. The commission paid to platforms by 
suppliers represents a fee for the services of intermediation rather than profit received as an 
independent intermediary, which again suggests a relation of agency in all of the areas of 
law studied. Indeed, these factors also reflect the fact that platforms only warrant to use 
reasonable efforts in facilitating transactions for the parties involved rather than warrant a 
particular outcome for their principals (i.e. suppliers), which is again, in line with agency 
principles. Importantly, the platforms do not set the price of the products/services in 
question, unlike, e.g., a retailer, with the exception of influence on price in the case of Uber. 
Interestingly, as seen above,322 in commercial law the way in which the price paid by the 
customer is arrived at is not determinative for a finding of agency.323 Thus, price-setting 
power appears more important in competition law than in the commercial law 
characterisation of an arrangement as agency, which suggests that in the case of a business 
PRGHOVXFKDVWKDWRI8EHU¶VFRPPon law may find agency where competition law does 
not.324 However, it is important to note that in the case of Uber, specific regulations apply 
requiring an element of price-setting.325 Further, Uber exercises limited influence on the 
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 It is a standard regulatory requirement, across the private-hire industry, for fares to be agreed between the 
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final price because Uber uses an algorithm that recommends a maximum fare to the driver 
in question who can accept a lower price from the customer.326 It is also notable that in the 
context of platforms, it is the suppliers (e.g. drivers) who pay the platform (e.g. Uber) for 
the platfRUP¶V VHUYLFHV ZKLFKe.g. Uber deducts from the payment by the customer, i.e. 
rider) rather than the platform paying the suppliers (e.g. Uber paying the drivers). This not 
only supports the assessment of the relationship as that of agency through its exclusion of 
alternatives such as a retail arrangement, but the direction of payment also casts doubts on 
alternative characterisations, such as that of employment, which would require the platform 
(e.g. Uber) to pay the suppliers (e.g. drivers).327  
TKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH&R-¶VKROGLQJVLQCEPSA to platforms is also of notable value 
in relation to remuneration and risks. First, the online platforms are in a very similar situation 
to the petrol-station operator in that they only receive remuneration as a result of enabling 
the conclusion of the contract between the third party and supplier (i.e. commission is paid 
after the transaction is facilitated and in proportion to the number and value of transactions 
so facilitated, etc.). This suggests the existence of agency not just in competition law, but in 
all areas of law studied. 6HFRQGWKH&R-¶VUHIHUHQFHWRLQYHVWPHQWVLQDGYHUWLVLQJVXJJHVWLQJ
a transfer of risk to the intermediary, which if, taken at face value, may suggest that platforms 
studied here are not agents because they invest in online advertising, etc. However, one has 
to distinguish between the advertising of the platform business itself and the advertising or 
other investment ³specifically linked to the sale of the goods´ which in case of, for example, 
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employer being under no obligation to pay the putative employee anything) to be the most important finding 
in relation to the conclusion that the relevant contract was not one of employment; id. ¶ 45. It should be noted, 
however, that in this case, the putative employee was negotiating her own fees with the clients at the club, in 
contrast to the case in e.g. Uber, where Uber sets the maximum fare. Having said that, there is, indeed, a line 
of tax cases in which private hire operators have been found to be agents for individual drivers; see, e.g., 
Lafferty v. The Commissioners for HMRC [2014] UKFTT 358 (TC); Khalid Mahmood v. The Commissioners 
for HMRC [2016] UKFTT 622 (TC), and also HMRC Guidance (VAT Notice 700/25: taxis and private hire 
cars) (Sept. 19, 2016) ¶ 3.3 available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-vat-applies-to-taxis-and-private-
hire-cars-notice-70025#para32 (accessed May 29, 2019). 
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Booking.com or Amazon Marketplace would be investing in advertising for the sale of a 
given room at a given hotel or a particular product of a third-party seller. If an investment in 
the agency business as such (including investment in advertising the business) renders an 
agent a separate undertaking, then no agreement between any agent and principal is likely 
to fall outside of Article 101 since any agency business will require some investment in the 
business, and advertising online is a core part of online business models. Thus, it must be 
that the CoJ here refers to risks other than those resulting from investing in the agency 
business as a separate business in itself. The relevant investments must be those made in the 
³relevant market´, not in the ³agency market´. Similarly, even in the case of advertising for 
the sale of a given hotel room or a given product, the financial risk of the room going vacant 
or the product not selling still lies with the hotel or the third-party seller. The only risk 
involved for the platform remains the risk of not generating commission income. Thus, even 
in such a case where the platform invests in advertising, the supplier continues to bear the 
main financial and commercial risk, a fact which would suggest the existence of agency on 
the part of the platform.  
$VQRWHGDERYHWKHUHDUHVRPHWHUPVLQWKHSODWIRUPV¶standard contracts, which are 
unusual for traditional agency contracts: terms that prevent the suppliers (i.e. principals) 
from contacting their contracting parties outside the platform (i.e. agent), and, terms that 
allow the platform (i.e. agent) to exclude suppliers (i.e. principals) from concluding future 
contracts on the platform. It could be legitimately questioned whether these terms prevent 
platforms from being agents of their suppliers. With the first type of term, the agent 
restricts/prohibits contact between the actual contracting parties. This can be deemed 
unusual in a traditional agency relationship where the principal would be expected to be able 
to contact its contracting party.328 )XUWKHUVXFKFODXVHVDOVRHVVHQWLDOO\LQYROYHWKHDJHQW¶V
imposing terms and conditions into the contract between the third party and its principal, 
which may raise questions concerning the provider of the underlying products/services in 
the contract with the third party.329 With the second type of clause, the agent has the means 
                                            
328
 See e.g., Uber (EAT), supra note 20, ¶ 110, where the EAT noted that it is questionable that agency is the 
ULJKWFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKHEXVLQHVVZKHQWKH³SULQFLSDO´LV prevented from building up a business relationship 
with the end user of the service.  
329
 This is one of the factors which the EU &RPP¶Q states to suggest that in the context of a sharing economy 
platform, the platform not only offers an information society service, but also provides the underlying service 
(e.g. transport, short-term accommodation, etc.); see EU &RPP¶Q, Collaborative Economy, supra note 323, 
Section 2.1. In contrast, in the context of agency, the fact that the agent can make contractual decisions on 
EHKDOIRIDQGIRUWKHSULQFLSDOGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHDJHQWLVFDSDEOHRIFKDQJLQJWKHSULQFLSDO¶VOHJDOUHODWLRQV
with third parties, demonstrating the existence of the external aspects of agency, confirming the presence of 
agency. 
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to prevent its principal from entering into a transaction with third parties through the 
intermediation of the agent in future where the supplier and/or third party fail to meet certain 
performance criteria. This can also be seen as a clause foreign to traditional agency relations 
as it involves the agent¶V imposing rules of conduct on the principal, which could be deemed 
to clash with the DJHQW¶V duty to account to the principal.330 
Both types of terms are, however, to be expected in the platform business model 
studied here because they seek either to prevent free-riding by suppliers and users, or, to 
preserve the quality of the platform. Both sets of these terms and conditions reflect the two-
sided nature of the platform business model.331 The first type of terms aims to prevent free-
riding WKDWZRXOGUHVXOWIURPSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFWLQJRXWVLGHRIWKHSODWIRUPRQFHWKH\³find´ 
each other on the platform. Such contracting would eliminate the possibility of remuneration 
for the platform due to the loss of commission, as these platforms only generate revenue 
when the transaction between the parties who have found each other on the platform is 
actually concluded on the platform. In the long run, such free-riding can also diminish the 
incentives to invest in the platform business model, and could be welfare-decreasing.332 It 
is, indeed, telling that Apple App Store terms do not contain a term restricting contact 
between the third-party app developer and customers: it appears that where there is no 
possibility of free-riding as in the case of Apple (resulting from the fact that only apps in the 
App Store can be used on iPhones), the platform has not adopted restriction of contact rules, 
which suggests that the rationale behind the rules may, indeed, be that of preventing free-
riding. The second type of these terms can be justified by the SODWIRUPV¶DLPLQJWRSUHVHUYH
the quality of the interactions on the platform in order to sustain the network effects enjoyed 
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 See supra text to note 55. 
331
 Two-VLGHGRUPXOWLVLGHGPDUNHWVUHIHUWRWKRVHPDUNHWVZKHUHDEXVLQHVVHJD³SODWIRUP´IDFLOLWDWHV
direct interactions between different types of customers; see Evans and Schmalensee, supra note 1, 15. 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ WKH &$ IRXQG WKDW 8EHU¶V UDWLQJ V\VWHP IRU GULYHUV DPRXQWV WR D SHUIRUPDQFH
management/disciplinary procedure which iVD³SRZHUIXOSRLQWVXSSRUWLQJWKHFDVHWKDWWKHGULYHUVZRUNIRU
8EHU´Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 96. Yet, given that such review procedures are in place in contracts of all 
of the platforms studied here, the CA may have failed to appreciate the reasoning and function of such 
procedures, which result from the two-sided nature of the business model and relevant network effects. It is 
difficult to agree that such procedures signify an employment arrangement due to the performance 
management quality that they demonstrate when all of the platforms studied here contain such clauses and 
employment is clearly not the correct characterisation of the relationship between third-party sellers and 
Amazon Marketplace, etc. That such terms are simply measures to ensure quality of the product/service 
provided by the intermediary from which it makes profit is acknowledged in the dissenting opinion of Underhill 
LJ in Uber (CA), supra note 20, ¶ 138. 
332
 7KLVZDVLQGHHGWKHUHDVRQIRUWKHGLVWLQFWLRQPDGHEHWZHHQ³QDUURZ´DQG³ZLGH´SODWIRUPPRVW-favoured-
customer clauses by some authorities in Europe, which found that narrow MFC clauses may be necessary for 
the business model to be sustainable; see Akman, supra note 6, 792, 799. 
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by the platform.333 These terms may arguably be necessary to preserve the investments made 
in the platform by ensuring a certain quality level in the dealings facilitated between 
suppliers and customers. This is because erosion of such quality on one or both sides of the 
platform can lead to a loss of network effects and of the necessary scale of operations for 
the platform, which can ultimately lead to the collapse of the business model.334 Thus, 
although both of these types of terms may be unusual for traditional agency relations, they 
do not appear to be unusual for the standard contracts of platforms given how the platform 
business model functions. Consequently, they should not be deemed to be factors preventing 
the existence of agency where, as demonstrated throughout this Section, the balance of the 
relevant factors points in the direction of a relationship of agency. 
All in all, as the law currently stands, the relationship between a platform and a 
supplier in the context of the relevant products/services market where the platform facilitates 
a transaction between the supplier and the third party (i.e. customer) cannot be legally 
explained in any other way than that the platform acts as the agent of the principal (i.e. 
supplier) in that transaction facilitated between the supplier and the third party. The 
implication for competition law purposes, as noted above, is that the application of the single 
economic entity doctrine and the agency rule thereunder exclude the restrictions of 
competition on the relevant market found in the agreements between platforms and suppliers 
from the scope of the prohibition in Article 101. The next Section explores whether, and if 
so, how, the single economic entity doctrine should be (re)interpreted in this context to 
render the competition law prohibition of anticompetitive agreements applicable to contracts 
of platforms with their suppliers. 
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 Network effects relate to the fact that on two-sided markets, demands on the two sides of the market are 
interlinked; see Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme, Pauline Affeldt, Market Definition in 
Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10(2) J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293, 296 (2014). There are two 
W\SHVRIQHWZRUNHIIHFWVGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFW$³GLUHFWQHWZRUNHIIHFW´H[LVWVZKHUHFRQVXPHUV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWR
pay for a product depends on the number of other consumers (or the quantity bought) of the same product; id. 
QRWH$Q³LQGLUHFWQHWZRUNHIIHFW´H[LVWVZKHUHFRQVXPHUV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\IRUDSURGXFWGHSHQGVRQWKH
number of consumers (or the quantity bought) of another product; id. In the context of two-sided markets, the 
indirect network effect relates to demand on one side of the market depending on demand on the other side of 
the market. 
334
 For example, if riders stop using Uber after dissatisfaction with the quality of the ride that they booked on 
the platform, this not only reduces the number of riders on one side of the market, but can also lead to a 
reduction in the number of drivers who offer their services on the platform because there will be fewer riders 
to offer their transport services to on the platform. Further, given that commission is only generated as a result 
of successful transactions, the lowering of the quality of the interactions on the platform can lead to a loss of 
the necessary scale of operations to generate any revenue. In the long run, the loss of the network effects and 
the necessary scale can lead to the collapse of the two-sided business model which operates on the basis of 
commission.  
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VI. (Re)interpreting the Single Economic Entity Doctrine and the Agency 
Rule: Competitive Neutrality 
Section V demonstrated, based on the principles of agency from different areas of 
law and the single economic entity doctrine, that the platforms studied in this article are 
legally agents of their suppliers in relation to the transactions that they facilitate on the 
relevant market between their suppliers and third parties. As noted above, the agency rule 
under the single economic entity doctrine means that once it is accepted that platforms are 
agents of their suppliers, the agreements between platforms and suppliers fall outside the 
scope of competition law in relation to restrictions of competition on the relevant market 
where the platform is acting as the agent of the supplier. Given the ubiquity of the platform 
model and the growing share of e-commerce in the digital economy, this finding implies that 
theUH LV D VLJQLILFDQW ³SODWIRUP JDS´ LQ FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ DV FXUUHQWO\ FRQFHLYHG, which 
immunises potentially substantial restrictions of competition from scrutiny. The next legal 
question, therefore, becomes whether this application of the single economic entity doctrine 
should be modified, and if so, on what basis such (re)interpretation should take place, so that 
such agreements which contain restrictions of competition come under the scope of 
application of Article 101.  
This author would argue that the agency rule and its operation under the single 
economic entity doctrine should be modified and/or (re)interpreted to the extent that there 
is a commercial conflict of interest between the platform (i.e. putative agent) and a given 
supplier (i.e. putative principal) in relation to the transaction to be facilitated with the 
customer on the relevant market. Namely, where there is a commercial conflict of interest 
between the platform and the supplier in relation to the transaction to be facilitated on the 
relevant market, the platform should not be deemed to be an agent of the supplier in that 
context. This is because, as agency law demonstrates, the concept of agency is 
fundamentally built upon an alignment of commercial interests between the agent and the 
principal, rather than upon commercial adversity.335 This results from the fact that agency is 
D PRGH RI GHOHJDWLRQ ZKHUH WKH SULQFLSDO DSSRLQWV WKH DJHQW WR DFW LQ WKH SULQFLSDO¶V
commercial interest to conclude transactions, which ultimately benefit both the principal and 
the agent, when successful. This reflects the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the 
agent and the principal, which requires WKHDJHQW¶V³loyalty´ to her principal WKHDJHQW¶V
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 See supra text around note 48. 
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³duty and interest´ need to be aligned and not in conflict.336 This fundamental feature of 
agency, namely that of commercial interest alignment resulting from the fiduciary nature of 
the relationship, can be transposed into competition law as a guiding principle to establish 
which commercial arrangements represent that of agency and, subsequently, justify the 
agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine and which do not. This is because 
despite this not being acknowledged in competition law jurisprudence, soft law or 
commentary, in such cases where their commercial interests are aligned, for competition 
purposes, the agent and the principal are also in a state of ³competitive neutrality´: they do 
not compete with one another and their business operations are complementary in nature 
rather than rivalrous. Under such circumstances, there is no reason not to treat the platforms 
as part of the same undertaking with the suppliers under the single economic entity doctrine, 
as the doctrine currently provides, as discussed in Section V. In fact, the principles and 
operation of agency in all areas of law studied point towards this outcome. Where the 
platform and supplier are in a competitively neutral position, the platform simply constitutes 
a means for the principal to conclude transactions with customers, and in this activity, they 
act as a single economic entity. It also makes commercial sense to treat them as one under 
such circumstances because the two entities would be acting as one on the relevant market 
in relation to the transactions concluded with third parties. This normally holds for the 
platform business model in that it is in the commercial interest of both the platform and the 
supplier to conclude a transaction on the platform where they both benefit from such a 
transaction by way of a commission and a profitable sale, respectively. This results from the 
fact that a platform and the suppliers thereon are normally in a vertical relation to one 
another, where the former provides a sales channel for the latter, enabling the latter to reach 
more customers more effectively, etc. This author would posit that in cases where the 
vertical relation between the platform and the supplier entirely holds, so that the platform is 
merely providing a service to the supplier (e.g. a sales channel), which the supplier uses for 
reaching its customers to provide its products/services, the platforms should continue to be 
held to be agents under the single economic entity doctrine as they are in a competitively 
neutral position in relation to their suppliers. 
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 See RML, supra note 81, ¶ 20 discussed supra around text to note 81. The proposal in this section is also 
partly in line with Restatement, supra note 37, s. 8.04, which stipulates that throughout the duration of an 
agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain from competing with the principal. The proposal, however, 
departs from the stipulation in the remainder of Section 8.04, according to which the agent also has a duty to 
UHIUDLQIURPWDNLQJDFWLRQRQEHKDOIRURWKHUZLVHDVVLVWLQJWKHSULQFLSDO¶VFRPSHWitors; see infra text after note 
345. 
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By contrast, where the relation between the platform and the supplier turns from a 
vertical into a horizontal one, then the agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine 
should be modified because in this case, commercial alignment is replaced with commercial 
adversity and ³competitive neutrality´ is replaced with ³competitive rivalry´: the parties 
become competitors on the relevant market. Platforms that are in a position where their 
interests are commercially adverse to the interests of the suppliers in that the platform is also 
a competitor of the supplier on the relevant market (through activities it carries out for her 
own account) should not be able to make use of the agency rule under the single economic 
entity doctrine in relation to restrictions of competition on that market. In such situations, 
not only does the platform become a competitor to the supplier and can conclude a contract 
for its own benefit instead of for the benefit of the supplier (i.e. its duties as agent conflict 
with its own interests), but it also has an automatic cost advantage in comparison to the same 
supplier because it does not have to bear the commission due on every transaction completed 
by the supplier on the platform. Thus, in situations where ³competitive neutrality´ no longer 
holds, the platform and the supplier should no longer be deemed part of a single economic 
entity, and the single economic entity doctrine should be (re)interpreted to accommodate 
this exception to the agency rule in relation to platforms. The implication of this 
(re)interpretation would be that those agreements between platforms and suppliers that 
restrict competition on the relevant market would be subject to the full application of the 
prohibition of Article 101 where the platform competes with the suppliers in question on the 
relevant market.  
This (re)interpretation is not only in line with the principles of agency found in 
different areas of law, according to which the most specific fiduciary duty of an agent is ³not 
to make a profit at h[er] SULQFLSDO¶VH[SHQVH´, but also with the implicit reasoning underlying 
the treatment of certain separate entities as part of the same economic entity in competition 
law.337 In fact, the rules concerning agency in these other areas of law and the operation of 
the agency rule in competition law demonstrate remarkable similarity in essence. Despite 
this not having been acknowledged in the competition law jurisprudence, soft law or 
commentary, as noted above,338 the centrality of risk-taking on the relevant market for a 
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 Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 6-042. See supra text around note 110. 
338
 See supra text around note 137. The Verticals Guidelines may be implicitly acknowledging this in stating 
that an intermediary is generally considered to be an agent, inter aliaZKHUH LW ³GRHVQRW XQGHUWDNHRWKHU
activities wLWKLQWKHVDPHSURGXFWPDUNHWUHTXLUHGE\WKHSULQFLSDO´9HUWLFDOV*XLGHOLQHVsupra note 31, ¶ 16 
(g). Unfortunately, it is unclear what the GuidelinHVPHDQE\UHIHUULQJWRDFWLYLWLHV³UHTXLUHGE\WKHSULQFLSDO´
in this context since it is in the nature of agency that the principal would require the agent to undertake activities 
on the relevant market on his behalf. 
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finding of agency (or lack thereof) suggests that once the agent adopts a course of conduct 
taking risks on the relevant product/services market (where it is appointed to facilitate 
transactions between the principal and third parties), and thereby puts herself in a position 
of competition with the principal, then she should no longer be deemed to constitute part of 
the same economic entity as the principal. In such a scenario, what agency law denotes to 
be ³commercial interest alignment´ reflecting the fiduciary nature of the agency relationship 
is replaced with ³commercial adversity´. For competition law purposes, this corresponds to 
a state of ³competitive neutrality´ being replaced with ³competitive rivalry´. Thus, in such 
circumstances where agency law would likely find a lack of agency, competition law should 
also find a lack of agency with the outcome that the single economic entity doctrine does 
not apply to the entities in question where there is no ³competitive neutrality´. Where there 
is competition between two parties on the relevant market in that the agent can, as a market 
actor in its own right, affect competition on that market, the rationale underlying the single 
economic entity doctrine should be deemed to no longer hold, and thus, the doctrine should 
not be applicable.  
It is noteworthy that this conflict of interest between platforms and their suppliers 
has recently not only gained attention from competition authorities around the world 
exploring its compatibility with competition law, but also led to outright bans of platformV¶
ability to sell on their own marketplace in competition with their suppliers in some 
jurisdictions.339 However, VXFK DQ RXWULJKW EDQ RQ SODWIRUPV¶ VHOOLQg on their platforms 
alongside third-party suppliers can itself have anticompetitive effects by leading to lower 
output and higher prices for consumers.340 The (re)interpretation of the single economic 
entity doctrine presented here is, thus, more appropriate from a competition as well as a 
commercial perspective than such outright bans on the platformV¶DELOLW\WRVHOORQtheir own 
platform. This is because the (re)interpretation proposed on the basis of ³competitive 
neutrality´ enables a flexible application of competition law by reinterpreting its scope of 
application in particular instances where conflicts of interest actually matter in relation to 
competition, whilst allowing the business model to continue to function as intended in all 
other aspects. The policy revision in line with this finding in the EU would be for the EU 
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 For example, Amazon is banned from selling its own products as a retailer on Amazon Marketplace in India 
due to new e-commerce regulations; see, Sasha Fedorenko, Amazon India removes products over new 
marketplace regulation, TAMEBAY, Feb. 1, 2019, https://tamebay.com/2019/02/amazon-india-removes-
products.html. See also EU informal Amazon probe, supra note 18; Bundeskartellamt investigation into 
Amazon, supra note 18; Senator Warren statement in relation to platforms, supra note 18; Spotify complaint 
against Apple, supra note 18.     
340
 See Hovenkamp, supra note 18. 
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Commission to include a provision in a revised EU VBER and/or in the accompanying 
Guidelines to the effect that platforms that compete with their suppliers on the relevant 
market in relation to the products/services provided to third parties (i.e. customers) will not 
be treated as agents of their suppliers in relation to agreements which restrict, distort or 
prevent competition on that market. This would make their agreements with their suppliers 
subject to the full application of Article 101. Thus, a third exception should be created in 
addition to the two exceptions already stipulated in the Guidelines concerning when an 
agency agreement ³exceptionally´ falls within the scope of the prohibition of Article 101.341 
6XFKDSURYLVLRQFRXOGUHDGDVIROORZV³DQDJHQF\Dgreement will fall within the scope of 
Article 101(1), even if the principal bears all the relevant financial and commercial risks, 
where the agreement is between a platform and a supplier, and the platform competes with 
the supplier on the relevant market in relation to the products/services sold/provided to third 
parties through the intermediation RIWKHSODWIRUP´ 
It is noteworthy that in an earlier judgment ± outside the agency context ± clarifying 
the concept of ³undertaking´ for competition law purposes, the CoJ referred to the fact of 
competition between the persons participating together in a given agreement being 
impossible as a sign of the persons¶ not being considered to be separate undertakings.342 
This is strikingly similar to the position in US law concerning the assessment of when two 
entities make up a single economic entity. For example, in Siegel Transfer, the US Court of 
Appeals found that in the case of agents, whose only function was to make arrangements for 
the tUDQVSRUWRIWKHSXWDWLYHSULQFLSDO¶VIUHLJKWZLWKDXWKRULVHGFDUULHUVbecause these agents 
did not compete with the putative principal and because they received commission from the 
principal based on the loads they arranged for the company to transport (which meant that 
WKH SDUWLHV¶ HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV ZHUH HQWLUHO\ FRQJUXHQW WKHUH ZDV D VLQJOH HFRQRPLF
entity.343 Indeed, the US Supreme Court clarified in American Needle that in establishing 
whether liability under Sherman Act, Section 1 (equivalent to Article 101) arises, the 
question is whether the agreement between parties ³deprives the market of actual or potential 
competition´.344 Thus, (re)interpreting the single economic entity doctrine in line with the 
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 See Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶¶ 19-20 and supra text around note 183 in relation to the existing two 
exceptions. 
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 Hydrotherm, supra note 114, ¶ 11. 
343
 Siegel Transfer, Inc. et al v. Carrier Express, Inc. et al, 54 F.3d 1125, 1135 (1995). For the argument that 
actors in a sharing economy arrangement pursue their own separate economic interests and would not be 
protected by the single economic entity doctrine in the United States, see Anderson and Huffman, supra note 
8, 900. 
344
 American Needle, supra note 5, 197. 
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competitive neutrality concept of this article could potentially bring the EU and US 
competition law treatment of platforms closer to one another, which would be desirable due 
to the global nature of the businesses of the platforms.345 
It should be noted that the relevant conflict or alignment of commercial interests and 
the position of ³competitive neutrality´ should be established regarding the position of the 
platform in relation to the one and the same principal (i.e. supplier), not in relation to the 
platform and competing principals. It has to be accepted that the online platform business 
model inevitably involves the platform¶V acting for different (and potentially competing) 
principals as is the case with more traditional agents, such as estate agents. What matters for 
the purposes of establishing that the platform is the agent of the supplier and that 
subsequently, their restrictive agreement on the relevant market should fall outside of 
competition law scrutiny is whether the platform competes with that principal whose 
agreement is in question on the relevant market (where products/services are provided to 
customers) in relation to which the restriction of competition exists. After all, the legal 
question is whether the platform is the agent of a given supplier by being part of the same 
single economic entity as that supplier in the context of the restrictive agreement on the 
relevant market with that supplier. Consequently, the fact that the platform acts for 
numerous principals at the same time is not prohibitive of a finding of agency, as seen above 
also in agency law and in some competition cases and Guidelines,346 and should not make a 
difference in relation to the competitive neutrality assessment, either. The pertinent issue 
here is whether the platform has operations on the relevant market concerning the 
products/services provided to customers and concludes transactions with customers for its 
own account in competition with the supplier, for whom it simultaneously acts as an agent.  
7KLVLVDOVRKRZWKH*&¶VILQGLQJVLQMinoan Lines should be interpreted. In Minoan 
Lines, the GC considered a new factor for determining whether there is a single economic 
entity in addition to the factor of economic risk: whether the services provided by the 
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 This is not to say that in their overall operation the U.S. intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and the EU 
single economic entity doctrine would become significantly aligned because the focus of the inquiry in the 
United States appears to be whether the allegedly anticompetitive conduct in question deprives the market of 
actual or potential competition, whilst the EU inquiry is focused on whether the entities in question can be 
deemed as separate undertakings in relation to their competitive position on the market. Namely, the EU 
inquiry does not conduct an assessment of the conduct in this initial step of establishing the existence of 
separate undertakings, which only becomes possible if it is established that there are separate undertakings. 
This is in contrast to the U.S. position, which puts the emphasis on the capacity to conspire, which necessitates 
an assessment of the conduct in terms of whether it can be deemed as an instance of such conspiracy.   
346
 See supra text around note 317. The proposition supported in this section is also in line with the common 
law principles of agency under which the principal should not have to anticipate that an agent might wish to 
act for parties with opposed interests in the same transaction; Bowstead and Reynolds, supra note 32, ¶ 6-015.  
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intermediary are exclusive.347 This is how the GC interpreted Suiker Unie, which the GC 
took to mean that there is unlikely to be a single economic entity if, at the same time as it 
conducts business for the account of its principal, the agent undertakes, as an independent 
dealer, ³a very considerable amount of business for its own account on the market for the 
product or service in question´.348 However, taken in consideration alongside agency law, 
the conflict in such a situation is better explained as an issue of commercial adversity or lack 
of competitive neutrality rather than that of exclusivity, because it is not so much about 
whether the agent acts exclusively for one principal or not that determines the crux of the 
potential conflict of interest. It is whether the agent itself is in a commercially adverse 
position (and thus not in a competitively neutral position) with regard to the principal 
irrespective of how many principals it acts for that creates a conflict of interest. In other 
words, the conflict of interest in such a scenario would continue to exist even if the agent 
acted exclusively for one principal, but at the same time also conducted business for its own 
account and its own benefit on the same, relevant market in competition with the principal. 
Thus, it is the financial and commercial risk that the intermediary undertakes on the relevant 
market, whereby it puts itself in a position in which it can influence competition on that 
market and compete with its principal, that (should) prevent(s) it from being an agent. In 
that context, whether it acts exclusively for one principal or not is neither here nor there, and 
thus, irrelevant. 
Application of the criterion of competitive neutrality to the platforms studied in this 
article ZRXOG UXOHRXW$PD]RQ¶VEHLQJDQDJHQW of suppliers on Amazon Marketplace in 
cases where Amazon, the retailer, competes with the third-party sellers on Amazon 
Marketplace, selling its own products in the same, relevant market.349 The criterion of 
competitive QHXWUDOLW\ZRXOGDOVRUXOHRXW$SSOH¶VSRVLWLRQDVDQDJHQWLQUHODWLRQWRWKH$SS
Store to the extent that Apple competes with app developers through the provision of Apple 
apps in competition with third-party developer apps in the same, relevant market. All of the 
other platforms ± and Amazon Marketplace and Apple App Store to the extent that they do 
not compete with their suppliers on the relevant market ± would continue to qualify as agents 
given their operations at the time writing.350 This is because currently, none of the other 
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platforms (Uber, eBay, Airbnb, Booking.com) are active on the relevant product/services 
market where they facilitate transactions between suppliers and customers: Uber does not 
operate its own vehicles to provide rides in competition with drivers supplying their services 
on the platform; eBay does not have a retail arm selling its own products on eBay; Airbnb 
does not own flats that it rents out in competition with the landlords supplying their own 
accommodation on the platform; and Booking.com does not own any hotels where it rents 
out rooms in competition with its hotel partners, etc.351 In the same vein, Amazon 
Marketplace and Apple App Store do not compete with their suppliers in relation to all the 
products/apps that they facilitate the sale/licensing of on their platforms. Thus, in 
transactions facilitated on these platforms between a supplier and a customer, where the 
platform is not a competitor on the relevant market, these platforms act as one with their 
suppliers in relation to those transactions with third parties, and should continue to be 
covered as agents under the single economic entity doctrine. Where the platform is a 
competitor on the relevant market to the supplier for whom it also facilitates transactions on 
the same relevant market, the agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine should 
not apply, and any restrictions of competition on the relevant market found in agreements 
between such platforms and their suppliers should be subject to the full application of the 
prohibition in Article 101.352 
A relevant question here is whether this concept of competitive neutrality should be 
limited to actual competition between the platform and the supplier, or, whether potential 
competition between them is also sufficient to establish the absence of competitive 
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neutrality. This author would argue that the relevant competition is that of actual 
competition, and not that of potential competition between the platform and the supplier. 
This is because at the stage of establishing whether two entities are part of a single economic 
entity and whether their agreement falls within the scope of the prohibition of 
anticompetitive agreements, one should not need to assess potential competition between 
them, which would involve second-guessing the future business conduct of the entities in 
question. Such prospective assessments are normally reserved for assessment of conduct 
(e.g. in merger control cases) and an application of the single economic entity doctrine is 
more aptly conducted on a factual basis at the time of the assessment in relation to the entities 
as they stand.353 Further, in cases where the platform is not actually in competition with the 
suppliers on the platform, there is no reason why the platform should not continue to count 
as an agent unless and until it starts competing with the suppliers because it is only then that 
there will be a relevant conflict of commercial interests between the platform and (only) the 
suppliers with whom the platform competes. The limited, relevant EU Commission 
decisional practice on agency (none of which concerned platforms) also suggests that a case-
by-case assessment of actual competition is what is required. 
In Eirpage, the Commission held that ³if one day´ agents start competing with their 
principals (i.e. they start offering the same services for which they are agents in direct 
competition with the principals), they could no longer act as agents.354 In another case, 
namely, ARG/Unipart, the Commission found the same entity (Unipart) to be an agent 
bearing no entrepreneurial risk when the entity promoted the sales of the ³principal´ (Austin 
Rover Group) for account of the latter and in consideration of a commission from the latter, 
but to be an independent undertaking when it came to activities regarding which each bore 
its own entrepreneurial risk.355 In this case, the two undertakings in question were in 
competition with one another for the provision of certain spare parts, and Unipart was selling 
5RYHU¶V parts for certain other spare others (for which it was the agent). Concerning the 
activities of the latter type, the Commission found that Article 101 was not applicable 
because the ³agent´ bore no entrepreneurial risk.356 In contrast, the obligations imposed on 
Unipart in relation to spare parts other than those Rover branded parts fell under the scope 
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of Article 101 because for those activities, each entity bore its own entrepreneurial risk and 
WKHREOLJDWLRQVUHVWULFWHGWKHVHSDUDWHHQWLWLHV¶³scope for competition´.357 This is notably 
similar to the position of Amazon on Amazon Marketplace where Amazon, the retailer, may 
or may not compete with third-party suppliers depending on the relevant product range. The 
same goes for Apple in relation to App Store where Apple, the app developer, may or may 
not compete with independent app developers depending on the relevant apps. Thus, where 
platforms do actually compete with their suppliers on the relevant market, they should not 
count as agents, but they should continue to count as agents on relevant markets where they 
do not actually compete with their suppliers at the time of the competition law assessment. 
In individual cases, the concept of competitive neutrality may require an initial 
assessment of the nature of the platform business in relation to the business of the suppliers, 
so as to establish whether the platform is in competition with the supplier. In fact, to some 
degree, the question of agency is closely related to the definition of the relevant market and 
the activity in question in which the intermediary is engaged because this determines 
whether the agent is in a vertical relation to the supplier in the production chain, as discussed 
above.358 The positioning of the platform and the agent in this vertical chain is also relevant 
to establishing who buys/receives what from whom. This becomes particularly important, 
inter alia, to determine standing to sue in private damages actions in jurisdictions such as 
the US. For example, if the activity of an intermediary in question is defined as ³distribution 
services to suppliers´ (as opposed to the provision of the supplied products to consumers) 
as was the position in Campos, then it follows that the intermediary is more likely to be an 
agent than not.359 In Campos, Ticketmaster (a ticketing service company) had long-term 
exclusive contracts with almost every promoter of concerts in the US.360 The legal issue was 
whether consumers, who purchased tickets from Ticketmaster, which distributed the tickets 
at outlets, over the phone, at the venue, etc. to consumers and charged consumers a fee for 
its distribution services, had standing to sue Ticketmaster as ³direct purchasers´ for inflated, 
supracompetitive fees.361 The consumers argued that they are the direct purchasers of the 
ticket distribution services because they pay the service fees directly to Ticketmaster.362 The 
US Court of Appeals disagreed and found that, despite such billing practices, consumers 
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were not direct purchasers because the ticket delivery services were an input in the product 
that the venues sold to the public, which the venues were unable to obtain in a competitive 
PDUNHW PDNLQJ WKH FRQVXPHUV¶ GHDOLQJV ZLWK 7LFNHWPDVWHU ³derivative´ and thus, 
indirect.363 Namely, it was the venues and promoters to whom Ticketmaster provided a 
service, DQGWKH\FRQVXPHG7LFNHWPDVWHU¶VVHUYLFHZKLFKZDVWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWLFNHWVWR
consumers. This points out that in relation to the product provided to consumers (i.e. third 
parties) on the ³relevant market´, Ticketmaster had no relevant operations because it 
provided distribution services to the venues (not to consumers) and any tickets that it sold 
to consumers, it sold them on behalf of the venues as their agent. This is because the relevant 
market in relation to consumers concerned tickets (i.e. consumers were ³consuming´ tickets, 
not ticket distribution services), and on that relevant market, Ticketmaster was only acting 
as the agent of the event promoters.364 The same legal issue of establishing who sells what 
to whom also lay at the heart of Apple (iPhone), which the US Supreme Court decided to be 
one of Apple¶V selling apps as a ³retailer´ to iPhone owners, strikingly without discussing 
the issue of agency or Campos at all.365 In its approach, the Supreme Court did not adopt the 
position of the amicus curiae brief for the United States, which had characterised Apple as 
providing distribution services that were DQHFHVVDU\LQSXWIRUDSSGHYHORSHUV¶VDOHVRIWKHLU
apps to customers and that were provided directly to app developers in line with Campos, 
with the consequence that consumers could not sue Apple as indirect purchasers of that 
service.366 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶Vcharacterisation of Apple as a ³retailer´ in an arrangement 
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where the subject matter of contracts is licensing of software (which technically excludes 
any possibility of ³resale´ as Apple does not and cannot ³buy´ a licence from app developers 
to ³resell´ the licence to consumers) and where the price of the product in question is not set 
by the ³retailer´ muddles the established conceptual distinctions between different 
commercial distribution models including retail and agency. In effect, it guts agency as a 
business model by equating it to retail, a distribution model which operates on completely 
different terms in relation to ownership, commercial risk, etc.367 In not recognising the 
possibility that Apple acts as the agent of the app developers to whom it provides a service 
on the relevant market in relation to app sales to consumers (rather than selling the apps as 
a ³retailer´ on its own behalf), the Supreme Court essentially throws into question the 
operating business model of all of the platforms studied in this work and of any other 
platforms which operate on similar business models.368  
The characterisation of the relevant market and the evaluation of who provides what 
to whom in the context of platform is, indeed, a thorny legal issue that has led to questionable 
approaches by different authorities around the world. For example, in Flight Centre, the 
Australian High Court adopted a somewhat puzzling interpretation of the arrangement in 
place. In this case, Flight Centre ± a travel agent operating through shops, call centres and 
the internet ± sold tickets on behalf of airlines and in line with airlines¶ tariffs, conditions of 
carriage and instruction.369 The agent could not vary or modify any terms and conditions, 
but it could sell tickets to consumers at the price which it determined.370 With each sale, 
Flight Centre created a contractual relationship between the customer and the airline.371 The 
agent had no proprietary rights to tickets and was remunerated by ³at-source´ commission 
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for each ticket sold.372 The commission was a percentage of the published fare, which was 
a fare fixed by the airline for the relevant seat on the relevant flight.373 If Flight Centre sold 
a ticket above this fare, it would keep the difference between the published fare and the 
actual fare as well as the commission.374 Flight Centre was free under the agency agreement 
to sell or not to sell an international airline ticket of any airline and to sell any ticket to any 
customer at any price.375 Thus, Flight Centre was operating under an agency model for 
competing principals (i.e. airlines) and had some pricing freedom in relation to the fares. 
The substantial question in the appeal was whether Flight Centre was in competition 
with three airlines when it attempted to induce each airline to agree not to discount the price 
at which that airline offered international airline tickets directly to customers.376 The 
majority opinion held that the critical question of whether Flight Centre competed with the 
airlines depended on two considerations: namely, that Flight Centre could not only decide 
WRVHOORUQRWVHOODQDLUOLQH¶Vtickets, and also to set its own price for the tickets; and second, 
that Flight Centre was not constrained in its authority to prefer its own interests over those 
of the airlines.377 The latter point is clearly, directly relevant to the inquiry of ³competitive 
neutrality´ as discussed in this Section. The High Court remarked that ³[w]hen Flight Centre 
sold an international airline ticket to a customer, the airline whose ticket was sold did not´.378 
Chief Justice French, dissenting, noted that ³[t]he proposition that an agent and a principal, 
both selling the services of the principal, compete with each other in a market for the sale of 
those services does not command ready assent´.379 Making reference to the EU doctrine of 
single economic entity, Chief Justice French WRRNLVVXHZLWKWKHPDMRULW\¶VILQGLQJWKDWDQ
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agent and the principal can be in competition with one another irrespective of whether the 
agent is an integral part of the other entity or not (although such a finding would indeed be 
sufficient for that conclusion).380 Thus, whereas the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission found that the agency relationship between Flight Centre and the airlines did 
not defeat the proposition that Flight Centre supplied a service to consumers in competition 
with the airlines, Chief Justice French concluded that what Flight Centre did in selling a 
ticket was properly regarded as the action of the airline itself.381 According to Chief Justice 
French¶Vdissenting opinion, there is ³no µmarket¶ for the supply of the tickets of a particular 
carrier´ and Flight Centre was not in competition with the airlines for which it sold tickets 
in any relevant market.382 In contrast, Justices Kiefel and Gageler opined that Flight Centre 
was in competition with each airline in a market for the supply, to customers, of contractual 
rights to international air carriage.383 They found that this was the case despite Flight 
Centre¶V supplying in that market as agent for each airline.384 Justice Nettle examined the 
issue of competition from the perspective of the consumer and found that an airline ticket 
sold by Flight Centre on behalf of an airline would, in most respects, be identical to an airline 
ticket sold by the airline, which connotes high degree of substitutability, and therefore, 
competition between tickets sold by the airline and the agent.385 
With all respect to the majority in Flight Centre, it is difficult to see how ³[w]hen 
Flight Centre sold an international airline ticket to a customer, the airline whose ticket was 
sold did not´.386 This is literally counterfactual because every time Flight Centre sold an 
international airline ticket to a customer, a ticket of that airline was sold: the airline did sell 
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a ticket, just not through its proprietary sales channels. The ³high degree of substitutability´ 
between the tickets sold by Flight Centre and the airlines results from the fact that they are 
identical, and one and the same thing. More importantly, what the majority may have 
confused is the difference between (i) a principal and an agent who have a conflict of 
commercial interest and are not in a competitively neutral position (i.e. they compete with 
one another on the same, relevant market) where they are both selling the same (or 
competing) products, and the agent has a choice to make a sale either on her own behalf and 
for her own profit, or on behalf of the principal and for WKHSULQFLSDO¶VSURILWDQGLLDQ
agent and a principal both of whom are selling only the product of the principal, where the 
benefit of the transaction to the principal differs depending on who made the sale because 
the direct sales channel is less costly to the principal (i.e. the principal makes a greater profit 
if he sells the product directly, due to not paying any commission to the agent). 
Commercially, option (ii) still involves the principal making a profitable sale irrespective of 
whether the sale was concluded by the agent on his behalf or by the principal himself. In the 
context of a particular sale of a particular ticket of a particular airline, the commercial 
interests of Flight Centre and the airline are still aligned: they both make a profit when the 
sale takes place. In contrast, option (i) involves a situation where, indeed, when the agent 
sells for her RZQEHQHILWDSURGXFWWKDWFRPSHWHVZLWKWKHSULQFLSDO¶VWKHSULQFLSDOORVHVWKH
opportunity to enter into that profitable transaction and, therefore, incurs the opportunity 
cost of that profitable transaction. Although it is clear that in option (i) the two entities are 
in competition with one another because either one or the other realises the gains from trade, 
in option (ii) given that the item being sold is literally the same and only the method of sale 
differs (and the issue is that of distribution of profits between the principal and the agent), it 
is difficult to argue that the principal and the agent are in competition with another for the 
sale of the very same thing. The only scope of unconstrained ³authority to prefer its own 
interests over those of the airlines´ that Flight Centre might have had relates to its own 
interests in relation to its agency business; it cannot have preferred its own interests over 
those of the airlines in the sale of airline tickets since Flight Centre does not operate its own 
airline. In relation to the platforms studied in this article, Flight Centre is commercially in a 
very different situation to, for example, Amazon Marketplace where Amazon, the retailer, 
and third-party sellers may compete with one another to sell the same/competing products 
to the same group of customers. This author would, therefore, agree with the dissenting 
opinion in Flight Centre in finding that Flight Centre was an agent of the airlines and not in 
competition with them. Applying the findings and normative suggestions of the current 
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article, this position of ³competitive neutrality´ would have required the application of the 
agency rule under the single economic entity doctrine in the EU with the outcome that 
restrictions of competition in the separate vertical agreements between Flight Centre and 
individual airlines concerning ultimately the pricing of the product on the relevant market 
would not be scrutinised under Article 101.387 This is because in relation to the product sold 
to third parties on the relevant market (i.e. airline tickets), Flight Centre was in a 
competitively neutral position with its principals and their interests were aligned in aiming 
to make a sale. Indeed, in some of the US cases examined in Flight Centre, US courts also 
found that similarly situated travel agents were agents of the airlines, which the majority of 
the Australian High Court clearly did not follow despite considering them as potential 
precedents.388  
What Apple (iPhone), Flight Centre and Campos demonstrate is that it is important 
to identify the nature of the platform business in relation to the business of the supplier when 
determining the competitive positioning of the platform and supplier with regard to one 
another and the relevant market on which they may be competing. Under the concept of 
³competitive neutrality´ developed in this article, the competitive position that has to be 
neutral relates to competition on the relevant market concerning the products/services 
provided to third parties, and, not competition on the market concerning, for example, the 
agency services of the platform, which it provides to the suppliers, in competition with, for 
example, other platforms. In the case of Flight Centre, therefore, the relevant market would 
have been that of air travel tickets and not airline ticket distribution services in deciding 
whether Flight Centre was part of the same undertaking as an airline in relation to airline 
ticket sales to consumers. In the case of Campos, the relevant market would have been that 
of event tickets (rather than that of distribution services), which was the product provided to 
                                            
387
 This is to be contrasted with a scenario where Flight Centre tries to facilitate collusion between airlines in 
coordinating the applicable price reductions. In that case, where Flight Centre essentially would be attempting 
to orchestrate a horizontal restriction of competition between airlines in getting them to agree not to discount 
in concert, the conduct in question would no longer be the vertical arrangement between a given airline and 
Flight Centre which can benefit from the single economic entity doctrine, but a horizontal restriction of 
FRPSHWLWLRQZKLFKIDOOVRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIWKHVLQJOHHFRQRPLFHQWLW\GRFWULQHDQGWKLVDUWLFOH¶Vinquiry. See 
supra text to note 184 in relation to facilitation of collusion. 
388
 For example, in Illinois Corporate Travel, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that a travel agent was an agent 
RIDQDLUOLQHDVGLVWLQFWIURPDUHVHOOHURIWKHDLUOLQH¶VWLFNHWVDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHDLUOLQH¶VSURKLELWLRQRI
DJHQW¶VGLVFRXQWVWRFRQVXPHUVZDVnot caught by the per se prohibition of price fixing); Illinois Corporate 
Travel, Inc., Mctravel Travelservices v. American Airlines, 806 F2d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1986). See also 
American Airlines, supra note 317. In American Airlines, supra note 317, 752, the U.S. Court of Appeals did 
not accept the existence of two separate markets for air travel (one for the transportation and one for the 
ticketing service) on very similar facts to Flight Centre, supra note 13, in holding that the relationship between 
travel agent and an airline was one of genuine agency. 
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consumers by Ticketmaster. In the context of Apple (iPhone), the relevant market would be 
that of apps rather than app distribution services, regarding which competitive neutrality 
would be assessed. 
In sum, despite no explicit acknowledgement to this effect in any area of law studied, 
the concepts of agency in different areas of law including competition law are built on a 
remarkably similar foundation, namely that of alignment of commercial interests which 
implies a position of competitive neutrality between the principal and the agent. Although 
in the vast majority of the platforms studied, there is, indeed, such alignment of commercial 
interests and competitive neutrality between the platform and the supplier in relation to 
transactions facilitated on the relevant market, there are also important instances where this 
does not hold. In such circumstances where the commercial interests of the platform and 
supplier are no longer aligned because the platform is not in a competitively neutral position 
in relation to its supplier on the relevant market for the products/services supplied to third 
parties, this article proposes a (re)interpretation of the single economic entity doctrine so 
that such platforms do not benefit from the agency rule to the extent that their agreements 
contain restrictions of competition on the relevant market. This section has demonstrated 
that such a (re)interpretation is necessary and justified on the basis of the principles 
underlying agency in different areas of the law studied, as well as the single economic entity 
doctrine in competition law. 
VII. Conclusion 
This article explored two related questions regarding the legal characterisation of 
platforms that facilitate transactions: first, whether they are agents of the suppliers for whom 
they facilitate transactions with third parties; and, second, whether competition law should 
apply to their agreements with their suppliers that contain clauses, which restrict competition 
on the relevant market concerning the products/services provided to third parties. The article 
found, after studying concepts of agency in different areas of law including competition law, 
and the relevant terms and conditions of six different platforms ± Uber, Amazon 
Marketplace, eBay, Booking.com, Apple App Store, Airbnb ± that these platforms are, as a 
matter of positive law, on balance, agents of their suppliers. The implication of this finding 
in EU competition law and in any competition law modelled on that of the EU is that 
agreements between these platforms and their suppliers which contain restrictions of 
competition on the relevant market cannot be scrutinised under the prohibition of 
anticompetitive agreements due to the ³single economic entity´ doctrine. The doctrine treats 
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agreements between agents and their principals as taking place within one and the same 
undertaking, which renders Article 101 inapplicable following the requirement that the 
agreement takes place between separate undertakings for the provision to be applicable. 
This implies that terms which restrict competition on the relevant market by, for example, 
fixing prices or restricting output, cannot be scrutinised as anticompetitive agreements. 
Thus, there is a potentially significant ³platform gap´ in the application of competition law 
to agreements between platforms and suppliers. Establishing that platforms are agents of 
their suppliers as the law currently stands and the existence of the consequent gap in the 
scope of competition law application to platform agreements is the first contribution of this 
article. 
The finding of agency as regards the relation between platforms and suppliers is in 
line with the operation of agency as a delegation model established in different areas of law, 
despite this not having been recognised as such in the competition law jurisprudence, soft 
law or commentary. This article has demonstrated that, in fact, the underlying principles of 
the agency relationship are more or less the same in all the areas of law studied including 
EU competition law. This is important because it means that where competition law has not 
established general principles determining whether a given business arrangement between 
two parties is one of agency, it can make use of the relevant principles established in these 
other areas of law. The similarity of the fundamental principles of agency across different 
areas of law is also important because it makes it possible to adopt a common legal 
characterisation of platforms, which would align with the concepts of agency in different 
areas of law, all of which may be applicable to the practices of the same platforms in 
different disputes.  
7KHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHJDSLQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZWRSODWIRUPV¶
agreements with their suppliers leads to a subsequent question, which this article has 
explored. Given the ubiquity of the platform model and the growing importance of e-
commerce in the digital economy, the immunisation of potentially substantial restrictions of 
competition from scrutiny by competition law requires a normative assessment of whether 
the identified ³platform gap´ should be filled, and if so, how. In this normative aspect, the 
article has found that the gap should be filled, but only in relation to one type of platform 
arrangement: where the platform in question not only facilitates transactions on behalf of its 
suppliers, but also competes with those suppliers on the relevant market where the 
products/services of the suppliers are sold/provided to third parties. This is because all of 
the areas of law studied place great emphasis on the alignment of commercial interests 
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between an agent and its principal, and such alignment lies at the heart of an agency 
arrangement where the duties and the interests of the agent are expected not to be in conflict 
as a result of the fiduciary nature of the relationship. As competition law currently does not 
explicitly recognise this factor in its assessment of agency relations, but relies on risk-taking, 
which this article has identified to be a factor that implicitly requires a position of 
competitive alignment between the agent and the principal, the article has developed a 
concept of ³competitive neutrality´ to inform a (re)interpretation of the agency rule under 
the single economic entity doctrine. This concept of ³competitive neutrality´ aligns the 
competition law assessment of agency with the assessment of agency found in different areas 
of law, and facilitates a general, principled understanding of agency under the single 
economic entity doctrine, and in particular its application to platforms, which currently does 
not exist. In the context of platforms, the concept of ³competitive neutrality´ reflects the fact 
that platforms are normally in a vertical relation to their suppliers in the production chain 
where they provide a service as an input for WKHVXSSOLHUV¶EXVLQHVVIRUH[DPSOHLQWKHIRUP
of a distribution or sales channel. Where the competitive positioning between the platform 
and suppliers turns into a horizontal relationship because the platform starts competing with 
its suppliers for whom it simultaneously acts for as an agent, this goes fundamentally against 
the existence of a position of agency. In such circumstances, by participating in the relevant 
market as an economic actor in its own right, the intermediary also takes risks and places 
itself in a position in which it can affect competition on the market. Thus, where 
³competitive neutrality´ is replaced with ³competitive rivalry´ between the platform and the 
suppliers on the relevant market, it is not possible to justify why the platform and suppliers 
should count as one and the same entity on the relevant market in relation to contracts 
negotiated/concluded with third parties. Consequently, this article proposed a 
(re)interpretation of the single economic entity doctrine so that the agency rule does not 
apply to platforms that not only facilitate transactions for their suppliers, but also compete 
with their suppliers on the relevant market. In the context of the rules applicable in the EU, 
the article has proposed a revision of the EU Verticals Block Exemption Regulation and/or 
the accompanying Guidelines to include a provision to the effect that vertical agreements 
between platforms and suppliers, which contain restrictions of competition on the relevant 
market for the products/services provided to third parties cannot benefit from the agency 
rule under the single economic entity doctrine, to the extent that the platform competes with 
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the suppliers on that market.389 Such a clausHFDQUHDGDVIROORZV³an agency agreement 
will fall within the scope of Article 101(1), even if the principal bears all the relevant 
financial and commercial risks, where the agreement is between a platform and a supplier, 
and the platform competes with the supplier on the relevant market in relation to the 
products/services sold/SURYLGHGWRWKLUGSDUWLHVWKURXJKWKHLQWHUPHGLDWLRQRIWKHSODWIRUP´ 
The findings of this article are important for the correct legal treatment of platforms 
in different areas of law and in different jurisdictions, not least because of the growing 
importance of e-commerce in the economy and the widespread adoption of the platform 
model. As demonstrated throughout the paper, different jurisdictions and different areas of 
law within the same jurisdiction (e.g. commercial, employment, tax, competition laws) are 
already approaching the same legal question of how to legally characterise what a platform 
is in significantly different ways. This is unfortunate because it can lead to legal and business 
uncertainty to the detriment of economic growth and technological development. It can also 
lead to undesirable fragmentation in the legal treatment of different businesses that despite 
operating in different business sectors adopt essentially the same model of operation, as 
demonstrated by the similarity of the contracts of the platforms studied in this article. The 
similarity of the standard contracts also demonstrates that agency is the business model of 
platforms across the board and is not a type of arrangement adopted by some platforms to 
conceal their real operation method. Acknowledging this would go a long way in ensuring 
that the law does not penalise legitimately adopted business models in treating them as if 
they were fundamentall\ GLIIHUHQW DUUDQJHPHQWV ,W ZRXOG DOVR HQVXUH WKDW WKH ODZ¶V
treatment of potentially anticompetitive outcomes does not depend on the form of the 
business model adopted by a given undertaking because it is only after accepting the 
arrangement for what it is, the law can respond effectively to the effects of the undesirable 
aspects of that arrangement.390 Where technology and the use of technology develop at 
speeds with which the legal system cannot keep up, there is a danger that the law will either 
become irrelevant or an impediment to the commercial use of technology that can benefit 
society. The current article has demonstrated in the context of some of the most popular 
platforms that that danger is real when it comes to the legal characterisation of platforms 
and the implications thereof for competition law. This requires speedy adaptation of some 
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 VBER, supra note 11 and Verticals Guidelines, supra note 31. 
390
 This is most interestingly demonstrated by the majority and the Dissenting Opinion in Apple(iPhone) (SC), 
supra note 27, both of which use practically the same facts from a hypothetical business arrangement to argue 
WKDWDJUHHLQJZLWKWKHRWKHURSLQLRQ¶VDVVHVVPHQWZRXOGEHSXWWLQJIRUPRYHUVXEVWDQFHsee, id., at 8-9 and 
Gorsuch, J. at 8-9.  
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of the existing concepts and rules of competition law, such as the single economic entity 
doctrine and the agency rule thereunder, regarding which this article has set forth a means 
for (re)interpretation. 
